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The celebration of the 200th birthday of the courts of the District of Columbia
offers an opportunity to focus on the diversification and proliferation of the federal
institutions of judging. During the twentieth century, the federal courts and Con-
gress worked together to create a host of statutory federal judges, including magis-
trate and bankruptcy judges who serve through appointments from Article III judges,
as well as administrative law judges and hearing officers working within agencies.
In addition to inventing this array of judicial officers, the federal judiciary also
redefined the work of judging to include efforts to settle cases and to influence
congressional deployment and allocation ofjurisdiction.
The innovations have many sources. One is doctrinal. The authority of statutory judges
stems from a rereading ofArticle III to license a great deal offederal adjudication without
Article Ill's structural protections. As litigants challenged the devolution ofjudicial power
their claims became an occasion to explore the import of judicial independence. In
general, the life-tenured judiciary permitted (and sometimes welcomed) congressional
generation of many adjudicative forms, seen not to pose a threat to "Article III values."
The doctrine in turn was crafted in the face of pressures f-om an expanding federal
docket that required some form of change. The particular programs chosen were based in
part on perceptions of the lessening utility of adjudicatory methods, in part on a sense of
varying levels of import of cases within the federal docket, and in part on incentives
created by legal rules and practices. For example, magistrate judgeships were particularly
useful for the Article III judiciary, which gained the power to create slots without the need
to obtain specific lines from Congress. As of 2000, the number of non-life-tenured judge-
ships within Article III was roughly equal to the number of life-tenured trial judgeships.
Moreover, in some twenty federal districts, the number of magistrate judges equaled or
exceeded that of district judges.
What are the effects of such innovations on the constitutional commitment to, and the
prudential belief in, judicial independence? In addition to focusing on the import of
contemporary doctrine, Professor Resnik examines the relatively new practices of the
appointment and reappointment ofjudges by judges. After showing the degree to which the
life-tenured judiciary is dependent on, and its fortunes are linked with, its non-life-tenured
siblings, Professor Resnik argues that Article III judges ought to learn to relax their own
status privileges and attempt, self-consciously, to blur distinctions among kinds of judges
so as to broaden the embrace of Article III. "Article III values" are, in her view, at stake,
and their preservation requires life-tenured judges to attempt to infuse these values into all
aspects offederal judging.
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I. THE LuxuRiES OF REFLECTION
In the year 2001, we paused to mark a court system's 200th birthday.' For my
contribution to this Symposium honoring the courts of the District of Columbia,
I provide a narrative that interweaves transformations occurring within the
federal judiciary nationwide with those occurring in the District. As becomes
vivid with the luxury of hindsight, during the twentieth century, the who, what,
and where of federal judging have changed dramatically.
The federal judiciary, and specifically judges of the D.C. courts, played a
central role in the production of thousands of new trial-level judges, some with
life tenure and some without, but all holding part of the federal power of
judgment. Life-tenured judges now have the task of appointing hundreds of
other "federal judges"-magistrate and bankruptcy judges who serve for fixed
and renewable statutory terms. Moreover, today federal judging occurs not only
in Article III courthouses but in office buildings belonging to agencies.
1. Landmarks are often invoked when the topic is judging. Our common law counterparts in
England, Australia, and Canada focus on the English Parliament's Act of Settlement of 1701 as
establishing judicial independence. See David Lemmings, The Independence of the Judiciary in
Eighteenth-Century England, in THE LIFE OF THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TENTH BRITISH LEGAL
HISTORY CONFERENCE, OXFORD, 1991, at 125 (Peter Birks ed., 1993) (discussing the 1701 Act, which
provided a form of judicial independence by authorizing judges to serve during good behavior rather
than at the pleasure of the King and by creating a system for removal of judges that required an address
of both houses of Parliament). Lemmings argued that the system inspired judges to court the pleasure of
members of Parliament and hence to become politically active. Id. at 129. The judiciary and the Legal
Historical Society of British Columbia marked the importance of that Act in Vancouver, Canada, May
9-11, 2001. See 1701 Conference: The 300th Anniversary of the Act of Settlement, http://
www.courts.gov.bc.ca/1701 (last visited Jan. 16, 2002).
In the United States, Article II of the United States Constitution is understood as committing this
polity to independent judges. Soon thereafter, in 1801, another artifact of that Constitution-the federal
Congress--created the courts of the District of Columbia. See Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 3, 2 Stat.
103, 105 (authorizing a circuit court staffed by a chief judge and two assistant judges charged with
exercising both federal and local jurisdiction); id. §§ 11-12, 2 Stat. at 107 (providing for the Orphans'
Court and for justices of the peace). See generally William Henry Dennis, Orphans' Court and Register
of Wills, District of Columbia, in 3 RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 219 (1900). A century
later, their jurisdiction became the predicate for the District's Municipal Court, which, as of 1921,
became a court of record. See Act of Feb. 17, 1909, ch. 134, 35 Stat. 623; Act of Mar. 3, 1921, 41 Stat.
1310 (providing for jurisdiction up to $1000 and for jury trials).
In 1802, the District Court for the District of Columbia, comparable in many respects to other United
States District Courts, was created. See Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 31, § 24, 2 Stat. 156, 166; see also F.
Regis Noel, Some Notable Suits in the Early District Courts, in 24 RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA
HISTORICAL SoctErY 67 (1922) (discussing aspects of the docket in the first century).
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During the twentieth century, Congress increased the work for this array of
judges through the creation of new causes of action. In addition, the docket
diversified through changing understandings of the rights of individuals against
government and of the desirability of grouping claims together in aggregates
such as class actions and multidistrict litigation. Judges themselves enlarged the
scope of their work to include promotion of settlement to litigants, instruction to
other judges about how to judge, and advice to Congress about which disputes
ought to be brought before the life-tenured judiciary.
An issue for the twenty-first century is what to do with this variety of federal
judges, in courts or in agencies and with or without life tenure, now engaged in
what some call "multi-tasking." Decisions need to and will be made about
whether to array these judges on a hierarchy so as to underscore the distinctive-
ness of their functions or, in contrast, to link them into a more homogenized set
of juridical actors so as to reflect their commonalities. As in the past, many such
decisions will be made in a hodgepodge fashion, responsive to a given problem
and reflective of a particular political moment. But realpolitik should not deter
us from reflection on what is at stake.
Underlying these choices is a tension between some of the contemporary
roles of judges and societal aspirations of independence for federal judges. The
retrospective that I offer demonstrates that Article III-the landmark of judicial
independence in the United States-is decreasingly relevant to many first-tier
federal judges. Questions thus emerge about the relationship between indepen-
dence, role specificity, and judging. I am less sanguine than some that, a
hundred years from now, values of independence of judgment and of procedural
regularity will still apply to actors named "judges."
Under this account, threats to the coherence of judging and therefore to the
independence of the judiciary do not come only from high-profile politicized
battles targeting particular judges or specific struggles with Congress over
jurisdictional boundaries. Rather, challenges to judicial independence also stem
from low-level administrative decisions and from doctrinal reinterpretations of
the transferability of aspects of federal adjudication to actors outside of Article
III who lack structural independence. The life-tenured judiciary is itself a
central actor in this tale, as it has promoted the blurring of judicial roles
between Article III judges and non-Article III judges, between adjudication and
dispute resolution, between public and private dispute resolution, and between
the work of the judiciary as a distinctive branch and the activities of other
federal agencies.
Therefore, a review of the twentieth century of federal judging needs to be
celebratory but not sanguine. Appreciation is due to the many reformers for the
invention of new forms of judging and of new layers of high-quality adjudica-
tors. The history of the evolution of trial courts in both the District of Columbia
and the nation demonstrates a creativity that has greatly increased judicial
numbers and capacity. Yet such diversification also brings new problems. By
taking on the tasks of settling rather than adjudicating disputes, of superintend-
[Vol. 90:607
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ing the appointment, reappointment, and promotion of other judges, and of
advocating specific programs and agendas, the Article III judiciary has weak-
ened its claim to a unique and peculiar mandate. Understanding the inventions
of the twentieth century therefore prompts questions about what efforts in the
twenty-first century are needed to shape a concept of a judicial role that will, a
hundred years hence, cohere.2
In Part II, below, I detail the twentieth-century devolution of judging from
life-tenured to non-life-tenured judges. Entailed in this transition was the reallo-
cation of judicial tasks as case law reconceived the meaning of Article III.
Thereafter, in Part III, I place these developments in the context of other aspects
of constitutional transformation, enabling national expansion of both the legisla-
tive and executive branches. Part IV turns to explore the pressures to make such
shifts within the judicial branch. I outline the alterations in the docket, both in
terms of the volume of cases and the kind. New causes of action became
available against the government, thereby prompting thousands of small claims,
while procedural reforms enabled the aggregation of thousands of cases into
large-scale litigations. Part V examines how, partly in response, at both the
micro and at the macro levels, the federal judiciary reorganized its own work.
The job of trial judge was reconfigured to embrace management and mediation.
In parallel fashion, the role of the Article III judiciary broadened with the
development of a corporate structure, permitting self-administration and the
capacity to forward agendas in Congress.
The conclusion, in Part VI, evaluates some of the consequences of the
changes by offering competing assessments of the effect of non-life-tenured
judges on the idea of judicial independence. One possibility is to embrace the
doctrinal toleration of the irrelevance of Article III to a great deal of federal
judging. I prefer the alternative, calling for constitutional and prudential interpre-
tations requiring the concept of structural independence to travel with the power
to judge. What is needed is the elaboration of a gestalt of judging for the
sub-Article III judges that takes seriously how important their decisionmaking
has become. Thus, I explore how to buffer against the twentieth-century reforms
that have, cumulatively, reduced the degree to which Article III protects individu-
als holding the power of federal adjudication and reduced the degree to which
the term "judge" specifies a set of obligations and tasks. Specifically, I focus on
how placing judges in the position of employing other judges and on a career
ladder affects the independence of those at both lower and higher rungs. I
propose means by which to distinguish judges from other government actors
and yet to homogenize the kinds of judges so as to make true the constitutional
"boast" of an independent judiciary. 3
2. These issues have special relevance to this Symposium dedicated to the courts of the District of
Columbia, as the judges and lawyers from the District were leaders in generating the array of judicial
actors and activities that have now become commonplace.
3. This is a variation on a phrase from a dissent by William 0. Douglas in Palmore v. United States,
411 U.S. 389, 412 (1973), discussed infra Part VI.
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II. A RANGE OF FEDERAL JUDGES IN A VARIETY OF SETINGS
A. MODIFYING THE WORD "JUDGE" AND SWELLING THE RANKS
In most discussions of the federal judiciary, the assumption is that pursuant to
Article III, all federal judges have life tenure and protected salaries. A widely
shared correlate is that the model provided by Article III is the best expression
of what judicial independence does and should mean.
In 1901, the equation of federal judge with Article III would have been
accurate.4 But in 2001, it is a mistake to assume that the federal judicial system
is populated either exclusively or even predominantly by life-tenured judges.
Indeed, at the trial level and within the Article III branch of government, more
judgeships lack life tenure than have it. As Charts I and II below detail, 845
judgeships are designated for bankruptcy and magistrate judges in contrast to
the 646 authorized for district court judges.5 Because a central question for this
discussion is who counts as a federal judge, and because more than one mode of
accounting is possible, details of the transformations between the early and late
twentieth century are in order.6
4. In 1901, life-tenured appellate and trial judges nationally numbered 113; seventy served on
the district courts. See History of Federal Judgeships tbl.K (Authorized Judgeships) [hereinafter
Authorized Judgeships], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablek.pdf (last visited Feb.
19, 2002). This table lists a single Article I judgeship as of that date. Id. Not included in this
accounting are United States Commissioners, whose office began with the First Judiciary Act. Paid
on a fee-for-service basis, commissioners undertook tasks such as administering oaths and issuing
warrants that could be understood as judicial but were often described as "ministerial." Their use
built on English practice, in which lay justices of the peace did such tasks within the common law
courts.
In the early twentieth century in the District of Columbia, ten justices of the peace had civil
jurisdiction over matters at or below $300 (today worth about $6000) and had some authority over writs
of attachment and replevin; lower level criminal jurisdiction belonged to the Police Court. See Charles
S. Bundy, A History of the Office of Justice of the Peace of the District of Columbia, in 5 RECORDS OF
THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 259, 268-70 (1902).
5. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 42 tbl. 12 [hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus 1999/
contents.html; see also Authorized Judgeships, supra note 4 (providing a slightly different count, listing
641 permanent and ten temporary judgeships).
6. Here, I focus on the growth in numbers and kinds of judgeships. Additional measures of legal
change include the increase in the number of lawyers, the funds spent on law, and the amount of
authoritative legal material. Surveying those measures, Marc Galanter concludes that the legal world is
"growing vigorously." See Marc Galanter, The Trial Implosion, Speech Presented at the Section on
Litigation and Civil Procedure Joint Program, Civil Litigation Without Trials, Annual Meeting of the
American Association of Law Schools (Jan. 3, 2001) (on file with author); see also Marc Galanter, Law
Abounding: Legislation Around the North Atlantic, 55 MoD. L. REv. 1 (1992). Changes about law also
need to be put into context. For example, census data report that, in the year 1900, the population of the
United States was about seventy-five million people; in the year 2000, the population exceeded 280
million, an almost fourfold increase. See Steven A. Holmes, After Standing Up to Be Counted,
Americans Number 281,421,906, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2000, at Al. The number of life-tenured trial
judges grew during that period from seventy in 1901 to 647 in 1999, which represents a ninefold
increase during that period.
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Chart I
Authorized Federal District Court Judgeships, Nationwide: 1901 and 1999
1901: 70 1999: 646
Article III District Court Judgeships
Chart II
Authorized Trial Level Federal Judgeships in Article III Courts, Nationwide: 1999
Art. III: District Court, Life-Tenured Magistrate & Bankruptcy Judgeships:
Judgeships: 646 845
*0 Bankruptcy (326) E Magistrate: Full-Time (454) El Magistrate: Part-Time (62) 0Magistrate: Combination (3)1
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1. Capturing a Variegated Landscape
Congress creates "authorized judgeships," not all of which are always
filled. In addition, under federal statutes, life-tenured judges can take "senior
status," 7 thereby continuing to serve but freeing a judgeship for another appoin-
tee. Hence, I provide two accounts of the federal judicial workforce, one
through authorized judgeships and another by calculating the numbers of per-
sons actually working as judges under the status of either an "active" or a
"senior" judge.
As to authorized judgeships, Congress has provided for 646 district court
judgeships. The individuals who gain such appointments have, pursuant to
Article III, constitutional protection for their jobs through life tenure and
salaries insulated against reductions. 8 1 call these judges "constitutional judges."
As of 1999, in the District of Columbia, Congress had authorized fifteen such
life-tenured trial-level judgeships. 9
Congress has also created other kinds of judgeships within the Article III
branch-bankruptcy and magistrate judges-whom I term "statutory judges"
because legislation commissions them to serve for fixed (and renewable)
terms through appointment by life-tenured judges.1° Bankruptcy judgeship
lines, set by Congress, number 326.1' Magistrate judgeship lines have been
delegated by Congress to the governing body of federal judges, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, which has authorized 519 such judge-
ships. 12 Given that in the District of Columbia only one bankruptcy and
three magistrate judges serve, 13 one could be unaware of the national
picture, in which the 845 authorized statutory judgeships outnumber the
life-tenured judgeships.
Data also need to be disaggregated to appreciate the effects of the overall
numbers. As of 2001, in six federal district courts, the number of magistrate
judges was greater than the number of life-tenured judges.14 In another sixteen
7. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 294(b), 295, 371 (1994).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. See History of Federal Judgeships tbl.H (U.S. District Courts, Additional Authorized Judgeships)
[hereinafter Additional Authorized Judgeships], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tableh.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2002).
10. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (1994) (bankruptcy judges appointed for fourteen-year terms by
appellate judges of that circuit); id. § 631(a), (e) (magistrate judges appointed for eight-year terms by
district judges).
11. See id. § 151; 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 43 tbl. 13.
12. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(a); 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 44 tbl.14. Of those 519, 454 are
full time.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(2) (authorizing one bankruptcy judge for the District); UNITED STATES
COURTS, DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA CnIcurr 1998 & 1999 REPORT 52 (2000) (listing three full-time
magistrate judges for the District), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/refdesk/
99annual.pdf). A fourth magistrate judge has been recalled and serves occasionally.
14. As of January 2001, those districts were the Middle and Southern Districts of Alabama, the
Western District of New York, the Eastern and Southern Districts of California, and the Western District
[Vol. 90:607
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districts, their numbers were equal. 15 In some districts, magistrate judges join
district judges "on the wheel," which means that judges of both kinds are
randomly assigned to civil cases when filed. Given the numbers, in some
districts, litigants have an equal chance of being assigned a magistrate or a
district judge.' 6
An alternative accounting, set forth in Chart III below, puts life-tenured
judges about thirty persons ahead of the non-life-tenured judges sitting in
federal trial courts around the country. That tally (of 881 life-tenured trial
judges) includes the 273 senior life-tenured district court judges' 7 who joined
their "active" judicial siblings in 1999 and excludes the thirty-eight then unfilled
authorized judgeships. 18 A parallel calculation for the statutory judges considers
that the bankruptcy bench also relies on senior judges, termed in this context
"recalled judges"' 9 (adding twenty-nine to their ranks), but also takes into
account twenty vacancies, bringing the bankruptcy bench to 335 in number.2 °
Some of the senior district court judges and the recalled bankruptcy judges do
not sit full time, so that counting the sixty-two part-time, the 454 full-time, and
the three "combined" positions for magistrate judges 2' provides comparable
of Texas. Telephone Interview with Staff, Magistrate Judges Division, Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts (Jan. 9, 2001).
15. Id. Those districts were in New Mexico, Arizona, the Northern District of New York, the Virgin
Islands, the Western District of North Carolina, the Middle District of Louisiana, the Northern District
of Mississippi, the Western District of Michigan, the Eastern District of Arkansas, the Northern and
Southern Districts of Iowa, North Dakota, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and the Southern District of
Georgia.
16. As the "practice tip" for the United States District Court of Oregon explains: "The District of
Oregon includes magistrate judges in the random assignment of new civil case filings." See D. ORE.
Loc. R. 72.1 (Practice Tip), available at http://ord.uscourts.gov/rules/civil%20rules/LR%2072.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2002). The District of Oregon is one of those with equal numbers of magistrate and
life-tenured trial judges. See supra note 15. Consent for trial before a magistrate judge, however, may
not be inferred by a litigant's decision not to object to the assignment of a magistrate judge when a case
is filed. See Hajek v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 186 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 1999).
17. Within the federal courts, judges may take senior status, thereby freeing a judgeship for
another appointee but continuing to carry a substantial work load. See JuDiCIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS (1995) [hereinafter LONG RANGE PLAN], reprinted in
166 F.R.D. 49, 160 (1995) (Recommendation 64) (discussing the contributions of senior judges and
calling for their recognition through practices, policies, and salaries).
18. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 42 tbl.12.
19. See 28 U.S.C. § 375(a)(1) (providing that bankruptcy and magistrate judges may, after retire-
ment, be recalled and through certification serve for renewable five-year periods).
20. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 43 tbl.13.
21. Id. at 44 tbl.14. The 1999 published tables do not list vacancies for magistrate judges. Further,
those tables do not include recalled magistrate judges. Because I cannot deduct for vacant spots, I have
also not added recalled magistrates. Data on the actual numbers are kept by the Magistrate Judges
Division. For example, as of January 16, 2001, 466 full-time magistrate judgeships were authorized;
nine vacancies existed, and nineteen recalled judges sat, totalling 476; sixty part-time positions were
authorized, five 'vacancies existed, and seven had been recalled, resulting in sixty-two part-time
magistrate judgeships. Telephone Interview with Staff, Magistrate Judges Division, Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 16, 2001). A total of 538 magistrates were thus serving in January of
2001-shifting the picture once again to make it likely that nontenured judges outnumbered the
tenured.
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treatment, yielding a total of 854.22
The District of Columbia provides an especially helpful focal point, for
within it are examples of the range of institutions comprising "the federal
courts." Within the territorial boundaries of this District are several specialty
courts, some of which are staffed by life-tenured Article III judges and
Chart III











Life-Tenured District Court Art. III Judges: 881 Magistrate & Bankruptcy Judges: 854
t[Bankruptcy EMagistrate E Active EjSenior
Includes active, senior, recalled, and part-time judges
22. Yet other methods are available to assess the number of judges. For example, the federal
government database providing historical data on judgeships in the federal system includes "Article I"
courts, but does not mention either magistrate or bankruptcy courts. See Authorized Judgeships, supra
note 4 (describing Article I judgeships for the United States Court of Federal Claims, the United States
Tax Court, the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and for Territorial Courts and
Article III judgeships for the Supreme Court, the courts of appeals, and the district courts). Alterna-
tively, were one to enlarge the lens to include trial and appellate judges, both active and senior and
excluding vacant positions, the life-tenured staff would be 1122 in number. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 42 tbl.12. Thus far, the bankruptcy and magistrate judgeships have not developed a
comparable discrete tier of appellate judges, although bankruptcy judges may serve on appellate panels
to review decisions of other bankruptcy judges. See infra notes 129, 130.
In terms of numbers of cases, the docket of bankruptcy judges has the highest number of filings,
1,354,376, in 1999. 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 268 tbl.F (1999).
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others of which are populated by statutory judges, sitting for fixed and
renewable terms and often termed "Article I courts." The list includes the
United States Court of Federal Claims, 3 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit,24 the United States Tax Court, 25 and the United
23. The first such court was created in 1855. See Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612; Fed.
Judicial Ctr., Courts of the Federal Judiciary [hereinafter Courts of the Federal Judiciary], available at
http://air.fjc.gov/history/oc bdy.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). Congress provided that claimants,
relying on a federal statute or regulation or contract to seek money from the federal government, were
to seek redress in the Court of Claims. See Stanton J. Peelle, History and Jurisdiction of the United
States Court of Claims, in 19 RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SOCIETY 1 (1916). From a
contemporary vantage point, that court was both more and less Article HI-like.
Despite its specialty jurisdiction, its judges were appointed by the President, confirmed by the
Senate, and had life tenure. But, unlike regular federal judges, effectuation of their decisions relied
upon congressional enactment of legislation to pay successful claimants. At the court's inception,
the concept of rights held against the government had not been developed, and the doctrine
therefore imposed no obligation for Article III processing when such disputes arose. See Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856), discussed infra note
102. In 1866, Congress provided for direct enforcement of judgments of the Court of Claims and
for Supreme Court review. A major jurisdictional expansion came in 1887, with the Tucker Act, ch.
359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887), locating all monetary claims against the federal government in that court.
See Peelle, supra, at 5-8.
According to the federal database on authorized judgeships, the Court of Claims was an
Article III court from 1855 to 1982. See Authorized Judgeships, supra note 4; see also Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (holding the court to be an Article III court). After 1982,
Congress sent the court's work in two directions-to an Article III appellate court (the Federal
Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 41) and to an Article I court (the United States Claims Court, whose
decisionmakers lost the title "commissioners" and gained the title "judges"). See Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. The court is located in the District, and
its judges must live within fifty miles of the District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 173, 175. In 1992, Congress
changed the court's name to the United States Court of Federal Claims. See Court of Federal
Claims Technical and Procedural Improvements Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat.
4516, 4516 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 171). The court is comprised of sixteen judges appointed by
the President with confirmation by the Senate and sitting for fifteen-year terms. Another eight
judges are "senior" judges who remain active on the bench. 28 U.S.C. § 178(e). One could
conceive of the development of the Court of Claims as an early form of alternative dispute
resolution-here providing an alternative to Congress, which had too many applicants seeking
private bills to obtain payment from the government. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 552-53.
24. 28 U.S.C. § 41. Twelve life-tenured judges sit. See id. § 44. Its jurisdiction, set forth at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1295, includes appellate review over the Federal Claims Court, district court decisions on copyright,
trademarks, as well as several specific legislative provisions, such as the Merits Services Protection
Board. When created in 1982, it took five judgeships from the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and seven from the United States Court of Claims. See Federal Courts Improvement Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. In addition to its active judges, five senior judges serve.
25. In 1924, Congress created the Board of Tax Appeals, which in 1954 was renamed the Tax
Court and called an Article I court. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (1994). See generally HAROLD DuBROFF,
THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (1979). The Tax Court has nineteen
judges, sitting for fifteen-year terms through appointment by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate. See 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a)-(c). The Tax Court in turn may appoint assistants,
formerly called "commissioners" and, in 1984, renamed "special trial judges." See Tax Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 464(a), 98 Stat. 494, 824; see also TAX CT. R. 183(a) (providing for
review of those judges' reports by the Tax Court and a presumption of correctness for factual
findings); infra notes 87, 336.
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States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.26
The District of Columbia is also home to what may be termed its "own"
courts, focused on the judicial work spawned within the District. Consider-
ation of the District thereby prompts another tally, provided visually in
Chart IV below.
Chart IV










Life-Tenured DC Circuit Magistrate & Bankruptcy: Non-Life-Tenured D.C.
Court (Appellate & 4 Courts (Appellate &
District): 27 Superior Court): 68
[EM District E Appellate LI Bankruptcy l Magistrate E D.C. Superior 1 D.C. Appellate,
26. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat. 4105, 4113
(codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251-7298 (1994)). The Court was renamed the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims in 1998. See Veterans Program Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-368, § 511, 112 Stat. 3315, 3341.
One specialty court, the United States Court of International Trade, is based in New York. See
Customs Court Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727 (1980) (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 251-258, 1581). Congress designated the court an Article III court, transferred the nine judges
who had served on the Customs Court to the new court, and specified that no more than five could
come from the same political party. The Court of International Trade replaced the Customs Court,
whose history began in 1890 when Congress created the Board of General Appraisers to take
customs disputes out of the district courts. The Board, operating within the Department of
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In the early part of the twentieth century, about twenty judges served in
D.C. courts ranging from the Police Court to the Court of Appeals. The ratio
of life-tenured to non-life-tenured was close to fifty-fifty. 27 Today, nine
appellate judges on the D.C. Court of Appeals and fifty-nine D.C. Superior
Court judges are responsible for civil and criminal cases. All are presidential
appointees serving for fixed fifteen-year terms. 28 Thus, in 2001, the District
relied on twenty-seven life-tenured judges and seventy-two judges without
life tenure,29 or roughly one life-tenured Article III judge for every three
judges without those constitutional protections.
The D.C. courts have proven to be a harbinger of the future.30 The D.C.
courts of the early 1900s previewed what a century later proved to describe all the
Treasury, was appointed by the President, approved by the Senate, and sat unless discharged for
cause by the President. The Board could sit in any port; its headquarters were New York City.
Appeals went to the federal circuit courts until 1909 when a separate Court of Customs, staffed by
five, was created and located in Washington, D.C. See Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act, ch. 6, § 29, 36
Stat. 11, 105 (1909).
How to characterize the body depended on whether one stressed its links to the Department of
Treasury or the powers of its appraisers, which, from 1908, included the ability to establish
procedural rules, to compel testimony, and to punish contemptuous behavior. In 1926, Congress
conferred on it the title "United States Customs Court" and called its members "justices." Act of
May 28, 1926, ch. 411, § 1, 44 Stat. 669, 669. In 1920, the court received additional jurisdiction,
reflected in its title "U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals." Act of May 29, 1920, ch. 488, 45
Stat. 1475. In 1929 and 1933, the Supreme Court held that Congress had acted pursuant to its
Article I powers over duties on imports and that the court was an Article I court. See Williams v.
United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
In 1930, the "justices" were renamed "judges," and like their Article III cousins, received
administrative support from the Department of Justice. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 518, 46
Stat. 590, 737. Further, although lacking life tenure, the judges served during good behavior.
Id. The 1948 revision of the judiciary's code placed the Customs Court within it; a 1958 act
termed it an Article III court. Act of Aug. 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-755, § 1, 72 Stat. 848, 848. The
U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ended in 1982, when aspects of its jurisdiction were
transferred to the Federal Circuit and the Court of International Trade. In 1962, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the court had Article III status. See Glidden, 370 U.S. at 561.
Other specialty courts, staffed by Article III judges, have come and gone. For example, the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, established by the Economic Stabilization Act of 1981, was
abolished in 1992. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 102(d), 106
Stat. 4506, 4507. Another had been the Emergency Court of Appeals, created by the Act of Jan. 30,
1942, ch. 26, § 204(c), 56 Stat. 23, 31.
27. See An Act to Establish a Code of Law for the District of Columbia, ch. 854, 31 Stat. 1189
(1901); An Act to Create a Juvenile Court in and for the District of Columbia, ch. 960, 34 Stat. 73
(1906); An Act to the Change the Name and Jurisdiction of the Inferior Court of Justice of the Peace for
the District of Columbia, ch. 134, 35 Stat. 623 (1909). In 1901, nine life-tenured judges served, as did
twelve non-life-tenured judges-justices of the peace and of the Police Court. In 1910, nine life-tenured
and eight judges with statutory terms-municipal court, juvenile court, and police court-served.
28. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-702, -903, -1501 (2001).
29. The calculations include the twelve appellate and fifteen authorized district judgeships in the
circuit as life-tenured judges. The non-life-tenured include the authorization for three magistrate and
one bankruptcy judges as well as the sixty-eight judges serving on the D.C. Court of Appeals and the
Superior Court. See id. §§ 11-702, -903.
30. A commentator writing in honor of the District's 180th birthday stated that the "District of
Columbia has had a [unique] history of many courts and endless judicial change." Theodore Voorhees,
The District of Columbia Courts: A Judicial Anomaly, 29 CAmH. U. L. REV. 917, 917 (1980). In contrast,
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nation: that roughly half of our "federal" judges would not be life-tenured. Similarly, I
predict that, a hundred years from now, life-tenured judges will at best comprise about
a quarter of the federal judicial workforce. Indeed, the statement that the life-tenured
judiciary is far outnumbered by the non-life-tenured judiciary could also describe the
present, if other "federal judges" who work outside federal courthouses are included
in the count. Some 1300 judges work in agencies-the Social Security Administra-
tion, the SEC, the EEOC, and the like.3 1 These administrative law judges (ALJs)
decide a volume of cases comparable to that of the life-tenured judiciary.32 In addition
to ALJs who work under the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
another group of individuals-sometimes called "the hidden judiciary" 33---discharge
yet other aspects of federal judging. Estimates are that some 2600 such individuals,
bearing titles such as "presiding officers," "administrative judges," "hearing officers,"
or "examiners" work within federal agencies but without the classification of "AL"
as specified by the APA. 34
Hold these non-APA judges aside for the moment. Were one to count only
my point is that the multiplicity of courts within the District presaged a similar diversity that has
occurred nationally, albeit perhaps less vividly.
31. As of September 30, 1999, federal agencies were assigned 1309 administrative law judges. See
U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGrT., FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONS OF FEDERAL
WHITE-COLLAR AND BLUE-COLLAR WORKERS AS OF SEPT. 30, 1999, at 100-01 tbl.W-E (2000); see also
Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections on the Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1343 (1992)
(explaining that, as of the early 1990s, about 1200 ALJs were "assigned to more than 30 agencies," and
ALJs' numbers were then "approximately equivalent to the number of judges on the federal trial
bench"); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudication: Trying to See the Forest and the Trees, 31
FED. B. NEWS & J. 383 (1984) (noting that about five times as many administrative law judges served in
1984 than had in 1947).
32. Verkuil concluded that "ALJs probably decide more 'cases' each year than do their federal
judicial counterparts." Verkuil, supra note 31, at 1343. Measuring the workload volume is difficult
given that the kinds of disputes, the numbers of parties, and the complexity of cases vary from agency
to agency and from agency to court. For example, in the 1997-1998 fiscal year, ALJs in the Social
Security Administration handled 500,000 cases; the Appeals Council considered 101,000 appeals. See
Soc. Sec. Admin., About SSA's Office of Hearings and Appeals, available at http://www.ssa.gov.oha/
overview.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2001). In fiscal year 1998, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) received 12,218 requests for administrative hearings and resolved 7494 appeals.
In addition, the EEOC receives about 75,000 charges annually; 48,000 discrimination charges are
resolved through state and local programs. See EEOC, EEOC Enforcement Activities, http://
www.eeoc.gov/enforce.html (last modified July 25, 2001).
33. Verkuil, supra note 31, at 1344.
34. Id. at 1345-46 (discussing these judges who exist outside the protections of the APA and who,
according to a 1989 survey conducted by the Administrative Conference of the United States, decided
about 350,000 cases). The largest set of cases (about 150,000) were decided by immigration "administra-
tive judges" employed by the Department of Justice; the Department of Health and Human Services
relied on "presiding officers employed by insurance carriers ... [to] decide[] 68,000 cases per year"
and the Department of Veterans Affairs handled 58,000 cases. Id. at 1346. Those agencies' judges
employed "procedures that range from the equivalent of formal APA hearings to informal processes
from which there is no appeal." Id. at 1347; see also John H. Frye III, Survey of Non-ALJ Hearing
Programs in the Federal Government, 44 ADMiN. L. REV. 261, 349 (1992) (discussing the roles of some
2700 presiding officers serving in a range of federal agencies). Many states have a parallel system in
which some administrative law judges are covered by state administrative procedure acts and others are
not. See Michael Asimow, The Influence of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act on California's
New Administrative Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 297, 301-02 (1996).
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Article I judges in courts such as the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims or
Tax Court,35 the judges of the District of Columbia, bankruptcy and magistrate
judges, and ALJs designated through the APA, the total is about 2350.36 That
number overshadows the 834 life-tenured judgeships (at both trial and appellate
level), bringing the current D.C. pattern of one life-tenured judge for every three
non-life-tenured judges in line with the country as a whole, as is illustrated by
Chart V, below. Moreover, if one thought of the judicial workforce as including
all the hearing officers in agencies and all the senior and recalled judges, we
could describe the country as currently relying on one life-tenured federal judge
for every four or five who lack such protection.
Chart V






Life-Tenured Art. III (Supreme, Appellate, Non-Article Ill (ALJs, D.C. Superior Courts,
District): 834 Article I Courts, Magistrate, and Bankruptcy)
2359
HArt. III Courts (834) IM Bankruptcy & Magistrate (845) [Art. I Courts (46) 0 D.C. Superior Courts (68) LJALJs (1400)
35. Authorized Judgeships, supra note 4 (listing forty-six such authorized judgeships).
36. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 42 tbl.12 (listing Article III judgeships). The D.C.
judges add another sixty-eight, while the bankruptcy and magistrate judges number 845, and the APA
ALJs number 1400.
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2. Constituting and Constitutionalizing the Capacity to Judge
A brief summary is in order. The federal judiciary now includes hundreds of
individuals who work within the Article III judiciary, who function in many
respects like Article III judges, but who lack Article III protections. A century
ago, most of these positions did not exist. What federal judicial officers there
were bore titles such as commissioner, referee, justice of the peace, or appraiser.
Over the decades, as their jurisdictional grants and adjudicatory work increased,
the practice developed of renaming those individuals "judges." The title was
often modified, cabined by terms such as "bankruptcy judges" or "magistrate
judges." In addition to such judges within Article III courts, another group now
sits in semi-free standing courts (such as the Tax Court) or atop an agency
structure (such as the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims). Again, while these
institutions are called courts, modification (for example, "Article I" courts or
"legislative" courts) 37 invokes the idea that they are somehow not quite "regu-
lar" federal courts. A third, much larger, number of non-life-tenured judges are
termed administrative law judges, hearing officers, and the like, and they work
in agencies.
The numbers that I have provided give a demographic picture of the array of
individuals exercising adjudicatory power within the federal system. But some
will surely respond that I have miscounted-that some of the individuals to
whom I affix the label "federal judge" do not qualify for that appellation; that
some of the entities that I describe as "courts" are not; that federal judging is
simply not subject to modification; and that all the adjectives-magistrate
judge, bankruptcy judge, administrative law judge-are clues to the fact that
these folks are not federal judges. Thus, I turn now to reflect on how this
proliferation of persons came to be and on why I argue that they should all be
understood as variations on the same theme.
The creation of tiers of federal judges could not have occurred without a
change in legal meaning-in the doctrine about who can be a "federal judge"
and what powers Article III contemplates as belonging exclusively to judges
appointed pursuant to its mandates. The issue has emerged many times in the
nation's history. As Congress began in earnest in the twentieth century to create
more judicial officers, some litigants complained. They argued their "right" to
an Article III judge, by which they meant a judge appointed for life and with
salary guaranteed. Their challenge entailed interpretation by Article III judges
about the import of Article HI.
Plainly, the experience in the United States of judging does not depend on life
tenure. State court judges, elected or appointed for terms, abound. Yet in the
federal system, Article III serves not only to authorize judging but also to create
37. The use of the term "court," like that of judge, has been a subject of debate and discord. See
DuBROFF, supra note 25, at 165-215 (describing the issues about whether to call the Tax Court a court,
as contrasted with a board). For a description of efforts by some judges to block other adjudicators from
being termed "judges," see infra notes 331-34 and accompanying text.
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a branch of government and an understanding of the special role of the judge,
freed from the ordinary burdens of employment through life tenure and guaran-
teed salary. On the constitutional paper, the judiciary is peculiarly situated.
While creating one of the three branches of the federal government, the
constitutional text does not do much to endow institutional authority. The
Constitution provides no express guarantees of budgets, courthouses, or even of
lower court judges. Further, the parameters of the jurisdictional mandates are
sufficiently cloudy so as to have occasioned thousands of pages of case law
and commentary on when federal courts can properly exercise jurisdiction
and what control Congress has over the courts. 38 Because of this thinness in
Article III provisions, some commentators have described the federal judi-
ciary as a "dependent judiciary,, 39 deeply reliant on executive and congres-
sional powers with little ability to act on its own.
But Article III has within it one (potential) safety net: a combination of life
tenure and protected salaries for those who achieve the status of "federal judge."
Those are the judges with unique power. One might therefore expect life-
tenured judges to guard their distinctive authority by reading Article I's text to
prohibit or to curtail assignment of federal adjudicatory activities to non-Article
III judges. Such an interpretation would have put pressure on Congress to
increase the numbers of life-tenured judges to meet adjudicatory demands. The
ranks of life-tenured judges might therefore have grown and, with them, the
power and clout of the Third Branch, populated with a larger corps of persons
committed to its special role and possessing its unique attributes. But the
demographic picture that I sketched above depends on a different reading of
Article III. Instead of prohibiting or finding only a limited role for federal
judges outside Article III's parameters, life-tenured judges have read the United
States Constitution to permit the transfer of many tasks of federal judging to
non-life-tenured judges.n°
A review of decades of case law reveals the trajectory. Turn back to the early
part of the twentieth century and recall that, in 1932, the Supreme Court
required de novo review of "jurisdictional facts" determined by administrative
hearing officers in a dispute about damages owed when a longshoreman fell.4'
In contrast, a 1985 Supreme Court decision concluded that Congress could
constitutionally give an arbitrator virtually final authority to decide a monetary
38. Recent case law includes Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000), and Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995). See generally Lawrence G. Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-
Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981).
39. John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial Independence, 72
S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 376 (1999).
40. See generally Judith Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO. L. Rav. 581
(1985).
41. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932) (permitting initial fact-finding by a hearing officer
but retaining Article III authority to review jurisdictional facts de novo).
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dispute arising under a statutory scheme between private litigants.4 2 During
those intervening fifty years, life-tenured judges shifted their understanding of
what "nonjudicial" tasks could be delegated to "nonjudicial actors." During the
very same decades, tasks once seen as "nonjudicial" became understood to be
part of the job of "judging" but nevertheless able to be shared with non-life-
tenured judges. Further, Article III judges relied on the Due Process Clause to
require adjudicators located outside of courts to behave in a manner akin to that
of court-based judges.
These shifts were gradual, as both practices and doctrine interacted to shape a
new normalcy. At first, tasks that were seen as not "judicial" or not "federal"
were remitted to lower echelon judicial officers.4 3 But over time, tasks that were
more obviously "federal judge-like" were passed down or out of Article III.
Concurrent with this evolution of doctrine about both delegation and due
process were shifting expectations of what federal trial judges were supposed to
do. Judges took on new jobs-drafting procedural rules, running the pre-trial
process, superintending lawyers, settling cases, and promoting certain legisla-
tive agendas in Congress. As Article I trial judges ceased to be coterminous
with the federal power of judgment at the trial level, adjudication ceased to be
the central focus of trial judging.
The D.C. courts have played a special role in all of these developments. The
District has been a repeat player doctrinally, as a regular source of case law
prompting the life-tenured judiciary to think about the meaning of Article III.44
Further, the District of Columbia has been the place in which functional
experimentation with additional personnel in courts has occurred. 45 By creating
42. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592-94 (1985) (upholding provisions
in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, to commit final decisionmaking, absent
claims of fraud, to arbitration).
43. E.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (holding that in the territories, Congress
could authorize judges who lacked life tenure because, in such instances, Congress was acting akin to a
state legislature). As I have argued elsewhere, that Chief Justice Marshall opinion now stands as a pillar
of Article III jurisprudence but, at the time, it laid to rest the question of the legitimacy of congressional
acquisition of additional lands. See Resnik, supra note 40, at 589-92.
44. See, e.g., Keller v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923) (approving congressional
vestiture of nonjudicial functions in the courts of the District); FTC v. Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927)
(concluding that the District's courts were part of the federal judicial system and may have jurisdic-
tion to enforce FTC orders); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (ruling that the
District's courts were Article III courts, whose judges' compensation may not be reduced); Nat'l Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (concluding that the District's citizens can use
diversity jurisdiction); Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973) (upholding the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, which created local courts under
Article I).
45. The District's early courts and some of its specialty courts created layers of relationships among
judges in a fashion familiar today through the example of the relationship between magistrate and
district court judge. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1870, ch. 133, § 20, 16 Stat. 153, 157 (taking criminal
jurisdiction from the justices of the peace and placing it in the D.C. Police Court, with authority over
offenses not punishable by imprisonment in a penitentiary); Courts of the Federal Judiciary, supra note
23 (describing the reliance by the Court of Claims on "commissioners to take depositions and issue
subpoenas" and that, in 1925, Congress authorized that court's five judges to appoint seven commission-
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the position of "pre-trial examiner," judges of this District pioneered the
employment of non-life-tenured actors to undertake new tasks, and many of
those same judges were also central to the project of reshaping expectations that
shifted those tasks to life-tenured trial judges.
Before I turn to document the evolution, let me underscore that the shifts in
doctrine and in practices have been driven by deeply pragmatic instincts about
the need to staff cases, to cope with growing dockets, to avoid confrontations
with Congress, and to respond to litigants' needs and rights.46 But the authoriza-
tion of judgeships outside of Article III was not only responsive to such
pressures, it was also inventive, aimed at reshaping and professionalizing
judicial roles as the country itself was moving towards a nationalized economic
structure. Further, the developments in this area of constitutional law were of a
piece with other twentieth-century readings of the Constitution, also expanding
the flexibility of national governance.
Such creative responses to the challenges of nationalization and modernity
merit our appreciation and respect. But, as will also be detailed below, a
majority of the current federal judicial corps no longer enjoys the insulation
once understood as definitional of federal judging. Further, those with life
tenure risk the dilution of the concept of the independent judge. As a conse-
quence, we who benefit from this multiplication of judicial roles have a burden
to find ingenious responses to the new challenges that the solutions provided by
our predecessors have generated.
B. WHAT'S A FEDERAL COURT? WHO'S A FEDERAL JUDGE? WHAT'S THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN BEING A FEDERAL JUDGE AND ARTICLE 1I?
Turn then to constitutional interpretation and statutory creation of judge-like
roles for non-Article III actors. The courts of and within the District have many
times been the subject of Supreme Court decisions concluding that Congress
could constitutionally create court-like structures with judges lacking Article Ill
attributes. A review of rulings attempting to sort D.C. courts reveals statements
that sometimes feel comedic, in which doublespeak is used as parody. For
example, a nineteenth-century decision concluded that because a justice of the
peace in the District was not a "judge," the jury of twelve persons that he
impaneled was not a "jury" and therefore a second jury-also composed of
twelve persons-could hear and decide the case again.47 A dissent in a more
ers whose tasks included hearing evidence and reporting findings of fact, subject to review by that
court's judges).
46. The pragmatism is often made explicit. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 540
(1962) (plurality opinion) (discussing the utility of understanding the Customs and Patent Appeals
Court as an Article III court because, with such denomination, other Article III judges could be
designated to comprise a quorum).
47. Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 17, 38, 44 (1899) (upholding a statute from 1895 that
extended the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace to matters involving property up to $300 and
concluding that a (second) jury trial before a circuit court preserved the constitutional right to a jury
2002]
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recent decision offered the view that "there is nothing 'inherently judicial' about
'adjudication.' 48 In support was proffered the tautology that Article III judges
alone exercised federal judicial power because federal judicial power was
vested in Article III judges alone.49 As Paul Bator put it: "The Supreme Court
opinions devoted to the subject of the validity of legislative and administrative
tribunals are as troubled, arcane, confused and confusing as could be imag-
ined." 50 The doctrinal confusion is driven by efforts to make an ever-larger path
for Congress to create judgeships without incurring the costs of Article III.
1. The Costs of Article III
Since this country's inception, a group of individuals with term appoint-
ments performed some kinds of adjudicatory roles at the lower end of
federal jurisdiction. 51 A few are famous, such as William Marbury, whose
failure to receive a commission prompted Marbury v. Madison.52 The
passing decades have witnessed a growth in their numbers and powers. The
history of the D.C. trial courts provides the paradigm. The jurisdictional
grants to the justices of the peace and to the Police Court were enlarged to
provide an early form of what we now call alternative dispute resolution. At
the time, these courts were described as a predicate to, but not as a substitute
for, the Article III court system.53 And just as alternative dispute resolution
has moved from its status as an "extrajudicial" activity 54 to become part of
the judicial activities provided in Article III courts themselves,55 so have the
trial and did not violate the prohibition on reexamination of jury trial decisions because the (first) jury
proceeding at which the justice of the peace had presided was not a common law jury in part because
justices of the peace were more like "special commissioners or referees"); see also United States v.
Mills, 11 App. D.C. 500, 505-06 (1897) (concluding that Congress had acted constitutionally in vesting
jurisdiction for small claims under twenty dollars in courts but that these courts were not part of the
Article III judiciary because, while the Police Court was a "court of the United States," it was not "a
court of the United States in the sense of the federal Constitution").
48. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 909 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Whether agency processes are sufficiently "judicial" as to permit South Carolina to assert a
constitutional immunity from decisionmaking is pending before the Court this Term. See S.C. State
Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 392 (2001).
49. Id. at 912 (arguing that it is not the "mode of decisionmaking" nor "the type of decision" but
rather the identity of the decisionmaker that makes the decision an exercise of federal judicial power).
50. Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under
Article Il1, 65 IND. L. REV. 233, 239-40 (1990).
51. See Bundy, supra note 4, at 268-70 (describing the jurisdiction of the justices of the peace); id.
at 272-93 (listing those who served).
52. Id. at 259-68 (describing those events); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1803).
53. Debates then, as now, questioned whether such alternatives impermissibly burdened rights of
access to courts. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1 (1899) (holding that the justice of the
peace trials were not too onerous to undermine the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial).
54. In the 1983 amendment to the federal procedural rules governing pre-trial processes, this term
was used. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (as amended in 1983).
55. The 1993 amendments to Rule 16 dropped that term in favor of the words "settlement and
the use of special procedures to assist in resolving the dispute." See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(9). For further
discussion, see infra notes 185-213 and accompanying text.
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lower tier justices (once seen as "out of court" actors) moved inside the
judiciary, gained new names, and proliferated in other institutions that are
now also understood to be courts.
Much of this manufacturing of judgeships has taken place outside of Article
III because of its perceived costs. I use the word "costs" here in terms of dollars
and politics. The dollar costs of an Article III trial judgeship have been placed at
$849,572 for a new judgeship, with yearly recurring costs calculated at $758,653.56
Magistrate judgeships are less expensive, calculated at $684,834 to begin and
thereafter at $596,751 yearly.57
The political costs are multifaceted, and they vary with the kind of judge.
Political capital is needed to convince Congress to create additional life-tenured
judgeships, which give appointments to a President.58 Requests often pend for
years, with the political alignment of Congress and the Presidency being a
significant factor.59 Bankruptcy judgeships are also line-items, requiring politi-
cal attention but with a different complexion. Once such positions are created,
the President does not have life-tenured patronage positions to fill directly
because appellate judges appoint bankruptcy judges. Still lower on the political
screen are magistrate judgeships, which require only money from Congress
because the power to create and to fill those lines lies exclusively within the
Article III judiciary itself.
The political economy of administrative judgeships involves yet other fac-
tors. Particular constituencies may be enlisted in support of or against specific
56. These are fiscal year 2000 figures. See Unit Cost Tables for New and Existing Judgeship
Positions, FY 2000, First Year and Annual Recurring Cost for Judgeships, Fiscal Year 2000 (chart
provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) [hereinafter Unit Cost Tables]. The initial
cost per district court judgeship includes salaries, staff, security, and facilities. Recent legislation
provided for cost of living increases. As of 2001, district court judges' salaries are $145,100;
bankruptcy and full-time magistrate judges' salaries are $133,492. See 106th Congress Ends: A COLA
for Judges, New Judgeships and Judiciary Funding in Final Bills, THIRD BRANCH, Dec. 2000, at 1, 1-2
[hereinafter COLA for Judges].
57. Unit Cost Tables, supra note 56.
58. See John M. de Figueiredo, Gerald S. Gryski, Emerson H. Tiller & Gary Zuk, Congress and the
Political Expansion of the U.S. District Courts, 2 Am. L. & EcON. REv. 107 (2000) (examining the
effects of caseload pressures and politics on the creation of judgeships). Dissatisfaction with this system
is often expressed. See Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some
Possibilities Under the Constitution (pts. 1-3), 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 486-88, 723, 870 (1930)
(pointing to the plainly political processes of appointment of lower court judges and partisan objections
to patronage positions as support for his proposals for a hierarchical structure, in which the Chief
Justice would appoint inferior judges and would develop mechanisms for supervision and for removal
short of impeachment). For a view that the appointment process is one of the few venues in which
Congress has been willing to take an appropriate role in affecting the life-tenured judiciary, see Charles
Geyh, Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS (forthcoming 2002)
(manuscript on file with author); and Charles Geyh, Judicial Independence, Accountability, and Power
of Constitutional Custom, 78 IND. L.J. (forthcoming Winter 2003) (manuscript on file with author).
59. See John M. de Figueiredo & Emerson H. Tiller, Congressional Control of the Courts: A
Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Expansion of the Federal Judiciary, 39 J.L. & EcON. 435 (1996).
Yet other forms of politics play roles in creating courts. See Voorhees, supra note 30, at 921-23
(discussing the 1863 alteration in the District's courts to enable the placement of four Republican
judges on its judiciary).
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legislative rights and remedies (such as federal benefits or environmental protec-
tion). Their voices can be added to promote the need for adjudicative mecha-
nisms, albeit of varying kinds. Agencies themselves have interests in the kind of
judge fashioned. For example, agency staff may want to be able to deploy
employees as judges when needed but then to use them for other roles as docket
demands fluctuate. Moreover, agency control is greater when the judges created
are denominated "administrative judges" or "hearing officers" rather than ALJs
given the protections of the APA.6°
Returning to the life-tenured, gaining Congress's attention has proved to be a
mixed blessing for the federal judiciary. Requests for judgeships sometimes
prompt inquiries from Congress on the deployment of current resources.61 In
the 1950s, for example, congressional inquiry focused on the vacations taken by
federal judges; the Judicial Conference responded with a Committee on Air
Conditioning to obtain funds to cool courthouses in the summertime. More
recently, debate has centered on whether vacancies should be filled and whether
certain judgeships should be abolished.6 3 In 1998, the Chief Justice appointed
60. See, e.g., Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. C, § 124, 113 Stat. 1501A-160
(providing authority "for the purpose of reducing the Indian probate backlog in the Department of
Interior" for the Secretary of Interior to appoint administrative law judges "for such periods of
time as the Secretary considers to be necessary" and to do so through a process different from that
provided by the APA, but only if the Secretary is "unable to secure the services of at least 10
qualified Administrative Law Judges on a temporary basis from other agencies and/or through
appointing retired Administrative Law Judges"); see also Ronnie A. Yoder, Retrospectives and
Prospectives on ALI Priorities-A Report in Progress, Remarks at the Federal Administrative Law
Judges Seminar at Virginia Beach, Virginia (Sept. 15, 1998) (on file with author) (discussing the
problem of the growth of an administrative judiciary lacking APA status and protections).
61. At a 1937 meeting of the Judicial Conference, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes read a letter
from Senator Henry Ashurst discussing a congressional subcommittee's review of the judiciary. Noting
that close scrutiny of the courts was anticipated, he raised concerns that the "helter-skelter" requests for
judgeships was a part of what was prompting such a comprehensive review. See Transcript of 1937
Meeting at 147, in Records Related to Judicial Conference Meetings, 1922-1958 [hereinafter Judicial
Conference Meetings Records], Entry 4, Box 13, located in Record Group 116, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
62. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 20-21
(Sept. 1955).
63. See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY
L.J. 1147 (1994); cf Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52.
See generally GORDON BERMANT, WILLIAM W SCHWARzER, EDWARD SUSSMAN & RUSSELL R. WHEELER,
FED. JUDICIAL CM, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES: ANALYSIS OF ARGU-
MENTS AND IMPLICATIONS (1993).
In 1996, the Judicial Conference approved a recommendation that its biennial district judge-
ship surveys should consider proposing that Congress eliminate judgeships or leave vacancies
unfilled. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (Mar.
1996) (discussing report from the Committee on Judicial Resources); see also REPORTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 18 (Mar. 1999). A proposal to
reduce the number of judges in the District of Massachusetts was met with disagreement by its
judges. See Letter from Joseph L. Tauro, Chief Judge of the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts,
to Patrick Conmy, Chair of the Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics, Judicial Conference (Apr. 8,
1998) (signed by all Article III judges in the U.S. District Court of Massachusetts) (on file with
author).
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the Judicial Officers Resources Working Group in "partial response" to the
concerns of specific Senators that the judiciary be as "vigorous in its standards
in filling judicial vacancies as it is to justify creating new judgeships." 64 Yet,
after the election of 2000, certain members of Congress who had previously
expressed distress about filling judgeships looked more favorably upon the
possibility. In short, the demands on judges for production of work and the
complexity of court-Congress interaction to achieve the requisite capacity create
incentives for licensing a great deal of non-Article III judging.
2. Overlapping Charters
While life-tenured judges have not yet decided that magistrate and district
court judges are fungible, the terrain that is the subject of debate today is
light-years from that contested only a few decades ago. For example, during
Prohibition, an issue arose about whether commissioners (magistrate judges'
predecessors) could be assigned some of the resultant criminal work. Because
of what were understood to be constitutional problems with such delegation, the
Judicial Conference did not pursue the proposal.65 Thereafter, in 1944, the
federal judiciary supported giving commissioners the power to accept pleas and
to sentence petty offenders. The justification was that, because "the power to
impose sentence" was not part of the constitutional judicial authority, Congress
could confer it on "administrative officers."6 6 As late as the 1970s, the State of
California objected to magistrates conducting evidentiary hearings on habeas
petitions. Before the United States Supreme Court, California argued the consti-
tutional invalidity by explaining that magistrates, appointed for terms, lacked
the "independence and authority requisite" 67 to decide the serious questions
presented in habeas corpus cases. Moreover, Article III contained "the implicit
requirement that judges who are charged with the exercise of the judicial
function will themselves conduct all proceedings necessary for a proper determi-
nation of each case."68
Today, magistrate judges routinely make proposed rulings on state prisoners'
habeas petitions, and the work of magistrate judges is understood to be "judi-
cial." 69 Similarly, arguments in favor of Article I courts and of agency adjudica-
64. Can the Federal Courts Cope Without More Judges?, TuIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1999, at 6, 6.
65. PETER GRAHAM FISH, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 67-69 (1973).
66. Report of Committee on the Trial of Minor Offenses by Commissioners, Trial of Minor Offenses
4-7 (1943), in Judicial Conference Meeting Records, supra note 61.
67. Brief of Amicus Curiae (State of California) in Support of Respondent at 7, Wingo v. Wedding,
418 U.S. 461 (1974) (No. 73-846).
68. Id. at 2. Similarly, when the legislation for magistrate judges was pending, the Department of
Justice argued that giving jurisdiction to magistrate judges in more criminal cases raised constitutional
objections not cured by a defendant's consent. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A GUIDE TO THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 8 (1995) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES].
69. Indeed, the legislative history of the 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act expressly
justified the expansion of authority on the grounds that "the Congress has .,. recognized that it is not
2002]
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tion do not rest on a conception that the decisionmaking is not judicial.
Illustrative is the statement quoted at the outset of this section-that "there is
nothing 'inherently judicial' about 'adjudication.' 70 Rather, the constitutional
parameters have been reconceived to permit delegation of the constitutional
judicial authority to actors who lack the constitutional protections of Article III
judges.7'
I have already referred to a central contemporary example-the creation in
1968 of the magistrate,72 renamed in 1990 "magistrate judge. 7 3 Initially under-
stood as providing assistance to district judges, magistrate judges' charter has
grown several times since.74 Under that statutory regime as interpreted by the
courts, magistrate judges may, with parties' consent, preside at civil trials and
issue final judgments.75 Magistrate judges also do a wide range of other
feasible for every judicial act, at every stage of the proceeding, to be performed by a 'judge of the
court."' See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES, supra note 68, at 24.
70. Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 909 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
71. As Linda Silberman commented in 1975, in "each instance" when Congress "entrusted" judicial
authority to non-Article III tribunals, "the mode of restructuring and refining dispute-resolution
mechanisms has been upheld and various adjudicatory functions have been exercised by non-Article I
personnel." Linda J. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Part I: The American Analogue, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1307 (1975).
72. See Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107. The Act was revised in
1976. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639
(1994)).
Such appointees initially were understood as providing assistance for judges but not as being judges
themselves. For example, within months of the initial act, District Judge Aubrey Robinson explained
that magistrates were not "clerical personnel" but "as indicated by the Act when it set up the
qualifications and gave them status, reasonable tenure, and what we judge to be at the moment a
substantial salary, that they will be, in effect, ... an integral part of the bench," assisting in the criminal
calendar and in pre-trial motions. See Proceedings of the Thirtieth Annual Conference of the District of
Columbia Circuit, 48 F.R.D. 141, 164-65 (1969) [hereinafter Thirtieth Annual D.C. Conference].
73. As introduced, the proposal was to change the name to "Assistant United States District Judge."
H.R. 5381, § 206 (1990). The Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States
opposed any formal name change, but in the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress conferred the
title "magistrate judge." See Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5104, 5117 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 631). According to its legislative history,
the title "judge" was commonly used beyond Article III and the change "reflect[ed] more accurately the
responsibilities and duties of the office," but the Act did not alter either jurisdiction or authority. See
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES, supra note 68, at 50-56.
74. In 1974, the Supreme Court ruled that the 1968 Act did not permit delegation to magistrate
judges to conduct hearings and propose rulings in habeas petitions filed by state prisoners. See Wingo v.
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974), discussed supra notes 67-68. Thereafter, Congress amended the statute
to authorize magistrate judges to make preliminary review of cases, to receive evidence, and to propose
findings. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 1, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729. Since then, Congress
has amended the statute several times, including in 1979 to provide for civil trial jurisdiction with
consent of the parties and to enlarge criminal misdemeanor jurisdiction, as well as to detail require-
ments of selection; in 1986 to permit recall of retired magistrates; and in 2000 to provide contempt
powers and additional authority over misdemeanor trials. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE
JUDGES, supra note 68, at 35-56; see also Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.
106-518, § 202, 114 Stat. 2410, 2412.
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fields v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir.
1984); D.D.C. Loc. R. 73.1. While all the circuits have upheld this provision, a few judges, invoking
630
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adjudicatory tasks76 without parties' consent, including sealing documents 7 7
proposing findings and conclusions of law in habeas78 and Social Security
litigation, and ruling on nondispositive motions.79
More generally, the constitutional case law establishes the following proposi-
tions: Congress has power to create "judicial officers" in "courts" that are not
constituted under Article III of the Constitution, as well as to create judicial
officers in courts within Article 111.8' Congress derives such powers from
Article I of the Constitution and arguably from Article IV.82 One cannot always
Article I1, have disagreed. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045 (7th Cir.
1984) (Posner, J., dissenting); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313,
1319 (8th Cir. 1984) (Arnold, J., dissenting); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix,
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 747 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
Some fifteen to twenty percent of all civil trials, both bench and jury, in the federal system are
conducted by magistrate judges. Telephone Interview with Staff, Magistrate Judges Division, Adminis-
trative Office of the U.S. Courts (Apr. 2002). Those trials are not part of the tally of trials provided by
the Administrative Office's tables on "trials commenced" in the annual reports. Id.
76. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 52 (4th ed. 1996) (providing a chart detailing the increase in
kinds and quantity of matters handled by magistrate judges through a comparison of their work in 1972,
1986, and 1994).
77. Wash. Post Co. v. Hughes, 923 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 944 (1991). As is
indicated by the phrase "cert. denied," the Supreme Court was given the opportunity but declined to
explore this aspect of magistrate judges' powers. While one cannot import legal meaning from the
Supreme Court's refusal to hear a case, the many requests by litigants to bring issues related to
non-Article III judges to the Court's attention is of interest in understanding the shape of the law and at
what level the normative decisions have been made. Therefore, throughout the remainder of this
Article, I will continue to note when a request for certiorari has been denied.
78. See, e.g., General Order Regarding Division Assignment and Apportionment of Cases Among
United States Magistrate Judges, No. 98-10 (E.D. Tex. filed July 2, 1998) ("Prisoner suits shall be
referred at the time of filing equally among magistrate judges with concurrent civil case responsibilities
except as specified.").
79. The line between dispositive and nondispositive rulings has provoked a good deal of litigation.
Held to be dispositive, and therefore subject to de novo review under the statute, have been requests for
preliminary injunctions and summary judgment, while nondispositive rulings, for which the standard of
review is "clear error" have included motions to amend complaints, litigation about discovery and
sanctions, and motions to disqualify counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, INVENTORY OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTIES 45-80 (3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter
MAGISTRATE JUDGE DtrnES] (listing case law).
Courts have recently debated whether a remand order from federal to state court is dispositive or
nondispositive for purposes of magistrate judges' authority. Compare Vogel v. United States Office
Prods., 258 F.3d 509, 514-17 (6th Cir. 2001) (detailing the case law and concluding, like the Third and
Tenth Circuits, that remand orders are dispositive because they preclude determinations by a federal
court and are therefore subject to de novo review by the district court), with A.C. Acceptance Corp. v.
Nelson, 103 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1130 n.1 (D. Minn. 2000) (noting that in the Eighth Circuit, motions to
remand a state court proceeding are not considered dispositive).
80. See Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1899) (relying in part on the English
tradition of justices of the peace as a model for disposition of disputes outside the system of common
law courts); see also McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 175 (1891) (upholding such judges for
territorial courts).
81. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
82. Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S (1 Pet.) 511, 511 (1828); Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 912
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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tell what kind of court Congress has created.83 The Customs Court has had the
dubious distinction of being the subject of a series of Supreme Court rulings,
first finding it to be an Article I court84 and subsequently concluding that it was
an Article III court after all.
85
Moreover, identifying a court as an Article III court does not always forecast
the kind of jurisdiction and powers that it possesses. In 1933, the Supreme
Court concluded that the D.C. courts were Article III courts that could, neverthe-
less, also take on special administrative tasks, understood as not judicial.86 In
1991, the Court concluded that non-Article III courts could themselves spawn
assistant judges by recognizing that the Tax Court has the power to create yet
other judges ("special trial judges") to staff its cases.87 And, in 1949, efforts to
equalize treatment of the District's citizens with those of the states prompted a
few Justices of the Supreme Court to adopt the proposition that, by relying on
Article I powers, Congress could constitutionally give jurisdiction to Article HI
courts beyond the list specified in Article 111.88
83. See Wilbur Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894, 906 n.50, 910-11 (1930)
(discussing treatises in the early part of the twentieth century that did not agree about how to categorize
the Court of Claims and commenting that during the litigation of Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438
(1929), the lower courts and the litigants assumed that the Court of Customs Appeals was a constitu-
tional court and only the Solicitor General adverted to pending legislation altering its jurisdiction).
84. See Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 460-61. For criticism, see George Stewart Brown, The Rent in
Our Judicial Armor, 10 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 127 (1941). Judge Brown, sitting on the Customs Court,
argued that the ruling should be reversed, particularly because it licensed Congress to remove from
life-tenured judges significant litigation to which the government was a party.
85. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
86. See O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933) (protecting those judges from salary
diminution); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). Subsequently, the Court addressed the
"hybrid" nature of the D.C. courts-that they were both Article III and Article I courts, serving both
national and local functions-and concluded that they were permitted to receive such "administrative"
tasks. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407 (1973).
87. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 870; 26 U.S.C. § 7443(a) (1994). Ten such judges, appointed by the chief
judge of the court, currently serve for fixed terms. With specific jurisdictional grants and review
processes by other Tax Court judges, the special trial judges in some ways parallel to magistrate judges
in the district courts. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7433, 7456. The role of such judges has produced some
controversy. See Gerald A. Kafta & Jonathan Z. Ackerman, Fact-Finding in the Tax Court: Access to
Special Trial Judge Reports, 91 TAX NoTEs TODAY 639 (2001) (criticizing a Tax Court decision,
Investment Research Associates v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 951 (1999), for refusing to release
factual findings of a special trial judge and calling for decisions of special trial judges to be treated the
same as are those of magistrate judges' decisions).
88. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Justice Jackson's opinion,
joined by Justices Burton and Black, offered that view to avoid overruling the Marshall Court's
conclusion in Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 445 (1805), that the word "state" for
diversity purposes could not be read to include the District. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 598. Justices
Rutledge and Murphy concurred, but "strongly" dissented from the reasoning which, they argued, was
unduly concerned with preserving the Marshall precedent. Id. at 604, 617-18 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Justices Frankfurter and Reed filed one dissent. Id. at 646 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Chief Justice
Vinson and Justice Douglas another. Id. at 626 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). In other cases, the Court has
also considered the balance between business characterized as "judicial" and other work; for example,
the Court concluded that the Claims Court's jurisdiction over ten cases that had been referred to it did
not defeat its status as a court dealing mostly with cases and controversies as Article Ill required. See
Glidden, 370 U.S. at 582.
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Indeed, the Supreme Court has not squarely explained why it has jurisdiction
over cases litigated in territorial courts, the District included. One possibility is
that territorial courts are constituted as a part of the "federal judicial power"
described in Article III, and hence Supreme Court authority is unproblematic. If
territorial courts are within Article III, however, then the question of why
Article III judges are not required to staff them remains. Alternatively, if
territorial courts exercise authority over cases that Article III courts could not,
then why are their rulings subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court? The Court's exercise of that jurisdiction may itself be an
illustration of the proposition that Congress may, constitutionally, give Article
III courts jurisdiction beyond that specified under Article III itself.89
To add to the confusion, the kinds of federal judges cannot be sorted solely by
reference to the types of jurisdiction that they possess. Criminal jurisdiction is
not definitional of Article III status. As the D.C. courts themselves demonstrate,
federal judges of territorial courts may preside over criminal proceedings.
Moreover, magistrate judges handle the bulk of the misdemeanor docket of
Article III courts. 90 A general federal jurisdictional mandate tied to physical
boundaries is also not definitional. The Federal Circuit now has nationwide
jurisdiction limited to certain kinds of cases, with a concentration in patents and
copyright.9 Oversight of state-federal relations also does not define a line, as
magistrate judges do a great deal of first-level habeas work, much of it relating
to decisions made in state courts.92 International relations may also be affected
89. See Katz, supra note 83, at 903 (discussing a parallel argument).
90. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 345 tbl.M-1 (U.S. District Courts, Misdemeanor
Defendants Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judge by Nature of Offense During the 12-Month Period
Ending September 30, 1999) (detailing the 10,773 dispositions by districts). Legislation enacted in
2000 enlarged magistrate judges' misdemeanor docket. Prior to that act, magistrate judges could try
petty offenses without consent except Class B misdemeanors involving a motor vehicle and Class C
misdemeanors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (1994), amended by Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996
Pub. L. No. 104-317, 110 Stat. 3847. Under the revised provisions, magistrate judges can try all
misdemeanors without consent of the parties. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-518, § 203, 114 Stat. 2410, 2414 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (b)). Magistrate judges' power to
"enter a sentence for a class A misdemeanor" remains tied to the "parties" consent. The 2000 Act also
provided authority to magistrate judges over all misdemeanors involving juveniles, including the power
to sentence offenders to prison. Now, "[t]he magistrate judge may, in a petty offense involving a
juvenile, exercise all powers granted to the district court" under the relevant subchapter. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3401(b).
91. The Commerce Court, created in 1910, is another short-lived example. See Act of June 18, 1910,
ch. 309, § 1, 36 Stat. 539, 539 (providing that court with jurisdiction over "[a]ll cases for the
enforcement.., of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission"). The Commerce Court was
abolished in 1913. See Urgent Deficiencies Act of 1913, ch. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219. See generally J.
Newton Baker, The Commerce Court-Its Origins, Its Powers and Its Judges, 20 YALE L.J. 555 (1911).
The Court of International Trade is another contemporary example. See 28 U.S.C. § 1581 (1994)
(detailing that court's jurisdiction over challenges under several sections of the Tariff Act of 1930 as
well as under the Trade Act of 1974 and other matters).
92. See 1999 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 5, at 357 tbl.M-4A (U.S. District Courts-Proceedings and
Cases Disposed of by U.S. Magistrate Judges Pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(B) and § 636(C)
During the Twelve Month Period Ending September 30, 1999) (listing dispositions of a total of 43,225
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by rulings of magistrate judges who have power to conduct extradition hear-
ings93 and to impose conditions of release. 94 Contempt powers, not quite
equivalent to those of the district courts, are available in some fashion to
bankruptcy judges95 and now to magistrate judges.96 The ability to convene
juries also cannot be equated with Article III tribunals, in that Article I courts
can lack juries97 and non-Article III courts can have them.98 Another distinction
"prisoner petitions, including state, federal and civil rights cases," of which some 9700 were state
cases). State-federal relations are also in issue in administrative processes, as is illustrated by the
pending question of whether states can claim sovereign immunity before the Federal Maritime
Commission. See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
122 S. Ct. 392 (2001).
93. See Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed sub nom. Ward v.
Attridge, 501 U.S. 1225 (1991); see also Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100 (2d Cir.) (ruling that
such power came directly from the extradition statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3184, and not from the Federal
Magistrates Act and, further, that such power was not judicial), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1007 (1996). In
general, the Judicial Conference has opposed congressional proposals to confer jurisdiction directly on
magistrate judges for any particular kinds of cases. See MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTIES, supra note 79, at 1.
94. In re Requested Extradition of Kirby, 106 F.3d 855 (9th Cir. 1996).
95. Bankruptcy judges have the power to impose sanctions and, some believe, have statutory and
inherent authority to impose civil contempt sanctions, including imprisonment, in core bankruptcy
matters. See Belinda K. Orem, The Impenitent Contemnor: The Power of the Bankruptcy Courts to
Imprison, 25 CAL. BANKR. J. 222, 223 (2000); see also Placid Ref. Co. v. Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc.,
108 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 105 authorized bankruptcy judges to issue
contempt orders); Hardy v. United States, 97 F.3d 1384 (lth Cir. 1996) (same); BANR. R. 9020
(providing procedural mechanisms by which bankruptcy judges could conduct contempt proceedings
but noting that punishment may need to be imposed by the district judge). The Judicial Conference
proposed legislative recognition of some contempt powers for bankruptcy judges in 1995. See LONG
RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, 166 F.R.D. at 112 (Recommendation 27b).
96. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 202, 114 Stat. 2410, 2412
(amending 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) to provide for the power of summary criminal contempt for behavior,
occurring in the presence of a magistrate judge, that obstructs "the administration of justice"). Further,
when magistrate judges preside at civil trials with the consent of the parties or in misdemeanor
proceedings, the magistrate judge has the power to impose criminal contempt punishable by fine or
prison for behavior "constituting disobedience or resistance to the magistrate judges' lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree or command." Magistrate judges may also exercise "the civil contempt
authority of the district court." 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) (1994). Magistrate judges' criminal contempt powers
are limited to penalties for a Class C misdemeanor, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3581(b)(8), 3571(b)(6), and
therefore magistrate judges may certify contempt to the district court for imposition of greater penalties,
28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(6); cf Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 184 F.R.D. 181, 197 (D.D.C. 1998)
(discussing the prior statute).
97. See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 571 (1962) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the
status of the Court of Claims as an Article III court did not rely on jury trials because "the legitimacy of
that nonjury mode of trial" derived from whether its jurisdiction included suits at common law within
the meaning of the Seventh Amendment).
98. Magistrate judges may preside at jury trials upon consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c);
MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTrrIEs, supra note 79, at 30. According to the 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 5, at
357 tbl.M-4A, magistrate judges sat on 11,320 consent trials in the year ending 1999. Under the 1994
Bankruptcy Reform Act, bankruptcy judges, "if specially designated" by the district court and upon
"express consent of all parties," may also conduct jury trials. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(e). Prior to the 1994
amendments, the Supreme Court had concluded that jury trials were required for certain disputes
arising in the course of a bankruptcy but had not ruled on which judges--district or bankruptcy-
should preside. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). The Second Circuit held that
bankruptcy judges could do so when core bankruptcy matters are at issue. See In re Ben Cooper, Inc.,
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sometimes proffered is that of finality, that a judgment needs to make its way to
an Article III judge as a predicate to obtaining the status of an enforceable final
decision.99 Territorial, military, and the District's own local courts all supply
examples of final federal judgments that violate that rule. Further, litigants may
waive access to Article III judges.'O° And, when magistrate judges preside at
civil trials, their judgments are entered as final decisions, appealable to the
circuit level, as are the judgments of district judges.' °1
Yet another line, relevant to the relationship between finality and Article III
status, relies not on the powers of the judge but on the claims made by the
litigants. Under earlier conceptions, claimants against the United States had no
"right" of redress, but instead could, at the option of the Executive or Congress,
be given the "privilege" of claiming against the government. Further, in such
instances, awards were not final but subject to legislative review or executive
order, providing for payment. 1
0 2
In the 1930s, the New Deal brought significant adjudicatory processes into
agencies, which had initially been conceived as providing an alternative to
courts through a set of processes affiliated with executive branch functioning-
specialized, focused, without the full trappings of a rights-based regime.
10 3
Indeed, some progressives saw agency decisionmaking as a welcome escape
from the federal courts, perceived as unfriendly to small claimants and specially
tied to corporate interests. 104
But changing conceptions of the rights of claimants against the government
undermine the distinctions between agency-based and court-based decisionmak-
896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded, 498 U.S. 964 (1990), reinstated, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928 (1991). Other circuits have disagreed. See Janine C. Ciallella, Should
Bankruptcy Judges Be Permitted to Conduct Jury Trials?, 8 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 175, 176 (2000)
(arguing that such power exists); see also In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th Cir. 1992). In that
case, Judge Richard Posner argued that the statute was silent but that "practical considerations" ought to
prompt the judiciary to fill the silence with affirmation of bankruptcy judges' authority to preside,
without consent, at jury trials. Grabill, 967 F.2d at 1159.
99. Warren H. Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals, 36 HARv. L. REV. 405, 412-15 (1922).
100. Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (holding that
"jurisdictional facts" had to be subject to review by an Article III judge).
101. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3); FED. R. Civ. P. 73. This provision was made in the 1996 amendments
to the statute. The standards of review applied to magistrate judges are the same as those applied to
district judges. See Grimsley v. MacKay, 93 F.3d 676 (10th Cir. 1996).
102. Katz, supra note 83, at 913 (noting that Article III courts were not required when the
"Constitution permits final determination by executive officers or an administrative tribunal" but were
when "a litigant has a constitutional right to a hearing before a court"). A central illustration is Murray's
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855).
103. See Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, ch. 324, § 5, 60 Stat. 237, 239-40 (1946) (then
codified at 5 U.S.C. § 1004-1010) (describing the procedures for agency adjudication, administra-
tive hearings, and judicial review and the requirements for agency examiners). These provisions
can now be found at 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (2000). See generally George B. Shepherd, Fierce
Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1557 (1996).
104. See EDWARD PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL
POWER AND THE POLmCS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 15-16 (2000).
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ing. As Charles Reich explained in his 1964 essay The New Property,10 5
government-defined benefits and other forms of contractual arrangements
should be understood not as privileges but as "entitlements," forms of
property to which constitutional protections against deprivation without due
process of law should attach. In 1970, in Goldberg v. Kelly,'0 6 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, agreed. While that opinion has been many
times narrowed, 10 7 a central premise has (thus far) remained: that some
statutorily defined benefits generate rights to procedural protection. As a
consequence, during the latter part of the twentieth century, Article III
judges imposed obligations on judges in administrative tribunals and legisla-
tive courts to behave in a court-like fashion, offering notice, an opportunity
to be heard (in some instances orally), impartial judgment, and decisions
limited to the record presented.'
0 8
As a result, while Article III jurisprudence left the legislative branch rela-
tively free under the "public rights doctrine" to design remedies outside of
Article III parameters, the life-tenured judiciary invoked the Due Process
Clause to insist that adjudicatory decisionmaking take a certain form.'0 9 That
approach has narrowed the distance between administrative judges and their
judicial siblings in courts. Delineations remain, occasioning debate on a range
of issues including whether agency adjudication is properly described as less
adversarial than court-based adjudication," 0 how to distinguish informal and
formal adjudication,' and whether administrative judges ought to forward
agency policy through adjudication." t2 But the functional differences have
diminished over the decades.
The line between court and agency has blurred in other respects as well.
Agencies are identified through their focus on a specific subject matter, as
contrasted with courts, which are assumed to have a more general charter. Yet,
as detailed above, federal courts identified by subject matter, such as the
105. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YAu L.J. 733 (1964).
106. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
107. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US. 319 (1976); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's
Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search
of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 28 (1976).
108. See, e.g., Mathews, 424 U.S. at 325 n.4, 333-48; Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924 (1997). Some
of the obligations stem from readings of the Due Process Clause; others are imposed through the
Administrative Procedure Act. See Sloan v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 231 F.3d 10 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(holding that a suspension of a contractor violated due process protections).
109. See generally Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform": Procedural Due
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 AMIN. L. REv. 591 (1998); Sylvia A. Law, Ending Welfare as We
Know It, 49 STAN. L. REv. 471 (1997) (review essay). As dozens of due process decisions make plain,
however, hearings subject to its parameters may have varying characteristics.
110. See Sims v. Apfel, 503 U.S. 103 (2000).
111. See United States v. Mead Corp., 121 S. Ct. 2164, 2173 (2001); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v.
Bureau of Land Mgmt., 147 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Utah 2001). See generally ABA Section of Admin.
Law & Regulatory Practice, APA Project, Final Black Letter Statement (Nov. 3, 2001), http://
www.abanet.org/adminlaw/apa.
112. See Verkuil, supra note 31, at 1348.
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bankruptcy courts and the Federal Circuit, have become a feature of the
life-tenured system. 1 3 Indeed, because of the jurisdictional constriction after
the 1973 reorganization, the D.C. Circuit increasingly is seen as a court
specializing in review of administrative actions. In sum, not only have the
numbers and tiers of federal judges increased and their statuses become more
varied, the places of adjudication have also diversified. No longer can one look
only to the buildings called "courthouses" to find courts.
3. Policing Boundaries
I do not argue a complete collapse of distinctions. A few limitations on the
powers of non-Article III judges, often stemming from statutory interpretation,
can be found in the case law. For example, parties are generally required to
consent to trial by a magistrate judge through affirmative measures rather than
opt-out procedures.1 1 4 Magistrate judges also have a limited role in felony
cases, but, with defendants' consent, may preside at jury selection115 and, in
some circuits, at felony voir dire.' 1 6 Moreover, a "growing number of courts
have authorized magistrate judges to conduct allocution proceedings to accept
felony guilty pleas."
' 17
Moving to the constitutional level, constraints exist on the authority of
Congress to vest jurisdiction in non-Article III judges, but detailing the bound-
aries with specificity is difficult. As is well-known, two decades ago, the United
States Supreme Court ruled in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co.118 that Congress had violated Article III in its grant of powers to
113. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L.
REV. 67 (1995).
114. See D.D.C. Loc. R. 73.1(a)-(b) (2000); see also Rembert v. Apfel, 213 F.2d 1331 (11th Cir.
2000) (requiring affirmation, rather than inaction, for consent to avoid Article III issues); Nasca v.
Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. 1998) (same). However, absent class members were not deemed
parties required to consent in a case in which a magistrate judge enjoined further prosecution of other
class actions. See Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266 (7th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Harper v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 527 U.S. 1035 (1998). Moreover, consent need
not always be specific; one circuit concluded that a litigant's signing a "joint status report" provided
sufficient evidence of a willingness to proceed before a magistrate judge. See Kadonsky v. United
States, 216 F.3d 499 (5th Cir. 2000).
115. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); cf. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989)
(declining to interpret the statute as authorizing delegation under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) because jury
selection is not susceptible to de novo review).
116. United States v. Taylor, 92 F.3d 1313 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1093 (1997)
(requiring that, as long as the district court reviews the objections, the district judge's delegation was to
be given substantial deference).
117. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTIES, supra note 79, at 124-26; see also United States v. Torres, 258 F.3d
791 (8th Cir. 2001) (joining the Second and Fifth Circuits in holding that, upon a defendant's consent, a
magistrate judge has the power to accept felony pleas as long as district judges provide de novo
review). Superintendence of jury deliberations has also been permitted. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTIES,
supra note 79, at 131-32. Some of the case law has attempted to delineate that which was "integral to
the trial" (and thereby exclusively the domain of district judges) and those pre-trial and post-trial
proceedings that are delegable. See, e.g., Ward v. Rutherford, 921 F.2d 286, 288 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
118. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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bankruptcy judges, but the Court lacked a unified view of the precise transgres-
sion. In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan attempted to create a presumption
against non-Article III judgemaking." 9 But only a few years thereafter, his
efforts were superseded when Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in
Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,'20 adopted a more forgiv-
ing balancing test, focusing on the need for judgeships and whether congres-
sional purposes were consistent with "Article III values." 12 1 The view, now
widely held, is that Congress has power when creating "public rights" (an
ill-defined category that includes but is not limited to disputants' claims against
the United States government) to control remedial regimes.' 22 Because, the
doctrine explains, Congress is not required to provide judicial redress at all, it
has power to locate judge-like remedies in judges who lack Article III protec-
tions. The life-tenured judiciary retains the power of oversight, but has not since
1982 ruled that Congress has crossed the constitutional line.
One constraint remains for discussion: the concept that supervision and
review by Article III judges cleanse any constitutional defects that delegation of
decisionmaking to non-Article III judges entails. If appellate review is avail-
able, goes the theory, then access to Article III remains open and hence the
"values of Article III" (here translated as the structural independence of adjudica-
119. Id. at 83-84 (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan wrote for four; Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor concurred based on the view that, by permitting bankruptcy judges to rule on state law
claims related to the bankruptcy, Congress had unconstitutionally vested disputes that had been "the
stuff" of Westminster in non-life-tenured judges. Id. at 89-90 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
MICH. L. REV. 47, 91-93 n.154 (1996) (reporting that some members of Congress perceived that Chief
Justice Burger, who had lobbied about the status of bankruptcy judges under the 1978 Act, had
promised that the provisions of that Act would be upheld, and citing his comment in dissent that the
plurality had not held the "broad grant of jurisdiction to the bankruptcy courts" to be inconsistent with
Article III as an effort to be true to that effort).
120. 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71
AM. BANKr_ L.J. 109, 121 (1997) (arguing that the post-Northern Pipeline decisions make the plurality
opinion no longer good law, and that, were the issues decided today, the 1978 amendments would have
been upheld).
121. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851-57. Professor Bator objected to the balancing test and offered, in its
stead, what he termed an "instrumental approach" akin to a substantive due process test-that the
Constitution be read to authorize Congress to constitute non-Article III courts and that congressional
decisionmaking be respected "unless irrational and unreasonable." Bator, supra note 50, at 257.
122. The scope of disputes over which Congress has control is the subject of debate. While the Court
has approved allocation of controversies over statutory rights between private parties to non-Article HI
judges, Justice Scalia has argued that the public rights doctrine ought to be limited to controversies to
which the federal government is a party. See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65, 70-71
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). In addition to the Supreme Court
case law, lower federal courts have upheld allocation of decisionmaking to non-Article III judges in a
range of settings. See, e.g., Noriega-Perez v. United States, 179 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999) (imposition of
a fine of $96,000 by the Executive Office of Immigration Review); Cavallari v. Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, 57 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995) (restitution orders under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989); Simpson v. Office of Thrift Supervision,
29 F.3d 1419 (9th Cir. 1994) (adjudication of breach of fiduciary claims against officers of a
state-chartered savings and loan association).
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tors) are served. Proponents of this view note that the Constitution does not
contemplate that federal judicial power has to be exercised initially by inferior
courts. Therefore, as long as an Article III court has "ultimate power to control
the legality and constitutionality" of the powers of administrative or lower
echelon adjudicators, constitutional mandates have been fulfilled. 23 Illustrative
of this approach are decisions addressing magistrate judges' powers and relying
on statutory provisions for review as a solvent to the constitutional objections
raised.
1 24
But that line has thinned in theory and is blurring in practice. In a few
instances, the Supreme Court has decoupled finality and Article 111.125 More-
over, most of the decisions of the administrative judiciary are no longer
subjected to de novo review. Even when that form of review is mandated by
statute (as in the case with dispositive rulings proposed by magistrate judges),
new "determinations," rather than new hearings, suffice.1 2 6 A range of other
decisions are reviewed under deeply deferential standards, such as that of clear
error.'
2 7
In addition, the authority of non-Article III judges to serve as appellate judges
is itself expanding. Some circuits permit magistrate judges to provide the initial
review of bankruptcy decisions. 128 Further, bankruptcy judges themselves have
appellate powers. In the late 1970s, circuits gained the authority to create
123. See Bator, supra note 50, at 268-69; Silberman, supra note 71, at 1316-21. See generally
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L.
REv. 915 (1988).
124. See, e.g., Bhan v. NME Hosp. Inc., 929 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 994 (1991)
(relying on the "clearly erroneous" review standard to prevent a referral to a magistrate judge from
being unconstitutional); Coolidge v. Schooner Cal., 637 F.2d 1321 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1020 (1981).
125. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 482-83 (1985) (approving
statute that gave non-Article 1II decisionmakers virtually final decision authority over disputes about
moneys owed when costs of data production are to be shared under the Fungicide Act); Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 573-74 (1962) (plurality opinion) (concluding that Article III decisionmakers
need not always have final powers and noting that most of the Court of Claims' jurisdiction involved
rendering final decisions that were of a "sufficiently conclusive character" to suffice for Article IHI
purposes).
126. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). A few courts have limited the power of district
judges to reject findings when credibility is important unless the contested testimony is heard again.
See, e.g., Hill v. Beyer, 62 F.3d 474 (3d Cir. 1995). Others have noted district court discretion to hold
such hearings. See, e.g., Conetta v. Nat'l Hair Care Ctrs., Inc., 236 F.3d 67, 73-75 (1st Cir. 2001)
(deciding that a district judge may hold an evidentiary hearing on a default judgment if additional
investigation is needed). Appeal courts generally presume the adequacy of the de novo determination.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTIES, supra note 79, at 189.
127. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1994) (magistrate judges). No data are kept on the numbers
of affirmances and reversals of magistrate judges' decisions. Telephone Interview with Staff, Administra-
tive Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 2001); see also Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Beginnings and
Ends: Court of Appeals Review of Administrative Law Judges' Findings and Opinions, 67 WASH.
U. L.Q. 661 (1989) (describing the critical role that fact-finding plays and the great deference accorded
to administrative law judges' findings, resulting in significant and growing power).
128. MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTES, supra note 79, at 121-22. ("Most circuits have held that bankruptcy
appeals may be referred to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).").
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Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (BAPs), groups of bankruptcy judges who sit in
lieu of district court judges to review the decisions of other bankruptcy judges.
Amendments in 1994 make BAPs the preferred mode, 12 9 and a current issue is
the stare decisis effects of their decisions.1 30 In sum, given that only a very
small percent of all bankruptcy rulings are appealed,13 ' the idea that "Article I
values" are served by providing litigants access through appellate review to
life-tenured judges has more theoretical power than practical application.
Writing in the late 1980s, Paul Bator could not imagine the transfer of
judicial review of administrative agencies to non-life-tenured judges. 32 In
contrast, from a contemporary vantage point, in which layers of non-Article III
judges review each others' work and Congress has restricted judicial review in
certain areas, 133 the specter of increasing reliance on non-Article III actors for
appellate work becomes a plausible prediction. And at least one circuit is
experimenting with an "appellate commissioner," an attorney sitting in the court
of appeals and ruling on selected motions, such as those seeking attorneys'
fees. 1
34
129. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 104(c)(3), 108 Stat. 4106, 4109
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)) (requiring BAPs absent a finding by ajudicial council of insufficient
funds or the imposition of delay). For critical commentary of BAPs, see Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., The
Case Against Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1 (1995).
130. Questions include whether BAPs have the power to create precedent and, if so, whether that
precedent binds bankruptcy judges throughout a circuit and a district. See, e.g., Bank of Maui v. Estate
Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that BAPs cannot bind district judges); In re
Enriquez, 244 BR. 156, 159 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2000) (disagreeing with the claim that it was bound by
Ninth Circuit BAP decisions); In re Endicott, 254 BR. 471, 476 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2000) (commenting
that BAP precedent "should be followed by Bankruptcy Courts in the absence of any contrary authority
from the District Court"); Life Ins. Co. v. Barakat, 173 B.R. 672 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that
BAPs bind bankruptcy but not district judges); see also In re Weinstein, 164 F.3d 677, 686 (1st Cir.
1999) (noting that while not binding, the bankruptcy panel's appellate decision was "convincing").
When reviewing the Barakat decision, the Ninth Circuit affirmed on the merits, declining to decide the
issue of BAPs' "precedent-setting power," which it characterized as a "subject of great debate." See
Barakat v. Life Ins. Co., 99 F3d 1520, 1526 n.9 (9th Cir. 1996). See generally Bryan T. Camp, Bound
by the "BAP": The Stare Decisis Effects of BAP Decisions, 34 SAN DtEoo L. REV. 1643 (1997).
131. For example, some 1,354,376 bankruptcy filings occurred in 1999. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 5, at 34 tbl.6 (U.S. Bankruptcy Courts-Bankruptcy Code Cases Filed, Terminated, and
Pending, Fiscal Years 1995 Through 1999). In terms of the federal circuit courts, bankruptcy appeals in
1999 accounted for 1109 of the 54,693 cases filed. See id. at 96-101 tbl.B-3 (U.S. Courts of
Appeals-Sources of Appeals and Original Proceedings Commenced, by Circuit, For the 12-Month
Periods Ending September 30, 1995 Through 1999). In addition, BAPs received 1356 filings in 1999.
Id. at 67 tbl.S-13 (U.S. Bankruptcy Appellate Panels-Appeals Commenced, Terminated, and Pending
by Circuit, During the 12-Month Periods Ending September 30, 1998 and 1999). Given the gap
between the time of filing and of appeal, a rough estimate is that some 2600 cases were reviewed by
either a BAP or a circuit court (and perhaps a few more were reviewed by a district judge) out of more
than 1.3 million filings considered at the first instance.
132. See Bator, supra note 50, at 270 (commenting that "the question is somewhat unreal and
contrived"). Further, he thought such provisions might fail as a matter of substantive due process. Id.
133. See generally Hiroshi Motomura, Judicial Review in Immigration Cases After AADC: Lessons
from Civil Procedure, 14 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 385 (2000).
134. See Press Release, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Federal Court of Appeals
Appoints First Appellate Commissioner (May 2, 1994) (on file with author) (describing the Ninth
HeinOnline -- 90 Geo. L.J. 640 2001-2002
2002] INVENTING THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
The increasing equivalence between life-tenured trial judges and their statu-
tory cousins on the trial bench is not a claim that the two sets of judges
currently hold identical powers. The Article III judiciary continues to express
both a doctrinal commitment to some distinctions and a political stance that the
tiers of federal judges are different. 135 In terms of the case law, life-tenured
judges still have a more general jurisdiction, more jurisdictional powers, more
control over felony prosecutions, and more finality of judgment than do their
non-life-tenured colleagues. 136 In terms of the structure of governance within
the judiciary, life-tenured judges dominate decisionmaking. Policy arguments
reflect these differences, as exemplified by the ongoing discussion about whether
bankruptcy judges ought to gain Article III status. 137
But reflection on the trend over the decades requires acknowledgement that
markers of difference have diminished while enthusiasm for delegation has
grown. Both case law and other judicial commentary by life-tenured judges1 38
have approved and encouraged congressional expansion of the non-Article III
Circuit General Order Pertaining to the Appellate Commissioner and detailing his duties, including
review of payments to lawyers under the Criminal Justice Act and ruling on "certain non-dispositive
motions").
135. That approach is maintained through the governance structures of the federal judiciary itself,
which has limited the participation of bankruptcy and magistrate judges, as well as through positions
taken by the Article III judiciary in Congress about the status of such judges. See Posner, supra note
119, at 80-84.
136. Many decisions address the question of the authority of magistrate judges. See, e.g., United
States v. Desir, 257 F.3d 1233 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (reversing a conviction after, without a defendant's
consent and without district judge superintendence, a magistrate judge responded to a question by a
jury and instructed the jury on deliberations); United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding that a consensual delegation of the final judgment in a federal prisoner's motion to vacate
conviction or sentence to a magistrate judge violated the Constitution); First Union Mortgage Corp. v.
Smith, 229 F.3d 992 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a magistrate judge lacked the power to order a
remand order to state court without a district court de novo review); Hill v. City of Seven Points, 230
F.3d 167 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a postconsent order of reference-either by local rule or by an
individual judge-was required to vest authority in a magistrate judge for disposition of a summary
judgment order based on immunity); United States v. Weissenberger, 951 F.2d 391, 398 (D.C. Cir.
1992) (ruling that a magistrate judge lacked authority to order a competency examination without a
district court request but that de novo review by that judge removed any defect); In re Wilson, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 1013 (E.D. Ark. 2001) (holding that magistrate judges lacked the power to strike a local rule).
In terms of bankruptcy judges, case law debates when a given proceeding is within the "core"
jurisdiction or not. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 72
AM. BANKR. L.J. 529, 541-44 (1998). The National Bankruptcy Review Commission's report in 1997
commented on the amount of "nonsubstantive litigation" about the jurisdictional boundaries. See NAT'L
BANKR. REVtaW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARs 738 (2000) (citing In re Orion Pictures
Corp., 4 F.3d 1095 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1026 (1994)).
137. See NAT'L BANU . REvIEW COMM'N, supra note 136, at 35 (Recommendation 3.1.1) ("The
bankruptcy court should be established under Article III of the Constitution."); see also Proceedings of
the Forty-Fourth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia, 100 F.R.D. 109, 157-64 (1983)
(discussing Northern Pipeline and whether an Article III court would be an appropriate response).
138. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, at 34, 166 F.R.D. at 94 (Recommendation 10) ("Where
constitutionally permissible, Congress should be encouraged to assign to administrative agencies or to
Article I courts the initial responsibility for adjudicating those categories of federal benefit or regulatory
cases that typically involve intensive fact finding.").
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judiciary. These judges are literally now built into our understanding of the
federal courts. Courtrooms and chambers are reserved for them in new federal
courthouse construction. Indeed, part of the impetus for new courthouse construc-
tion in the District is the lack of appropriate courtrooms for bankruptcy and
magistrate judges. 139 And, in the new buildings, the dimensions of magistrate
judges' courtrooms-like the powers of magistrate judges-have grown. The
1997 design manual for construction of federal courthouses requires that magis-
trate judge courtrooms be larger than before, increasing from 1500 to 1800
square feet.1 40
4. Distancing Federal Judging from Article III
In short, the last century has produced a proliferation of federal judges.
Through new interpretation of the meaning of Article III, the idea of who
can have some of the federal power to judge has been transformed. When
contemporary debates about the powers of bankruptcy and magistrate judges
are viewed from a hundred-year vantage point, the shift in where we are on
the spectrum becomes plain. A new tier of federal judges has emerged to
wield the federal power of judgment in an array of contested disputes, often
with the government as one of the disputants. When their numbers are
compared with the life-tenured judges, the tally reveals that a majority of
first-tier federal judges do not have the constitutionally specified attributes
aimed specifically at protecting their independence of judgment. Initial
fact-finding and law application at the trial level are increasingly the
purview of a judiciary lacking life tenure.
The result of these decades of case law and statutory revisions is a
rereading of the Constitution that distances Article III from the center of
federal judging. Such a revision requires one to assume that (1) Article III is
ill-suited to all the kinds of judging needed in the federal system; (2) were
Article III to be a predicate for such judge creation, sufficient numbers of
judges would never be provided; and/or (3) Article III's purposes are
sufficiently or better served with fewer judges having its distinctive protec-
tions. Some commentators welcome all or any of these premises, reflecting a
flexible approach both in terms of separation of powers and of the strictures
of Article 111.141 But I am concerned that, although we have functionally
139. The 1952 courthouse provided twenty courtrooms. A space on the first floor served as
a hearing room for United States Commissioners. See THE UNITED STATES COURTHOUSE FOR THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: A DESCRIPTION OF THE BUILDING AND COPIES OF THE FLOOR PLAN 3, 4 (1952).
One small courtroom, now used by magistrates, is considered unsuitable for criminal proceedings.
140. For the new requirements, see U.S. COURTS DESIGN GUIDE 4-41 (1997). The guide was prepared
under the direction of the Security and Facilities Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United
States and is available from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Accession No. PB97-152466. That
guide was first published in 1991. Id. at Preface-2. The prior space requirements are detailed at
Revisions-3.
141. See, e.g., Bator, supra note 50, at 261 (describing a "reciprocal relationship" between the
delegation of "low-level and specialized and transitory tasks of administrative adjudication" and the
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altered the definition of a federal trial judge, we have yet to face the effects
of those changes on our commitment to an independent federal judiciary.
III. SORTING JUDICIAL ROLES BY RECONCEIVING THE "FEDERAL"
The creation of tiers of federal judges is one invention of the twentieth
century, albeit one not yet plain within either popular or legal culture. In
contrast, the assumption that the term "the federal courts" delineates a
recognizable and coherent group of judges and courts is so familiar in the
twenty-first century that it may be difficult to retrieve earlier impressions. In
the nineteenth century, the state courts dominated the landscape, literally in
material terms and figuratively in legal terms. Only in the twentieth century
did federal construction programs help to create a federal presence in many
communities through buildings that were in part a courthouse, in part a post
office, and in part a customs office. 14 2 Only in the 1930s did law school
curricula begin to include courses focused on the federal courts. 14 3 In the
same decade, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins 144 brushed aside a conception
of a shared common law145 and replaced it with the requirement that federal
trial courts, in diversity cases, had to look to state courts for interpretations
of law. After the 1954 ruling in Brown v. Board of Education,146 popular
attention turned to the lower federal courts as they undertook a program of
desegregation. School prayer litigation continued to make the federal courts
a flash point, as did debates about the rights of criminal defendants. By the
end of the twentieth century, the phrase "Don't make a federal case out of it"
had become a part of the national vocabulary. 147
Thus, another invention of the twentieth century was making meaningful the
concept of "the federal," in part through efforts to delineate sets of problems as
properly addressed by federal courts as contrasted with state (or, in the terms of
the District of Columbia, "local") courts. The larger issues of federalism are for
conception of a federal judiciary as "a small group of reversed, elite generalists, entrusted with
enormous powers of constitutional governance over the other branches and the sovereign states");
Pillsbury, supra note 99, at 425 (arguing the necessity of that approach for "modern government"). See
generally Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30
WM. & MARY L. REv. 211 (1989).
142. See Lois CRAIG, THE FEDERAL PRESENCE: ARCHITECTURE, POLITICS, AND SYMBOLS IN UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT BUILDING 277-409 (1977).
143. See Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U.
Cm. L. REv. 671, 681-87 (1989) (discussing the first casebooks and courses).
144. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
145. William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1889: The
Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1513 (1984).
146. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
147. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error: Jurisdiction as Injury, Transforming the Meaning of Article
II, 113 HARV. L. REv. 924, 981 (2000) (detailing that phrase's appearance in published opinions and in
popular literature in the 1950s and thereafter).
2002] 643
HeinOnline -- 90 Geo. L.J. 643 2001-2002
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
another time,' 48 but one aspect must be considered here. The changing concept
of what is a "federal case" provides further insight into the impetus to delineate
categories of federal judges and of courts. The issue is of particular relevance to
the history of the District of Columbia, which during the later part of the
twentieth century formally separated two aspects of its court system and hence
embodied the notion of the distinction. But despite the two different sets of
courts, what the District exemplifies is that the local and the national are deeply
interactive entities. Assignments of particular kinds of issues to one venue or the
other are not based in unchanging history or constitutional text but stem from
specific decisions in a given time about which level of government should
perform what task.
A. "THIS DISTRICT IS WHOLLY FEDERAL"
The question of the status of the District of Columbia's courts has spawned a
body of case law. In 1833, Chief Judge William Cranch of the Circuit Court for
the District of Columbia ruled on the court's power to hold over an indictment
that had charged an individual with the crime of running a house of "ill fame"
and to reach witnesses outside the District's boundaries. 149 Apparently, the
disputants agreed that federal courts had the power to hold special sessions for
federal offenses and to subpoena witnesses beyond the District but that munici-
pal courts did not.15 0 All also agreed that when Congress legislated for the
District, it did so "in its national character."1 5 ' At issue was how to categorize
the District's circuit court.
Chief Judge Cranch concluded that Congress had given the District jurisdic-
tion without distinguishing cases of "a purely federal character, and those of
what might be called a municipal character." 152 He opined:
Here it is all federal power and federal jurisdiction.... Here is no government
but that of the United States; no executive but that of the United States; no
legislature but that of the United States; and no judiciary but that of the
United States .... This District is wholly federal. 153
148. See generally Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender and the Globe, 111
YmA L.J. 619 (2001); Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can It Be "Revived?," 51 DuKE
L.J. (forthcoming Mar. 2002).
149. United States v. Williams, 28 F. Cas. 647 (C.C.D.C. 1833) (No. 16,712). The judge also served
as the official reporter for both the Circuit Court in the District and the United States Supreme Court.
See Noel, supra note 1, at 88; see also William F. Came, The Life and Times of William Cranch, Judge
of the District Circuit Court, 1801-1855, in 5 RECORDS OF THE COLUMBIA HISTORICAL SoCIETY, supra
note 4, at 294.
150. Williams, 28 F. Cas. at 648.
151. Id. (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (mem.)).
152. Id. at 649.
153. Id. at 655. The court rejected the view that Congress acted like a legislature of a state. Id. at
658. The decision did not refer to American Insurance Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), which
had been decided a few years earlier and which had reasoned that, when Congress legislated in the
territories, it was providing a government akin to that provided by the states. The Williams decision did,
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Cranch argued not only the inevitability of his characterization but its propriety:
that the District was a place in which all citizens of the United States stood on
equal footing, and that federal criminal jurisdiction was particularly appropriate
to exercise as a means of recognizing that status rather than permitting offenders
routes of escape by leaving the jurisdiction.' 54
Jump a century and a half forward to the 1970s and to another marker in the
District's history, the District of Columbia Reform and Criminal Procedure Act
of 1970.155 As Chief Judge David Bazelon explained, in the 1970 legislation,
"Congress created a two court system in the District of Columbia which is
analogous in many respects to the federal-state court systems elsewhere in the
United States." 156 The very passage of the Act marks the intelligibility of a
distinction between that which is federal and that which belongs to state (or, in
this context, to local) courts. 157
Yet that delineation was not intuitive in 1833. Between Chief Judge Cranch's
assertion in 1833 that the District was "wholly federal" and the Court Reorgani-
zation Act of 1970 came a Civil War; a host of national legislative enactments
creating federal statutory laws governing antitrust, consumer fraud, securities,
environmental regulation, and civil rights; and many Supreme Court holdings
delineating the "state" from the "federal." Landmarks such as Murdock v. City
of Memphis1 58 established the concept of state control over state law at the level
of the Supreme Court, while Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins159 provided the
district court analogue. The subdivision of the District's courts relies on the
idea, acquired in the nineteenth century and deepened over the course of the
twentieth century, that "a federal case" can be distinguished from a "a state
case."
But probe a bit deeper and the delineations fade, again because of political
and social activities of the last two centuries. Those close to the subject matter
of federal jurisdiction know well how ethereal the distinction is between that
which is federal and that which is state. Reams of published opinions struggle to
mark such a boundary as well as to acknowledge the overlap between state and
federal authority. Concepts such as pendent and ancillary jurisdiction authorize
federal courts to hear claims arising under state law. Bodies of law going under
however, rely heavily on the special and distinctive nature of the District, hence implicitly distinguish-
ing it from other territories.
154. Williams, 28 F. Cas. at 655-58.
155. Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473.
156. Proceedings of the Thirty-Third Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 60 F.R.D. 271, 273 (1972) [hereinafter Thirty-Third Annual D.C. Conference].
157. As Judge McGowan noted at the Thirty-Third Annual D.C. Conference, the Reorganization Act
was "the farthest advance thus far made towards home rule" in the District, putting the "judicial branch
out in front of the executive and legislative departments in terms of analogizing the District to a state."
Id. at 281.
158. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875) (mem.).
159. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally Susan Bandes, Erie and the History of the One True
Federalism, 110 YALE L.J. 829 (2001).
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the headers of "abstention" and "comity" require federal courts to decline to
hear some claims arising under federal law if it would require interpretation of
state law or interrupt pending state court proceedings. Moreover, determining
when a claim "arises" under federal law has proved daunting even for the
Supreme Court, which has yet to settle on a single test and which in the recent
past has split on whether a particular claim is "federal" or not.t6° Further, the
scope of federal common law and of federal procedural rulemaking powers
continues to provide debate. 161
Such problems have prompted efforts to revise jurisdictional lines. Indeed,
when Professor Paul Mishkin offered a tour through the subject at the D.C.
Circuit conference devoted to the Court Reorganization Act of 1970, he joked
that "seven years," rather than thirty-seven minutes, would be a more appropri-
ate segment in which to address the topic.1 62 He then explained efforts by the
American Law Institute to develop principles of distinction. And in the 1990s,
the Institute launched yet another project aimed at statutory reform. 163
But however murky or unavailing such line drawing is, one aspect of the line
has become plain: to be "federal" has come to be understood as to be more
"important." Given egalitarian norms, discussions of the hierarchy are often
downplayed, with celebrations of "our federalism"' 64 that emphasize the central-
ity of states in the governance of the United States. But within the framework of
courts, it is the United States Supreme Court that has the final word, and the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution imposes the rule that when state and
160. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986); Donald Doemberg,
There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the
Purpose of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987); John B. Oakley, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: When Does What "Arise Under" Federal Law?, 76
Thx. L. REv. 1829 (1998).
161. See, e.g, Semtek Int'l, Inc., v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); John Duffy,
Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEx. L. REv. 113 (1998) (arguing that federal
courts lack authority to make administrative common law).
162. Paul J. Mishkin, A General View of Federal Jurisdiction, in the Panel and Discussion, The
United States Courts in the District of Columbia: From General to Limited Jurisdiction, in Thirty-Third
D.C. Conference, supra note 156, at 282, 282-296. At the time, Mishkin, joined by Charles Alan
Wright and Richard Field, were at work on the American Law Project, Federal-State Jurisdiction. Id. at
282. Speaking thereafter, Professor Sherman Cohn discussed whether the Supreme Court would have
jurisdiction to hear Palmore v. United States, 290 A.2d 573 (D.C. App. 1972). See Sherman L. Cohn,
General Considerations Relating to Relationships Between Federal and Local Courts, in Thirty-Third
Annual D.C. Conference, supra note 156, at 297, 297-311; see also Marcy C. Lawton, The Particular
Problems of Federal and Local Court Relationships in the District of Columbia, in Thirty-Third Annual
D.C. Conference, supra note 156, at 316, 316-324 (detailing the overlap between the jurisdiction of the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and that of the D.C. Superior Court).
163. Am. LAW INST., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REvISION PROJECr (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1-4, 1997-
2001). See generally John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute's Federal Judicial
Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 855 (1998) (describing the project from his perspective
as its reporter); Joan Steinman, Crosscurrents: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Removal and the AIU
Revision Project, 74 IND. L.J. 76 (1998) (commenting on those proposals).
164. Justice Black famously invoked that phrase in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970),
another maker and marker of federal-court identity.
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federal law conflict, state law gives way. Furthermore, in terms of the status of
judges, Article III's attributes of life tenure and protected salaries are those
claimed to provide the best shield for judges, and hence the status of Article III
is much coveted by judges without it. Dockets are also distinguished by social
and political import, and here again, over the twentieth century, federal jurisdic-
tion has come to be equated with the "important cases." The phrase "Don't
make a federal case of it" is readily translated as an injunction against making
an issue more important than it is.
B. THE PLASTICITY OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
The approach of federal lawmakers, both congressional and judicial, toward
constitutional strictures within Article III and the development of a robust
concept of the richness of federal law are part of a larger story of constitutional
interpretation. During the second half of the twentieth century, the Constitution
was not read by either the courts, the Congress, or the Executive as imposing
substantial inhibitions on national transformation. The plasticity of constitu-
tional design appeared both in doctrine about what each of the three branches
could do and also in practice, as each of the three branches developed institu-
tions not mentioned in constitutional text. Article III does not specify an
organizational structure for the judiciary outside the hierarchy of court pro-
cesses. Similarly, Article I does not dictate the committee and staff structure
now central to legislation, and Article II gives few hints as to the shape of what
is now the executive branch. 16
5
As the judiciary offered a flexible reading of Article III that sanctioned and
enabled the production of thousands more judicial personnel, the judiciary also
developed an open attitude toward the Commerce Clause, understanding its
capacity to permit national legislation on issues ranging from strip-mining to
migratory birds, from labor policies to children's welfare. 166 In a comparable
fashion, executive authority was also understood broadly, such that, for ex-
ample, provisions of the Constitution about war powers did not prevent execu-
tive authorization of war-like activities. 167 Similarly, legislative powers were
not understood to preclude entities other than Congress from promulgating
regulations that are statute-like in their reach. 
168
Retrenchment, in some form, marked the last decade of the twentieth
century, but its contours are not yet solid. Plainly, a bare majority of the
165. See, e.g., Elana Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); Larry
Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994).
166. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964). The era closes with Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
167. See generally JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILrrY: CONSTTrUTIONAL LESSONS OF VETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
168. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1988) (upholding the Sentencing Reform Act,
providing for members of the life-tenured judiciary to join with others to create sentencing guidelines).
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current Supreme Court no longer understands congressional authority to be
as capacious as it once was. 169 Executive powers at the regulatory level have
been contested, 170 but, in the wake of the September l1th terrorist attacks,
are likely to be understood as robust. Turning specifically to Article III's
scope, the current Court has curtailed congressional powers to confer jurisdic-
tion, but has tolerated a good deal of congressional incursion on Article III
courts' power. For example, relying on separation of powers, the meaning of
the "case and controversy" requirements of Article III, and, more recently,
the Commerce Clause, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Court has struck legislation granting access to the federal courts. 17
The Court has also tolerated congressionally imposed limits created in the
1990s when Congress turned what had been law school hypotheticals about
"jurisdiction stripping" into statutes. These provisions have been upheld, but
interpreted as leaving open very limited avenues for redress. 172 Further,
while some lower court judges had objected to congressional restrictions on
courts' equitable powers, 173 the Supreme Court has concluded that Congress
has a great deal of license to constrain life-tenured judges' remedial author-
ity. 1 74 The phrase Article III constriction captures the Court's holdings
insisting on the limits of Congress's constitutional powers to grant jurisdic-
tion to life-tenured judges yet upholding congressional constraints on the
judiciary's remedial authority.
Article III devolution captures the Court's enthusiasm for shifting judicial
powers from life-tenured to others. For example, in discussion of the problems
of asbestos class actions, the Supreme Court has repeatedly appealed to Con-
169. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44
(1996); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by
Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000).
170. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); FDA v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
171. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 21 (1995) (separation of powers); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (Article III); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Commerce Clause
and Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44 (Eleventh Amendment); Kimel, 528 U.S.
at 91 (Fourteenth Amendment).
172. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214; Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
div. C., 110 Stat. 3546; Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66.
The Court has begun to address the effect of the statutes on its jurisdiction. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289 (2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996). See
generally Vicki C. Jackson, Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the Federal
Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445 (1998).
173. See, e.g., Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2000); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d
162 (2d Cir. 1997), vacated, 172 F.3d 144 (2d Cir. 1999); French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437 (7th Cir.
1999), rev'd sub nom. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
174. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 342. See generally Louise Weinberg, The Article 11 Box: The Power of
"Congress" to Attack the "Jurisdiction" of "Federal Courts, " 78 TEx. L. REV. 1405 (2000).
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gress to provide resolution mechanisms outside the Article III courts.' 75 More-
over, through approval of alternative dispute resolution, including mandatory
arbitration for federal statutory claims, the Court has welcomed the transfer of
jurisdiction out of the judiciary itself. 17 6 Thus, by means of both case law and
commentary, 77 the leaders of the life-tenured judiciary have voiced opposition
to "federalization," by which is meant the creation of civil causes of action
providing access to the federal courts and of criminal prosecutorial authority in
the federal courts. More judging moves outside Article III and, through encour-
agement of alternative dispute resolution and enforcement of contracts for
private dispute resolution, outside of courts altogether.
IV. ALTERING THE UNDERSTANDINGS OF A CASE: A SMORGASBORD OF CASES AND
THE GROWTH OF LARGE-SCALE LITIGATION
Federal judges were not the only ones multiplying in number and diversi-
fying in kind during the twentieth century. So were cases. In raw numbers,
the dockets of both trial and appellate courts have grown enormously.
According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, during
thirty-year intervals before the 1960s, both the number of cases and the
number of judges doubled; between the 1960s and 1990s, the numbers
tripled. 17 8 Beginning in 1974, the Administrative Office has also tracked
jurisdictional grants. Congress created 474 new causes of action during the
twenty-four years between 1974 and 1998.179 New legislative enactments,
both civil and criminal, ranged from consumer and environmental rights to
workers' protection and civil rights.' 80
175. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591, 622 (1997); see also JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE AD Hoc COMMITrEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION (Mar. 1991) ("Reavley Committee") (propos-
ing such alternatives in the early 1990s); Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, 106th Cong.,
H.R. 1283, 1st Sess. (1999) (proposing the establishment of an Asbestos Resolution Corporation to
provide initial process for such claims, subject to judicial review in the district courts).
176. See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. St. Clair Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
177. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, 166 ER.D. at 84-94 (Recommendations 2-10) (urging
Congress to have a presumption against the creation of new federal civil causes of action and new
federal criminal jurisdiction); discussion infra notes 224-29 and accompanying text.
178. See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Data on U.S. Courts of Appeals, Number of Judgeships
and Appellate Filings, Selected Years, and U.S. District Courts, Number of Judgeships and Cases Filed,
Selected Years (Sept. 1998) (on file with author).
179. Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Revision of List of Statutes Enlarging Federal Court
Workload (Sept. 18, 1998) (on file with author).
180. Data on filings provide a limited picture, as the judiciary recognized when it refined its
measurement techniques to analyze "weighted" filings, attempting to reflect the different burdens
imposed by various kinds of cases, some of which conclude without any court action at all. One such
evaluation determined that, between 1962 and 1988, work for district court judges doubled. See Larry
Kramer, "The One-Eyed Are Kings": Improving Congress's Ability to Regulate the Use of Judicial
Resources, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 73, 74 (1991); see also GORDON BERMANT, PATRICIA A. LOMBARD
& CARROLL SERON, THE CASES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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Caseloads continue to be the central source of judicial work.' 8' Yet the word
"case," like the phrase "federal judge," has had a changing definition. While
many commentators focus on Congress as the source of new work for judges,
less attention has been paid to the role of judges and lawyers, who, through
doctrine and as rulemakers, have also contributed significantly to the judicial
workload by altering understandings of what configurations of events form a
single "case." In 1966, for example, the Court recognized that state claims
emerging from the same "nucleus of operative fact" as federal claims could
constitutionally be brought into federal court under the theory of pendent
jurisdiction. 182 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, crafted in 1938, autho-
rized liberal rules of joinder of parties and of claims and the consolidation of
cases. These rules helped to shift the understanding of the plausible parameters
of cases. As amended in 1966, these rules also permitted a new mechanism for
group-based litigation: the class action. Further, the Judicial Conference sought
and received congressional authority to alter venue rules through the multidis-
trict litigation statute to bring cases together for pretrial processing.183
Through such efforts, the idea of what claims were sufficiently linked and
interrelated to be part of the same unit changed. Our vocabulary reflected the
shift by describing the "asbestos litigation" or the "tobacco litigation," as a
series of cases properly before a single judge, charged with ruling on law, facts,
and remedial regimes. 184 The resulting array of cases creates a smorgasbord,
with choices to be made about which judges are to preside over what disputes.
Further, the growth in the docket and the emergence of large-scale litigation was
one of several factors that prompted judges to reconceive the tasks of "judging"
by focusing on management, settlement, and alternative dispute resolution.
Cmcurr (Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1982). In an effort to understand the docket and whether distinctive features
of the D.C. Circuit docket imposed differing work demands, the researchers relied on two measures,
"input burdens" (such as the numbers of lawyers on a case, number of briefs filed, parties, length of
records on appeal) and "output indicators" (including type and length of a court's decision). Id. at
xi-xiii, 15-18. The researchers determined that they could not find a relationship between input and
output burdens. For example, administrative cases imposed greater input burdens but not necessarily
striking differences in output indicators. Id. at xii. Criminal cases imposed greater "burden of publica-
tion" than other kinds of cases. Id. at 35.
181. The topic of the volume of work has been a common one addressed at conferences of the D.C.
Circuit. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Fifty-Seventh Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia
Circuit, 191 F.R.D. 187, 190-92 (1998) (Opening Remarks of Chief Judge Harry Edwards) (discussing
expedited procedures for "the disposition of uncomplicated motions" and that the time for processing
appellate cases declined from fifteen and one-half months in 1995 to eleven and one-half months in
1998).
182. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994)
(providing for supplemental jurisdiction).
183. The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968 was enacted at the urging of the Judicial Conference.
See Pub. L. No. 90-296, § 1, 82 Stat. 109, 109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994)); see also Lexecon
Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) (concluding that the statute did not
permit MDLjudges to retain cases for trial).
184. See generally Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5
(1991). Grouping cases also enables an organization to reduce the numbers of tasks to do by
consolidating the number of decisions to be made.
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V. MULTIPLYING JUDICIAL ROLES
The changes in who can judge and in the numbers and kinds of cases were
concurrent with changes in what trial judges actually do. Judges within the
District of Columbia were among the first to insist that the Article III judiciary
needed additional personnel to accomplish its tasks and among the first to alter
the understanding of what those tasks were. Through such efforts, "the judicial"
took on new meaning.
A. INVENTING AND STAFFING THE PRETRIAL PROCESS BY REORIENTING
THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE
In 1958, judges of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
obtained approval from the Judicial Conference of the United States to employ
someone called a "pre-trial examiner," deputized to meet with litigants in
personal injury disputes to discuss discovery and settlement. 185 Within a de-
cade, proposals to create the position of magistrate were before Congress, and
when the Federal Magistrates Act passed in 1968, the District of Columbia was
one of five districts chosen to have magistrates. 186 These new judicial officers
had tasks identified as ministerial, administrative, and supportive. Further, in the
case of the pre-trial examiner, the job itself was novel, consisting of advising
and assisting parties in negotiations and in trial preparation. In 1958, that work
was not understood as part of what federal judges did. As explained by a
committee of the Judicial Conference evaluating the use of pre-trial examiners
in personal injury cases, the experiment was a success because judges could be
"relieved of many non-judicial functions in connection with pretrial proceedings
and... enabled thereby to devote themselves strictly to their judicial tasks."
' 187
Over the subsequent decades, however, judges began to perceive that their own
185. See Handmarked Report from Judge Biggs 27 (Feb. 24, 1958), in Judicial Conference Records,
located in the offices of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts [hereinafter Judicial
Conference Records/AO Collection], Binder Mar. 1958; Joint Report of the Committee on Supporting
Personnel and the Committee on Court Administration, in Judicial Conference Records/AO Collection,
supra, at Binder Mar. 1958, Exhibit 5.
In 1960, the Judicial Conference authorized a similar position for the Southern District of New York.
See Budget Committee Report 5 (1960), in Judicial Conference/AO Collection, supra, at Binder Sept.
1960; see also Memorandum re Use of Special Master to Supervise Pre-Trial Discovery in Protracted
Cases (Jan. 21, 1957), in Judicial Conference Records/AO Collection, supra, at Binder Mar. 1957,
Supplemental Agenda Item 9 ("special masters in protracted cases"). After the Magistrate Act in 1968,
the District continued to have pre-trial examiners. See Excerpts from Proceedings of the Thirty-Second
Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 54 F.R.D. 107, 122, 124-25 (1972)
[hereinafter Thirty-Second Annual D.C. Conference] (remarks of Judge Gerhard A. Gesell) (discussing
the court's use of pre-trial examiners, noting that the District was the "only court in the country"
currently using them and commenting that the trend was for those individuals to become magistrates).
186. See Thirtieth Annual D.C. Conference, supra note 72, at 164-65.
187. Report of the Committee on Court Administration 3, app. at 26 (1964), in Judicial Conference
Records/AO Collection, supra note 185, at Binder 1, Sept. 1964 (emphases added). In contrast, a 1970
report to Congress on the District stated that the pre-trial was "a judicial function" and advocated that
pre-trials be used and that they be held by judges "who will try the case.., two weeks to a month
before the actual trial." SENATE COMM. ON THE DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., REPORT OF
2002]
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role was multifaceted and that "judging" included the work of managing cases,
superintending lawyers, controlling the shape of litigation, and promoting settle-
ment in lieu of adjudication. 88 Judges of the D.C. courts played a central part in
this reorientation of the judicial role.
The magazine story from which I drew the title of this Article provides a
window into these efforts. Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice was published in
Reader's Digest in August of 1948.189 Its subject was the D.C. District Court's
new experiment.
Tucked away at the end of a comparatively quiet corridor in the busy, noisy
courthouse of the District of Columbia is one of the country's new and
unusual tribunals-the Pre-Trial and Assignments Court, [which] dispenses
more justice in less time than any other in the building.' 90
What was "new and unusual" was that judges and lawyers were conferring in
advance of trial to discuss the contours of a lawsuit and, some hoped, to settle
such disputes as well.
The Honorable Bolitha Laws of the D.C. District Court was central to
these efforts (and to the press coverage of them).' 9 He had worked as a
member of the Judicial Conference's Pre-Trial Committee, 92 created in
1940 to encourage the use of pre-trials, a then-novel addition in the federal
system that the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had licensed. Bolitha
Laws and his colleagues were distressed that their fellow judges did not
fully embrace the "modern" method of the pre-trial conference, which, in
their view, could streamline trials and respond to the problems posed by
growing dockets. These judges tried to promote judicial use of pre-trials
through surveys, through distribution of "how-to" handbooks, and through
targeted marketing of pre-trial techniques to newly appointed judges. Were
one appointed to the federal trial bench in the early 1950s, one would have
received a letter beginning:
THE COMMITTEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE TO THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRcUIT 10-11 (Comm. Print 1970).
188. See generally Judith Resnik, Whose Judgment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement
and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1471 (1994);
Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982).
189. Frederic Sondern, Jr., Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice, READER'S DIGEST, Aug. 1948, at 45.
190. Id. at 45.
191. Judge Laws was a member of the D.C. District Court from 1945 to 1958 and served as its chief
from 1948 until 1958. See also Bolitha J. Laws, Pre-Trial Procedure, Address Before the Section of
Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association (Sept. 10, 1940), in 1 F.R.D. 397, 401-02
(explaining his efforts at settlement and noting that he reassured counsel not to be deterred from
seeking their days in court).
192. See Pre-Trial Committee Folder (1949), in Records of the Pre-Trial Committee, 1940-1955
[hereinafter Pre-Trial Committee Records], Entry 7, Box 2, located in Record Group 116, National
Archives, Washington, D.C.
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The National Judicial Conference Committee on Pre-Trial Procedure bids you
a warm welcome to the federal judiciary .... Many of our fine trial judges are
convinced by experience that the sensible use of pre-trial ... is of material aid
in the proficient and expeditious disposition of litigation.193
When such efforts provided insufficient, these judges undertook yet another
new task: teaching. 
194
Only fifty years ago, the idea of teaching judges about judging was
thought odd. In 1954, a senior staff member of the Administrative Office
wrote to a distinguished judicial leader that "the idea of a 'school for
judges' would lend itself to ridicule." 195 Judges were assumed to be steeped
in the life of the law; formal education would undercut that image. But
interest in teaching came from several sources, including from judges
formulating and promoting a new pre-trial role for judges in ordinary cases
and from judges involved in what is now called "large-scale" or "complex"
litigation. In 1951, E. Barrett Prettyman, Sr. chaired a committee charged by
the Judicial Conference of the United States to consider how to handle such
"protracted cases." 19 6 He recommended that judges who were assigned such
protracted cases should "at the earliest moment take actual control of the
case and rigourously exercise such control throughout the proceedings." ' 97
Further, such judges (whom he described as "iron-hearted in demeanor") 98
should hold conferences with lawyers to organize the path of the litiga-
tion.' 99 These views took hold among a group of judges who became eager
to explain to their colleagues how to handle the "big case." And judges
promoting pre-trials in ordinary cases were frustrated that too few of their
colleagues shared their enthusiasm.
Together these judicial leaders pressed for institutional innovation. The first
seminars convened were for protracted cases, and then, in 1960, the Judicial
Conference of the United States began holding regular seminars for newly
appointed judges. Five years later, the New York Times reported that "the
193. See, e.g., Letter from Alfred P. Murrah to Lester L. Cecil (May 25, 1953) (on file with author).
Judge Cecil was then a new appointee to the federal bench in Ohio.
194. See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemak-
ing on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REv. 133, 158-79 (1997) (detailing the
development of such teaching efforts within the federal judiciary).
195. Letter from Will Shafroth to Alfred P. Murrah (Mar. 22, 1954), in Records Relating to Judicial
Conference Committees, 1941-1957 [hereinafter Judicial Conference Committee Records], Entry 5,
Box 5, located in Record Group 116, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
196. Judge Prettyman, appointed by Harry Truman, sat from 1945 until 1971 on the D.C. Circuit,
and served as chief judge from 1958 until 1960.
197. Proceedings of the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 F.R.D. 319,
614-15 (1959) (Resolutions Adopted at the Seminar on Protracted Cases).
198. This description is attributed to a 1951 speech by Judge Prettyman. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
STUDY GROUP ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIG., HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE
TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES (1960), reprinted in 25 F.R.D. 351, 384 (1960).
199. Id. at 385.
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Federal judicial hierarchy is pLtshing a campaign to make its trial judges
abandon their traditional role as passive umpires between opposing lawyers
and to become 'More masterful in controlling trials. '20 0 Return to Read-
er's Digest's description and appreciate how accurately it captured the work
of Judge Bolitha Laws and his colleagues, whom the author described as
"crusader[s]. '' 2° Judge Laws "and a group of the nation's foremost judges
and attorneys... preach[ed] their gospel to bar associations all over the
country., 20 2 Thereafter, they succeeded by formalizing education for the
profession of judging. Forty years later, their vision of the judicial role has
come to permeate judicial education programs, federal statutes, practices, and
rules.2 0 3
Materials from the D.C. Circuit's conferences and its local rules reflect
the shift in expectations of judges. 2° In 1969, the D.C. Circuit began
regularly publishing its conference proceedings.2 °5 At several conferences,
discussions addressed the changing role of individual judges toward their
cases,20 6 the pre-trial process, 20 7 judicial promotion of settlement,20 8 and
reliance on magistrate judges, attorneys designated as "early neutral evalua-
200. More U.S. Judges Go to School, N.Y. TiMsS, June 23, 1965, at 13.
201. Sondem, supra note 190, at 45.
202. Id.
203. See also Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, Thinking Outside the Civil Procedure
Box: Reformulating Pretrial Conference Laws, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 347 (2002) (calling for
reformulations of all written pre-trial conference laws to guide judges and litigants about the
matters to be addressed). Federal agencies too must explore the use of ADR. See Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 556(c)(6)-(8) (2000)).
204. See Jill Sayenga, Office of the Circuit Executive, A History of the District of Columbia Circuit
Judicial Conference, 1940-1989 (June 1989) (paper prepared for the D.C. Circuit's Fiftieth Judicial
Conference) (describing the accomplishments, formats, and contents of the Circuit's conferences).
Chief Justice Warren Burger credited the leadership of Judge Prettyman with bringing to the Circuit's
conferences a focus on specific topics related to the administration of justice. See Proceedings of the
Thirty-First Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 51 FR.D. 25, 31 (1970)
(Greetings from the Chief Justice).
205. See Thirtieth Annual D.C. Conference, supra note 72, at 141. The format has shifted over time;
conferences from 1958 until 1960 included formal resolutions, debated and then voted upon. My thanks
to staff of the ED.C. qircuit for providing photocopies of those proceedings to me.
206. See id. at 159-60 (cormments of Judge Wright) (describing that there was "no better way to
expedite the disposition of a lwsuit than by placing the responsibility for the termination of that
lawsuit upon the sheulders of a' particular judge ... [who] by pretrying the case himself.., can
expedite the determination of cases without trial").
207. See Proceedings of the Forty-Fifth Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 105
ER.D. 251, 365-76 (1984) (discussing the promulgation in 1973 of a standard form of pre-trial order
instructions, the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 adding [structure to pre-trial procedure, and relations
among judges and lawyers).
208. Id. at 384-87 (debating whether judges or magistrates should be involved in settlement);
Proceedings of the Thirty-Ninth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, 81 F.R.D. 263, 321 (1978) (including description of a magistrate judge who began by
stating,"'This is a settlement conference. The main rule is we don't leave here until settlement is
achieved"'); Proceedings of the Thirty-Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the District of
Columbia Circuit, 77 F.R.D. 256, 302-06 (1977) [hereinafter Thirty-Eighth Annual D.C. Confer-
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tors," "mediators," and "arbitrators. 2 °9 In 1971, the conference described
such efforts under the title "Non-Judicial Means of Resolving Legal Dis-
putes. ' 210 Just thirty years later, these techniques are no longer viewed as
"non-judicial" because arbitration, special masters, magistrate judges, and
settlement efforts have become a part of judicial proceedings. 21'
A ruling in the 1990s of the D.C. Circuit's appellate court provides the
appropriate coda. At issue was whether a court-appointed mediator, working in
an alternative dispute resolution program in the "local" D.C. courts, was entitled
to judicial immunity to protect him from a civil suit for damages.212 The
appellate court held that the mediator was entitled to judicial immunity because
what the court-appointed mediator did was no different from what a judge
might have done.213 In other words, the tasks of judges have come to encom-
pass mediation. Both judge and mediator strive to resolve cases without adjudi-
cation.
B. INVENTING THE ORGANIZED JUDICIARY
Just as individual judges came to understand their job to be different, so did
the judiciary as an institution alter its approach to its own role. During the same
ence] (discussing judge-run settlement conferences and uniformity of practice during the pre-trial
process).
209. See, e.g., Proceedings of the Fifty-First Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit,
134 F.R.D. 321, 361 (1990) (describing appellate and district court mediation programs and early
neutral evaluation at the trial level); Proceedings of the Forty-Sixth Judicial Conference of the District
of Columbia Circuit, I I F.R.D. 91, 194-217 (1985) (discussing court-initiated and organized programs
for ADR); Thirty-Eighth Annual D.C. Conference, supra note 208, at 309-10 (discussing arbitration).
210. See Thirty-Second Annual Conference, supra note 185, at 142, 154-77.
211. The local rules of the D.C. Circuit's trial and appellate courts specifically address such efforts,
built now into the framework of court-based processing. See D.D.C. Loc. R. app. B, at 114 (Dispute
Resolution Programs), available at http://www.dcd.uscourts.govflocalrules.pdf (discussing creation
in 1989 of mediation program, described as prompting resolutions that are "faster, less expensive,
more creative, and better able to address the underlying interests of all parties" than "formal litiga-
tion and direct negotiation of the parties"); id. app. C, at 121 (Program Procedures for Mediation
in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit); id. R. 16.3 (requiring meetings
of counsel fifteen days after a defendant appears to consider the propriety of mediation); The
Appellate Mediation Program (Apr. 1998), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/formscab/
mediat.pdf.
Mediation referrals do not, however, alter scheduling orders. See Olgyay v. Soc'y of Envtl. Graphic
Design, 169 F.R.D. 219 (D.D.C. 1996) (enforcing the schedule for discovery); see also http://
www.dcbar.org/dcsc/resolution.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2001) (describing the Multi-Door Dispute
Resolution Division of the D.C. Superior Court, which created the division in 1985 to provide
mediation, arbitration, and case evaluation through a full-time staff of nineteen plus volunteers serving
as "neutrals").
212. Wagshal v. Foster, 28 F.3d 1249, 1252-53 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1004 (1995);
see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (executive official performing adjudicative decision-
making had immunity from suit like a judge); Austern v. Chi. Bd. Options Exch., 898 F.2d 882, 886 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990) (commercial organizations sponsoring contractual arbitration
immune from civil liability).
213. Wagshal, 28 F.3d at 1252, 1254.
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decades in which agencies were being required to function more like courts, the
federal courts were developing institutional structures that enabled the judiciary
to act more like an agency. Today, the federal judiciary functions as an entity
that can minister to itself and can present to other branches of government a set
of goals and programs. During the twentieth century, the Article III judiciary
developed means by which to define a set of interests as its own and to promote
them.
Although federal judges in the District have long had ready access to each
other and to other public officials, the rest of the federal judiciary was dispersed
and relatively uncoordinated. Recall, for example, that in 1915, some 120
federal judges were spread across the nation, with, for example, a single district
judge in Indiana or Maryland or Massachusetts.214 They used different rules
when deciding cases in their courts, and they had little institutional means by
which to talk with each other. The Attorney General gave Congress reports on
the federal courts and asked Congress for the judiciary's funds. The American
Bar Association also served to advance concerns about judicial administration,
salaries, and staffing. Further, while individual judges might have pressed
specific reforms, no means existed to do so collectively.
21 5
But in the 1920s, Congress authorized annual meetings for a group of senior
judges, which became what is now called the Judicial Conference of the United
States. t6 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court presides over the twenty-
seven judges, who make official policy for the federal judiciary. In 1937, the
D.C. Circuit joined that body. 217 In 1939, at the behest of life-tenured federal
judges, Congress created the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
to collect data, submit budgets, and run the facilities for the federal court
system.218 In 1967, the Federal Judicial Center came into being to expand the
ability of the judiciary to focus on education and research.21 9 Under Warren
214. See, e.g., 220 F. v-vii (1915) (listing the district judges and their assignments).
215. As then-Chief Justice William Howard Taft put it, each federal judge had "to paddle his own
canoe." William Howard Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in Federal
Courts, 8 A.B.A. J. 601, 602 (1922).
216. See Act of Sept. 14, 1922, ch. 306, § 2, 42 Stat. 837, 838. The Act created the Conference of
Senior Circuit Judges, which has since been renamed, revamped, and, as the Judicial Conference, is
now authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1994). As Robert Post has argued, legislation that reconfigured
the Supreme Court's docket was also instrumental in bringing into being the judicial branch as we
understand it today. See Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent,
Legal Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MiN. L. REv. 1267 (2001) (discussing the
Judiciary Act of 1925, which reduced the mandatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and thereby
ceded authority to the Court to shape its own docket, which in turn occasioned a different understand-
ing by the justices of their role).
217. See Act of July 5, 1937, ch. 427, 50 Stat. 473 (then-codified at 28 U.S.C. § 218 (1940))
(providing for the District of Columbia's senior circuit judge to be included).
218. See Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 501, sec. 1, § 304(2), 53 Stat. 1223, 1223 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 601-612 (1994)).
219. See Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, sec. 101, § 620, 81 Stat. 664, 664 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 620-629).
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Burger's tenure, Chief Justices began to make "state of the judiciary" speeches.22°
In 1991, the judiciary set up an Office of Judicial Impact Assessments to file
"estimates" or predictions on the effects of new causes of action on court
dockets.221 A few years thereafter, via a "futures planning process," the Judicial
Conference approved ninety-three recommendations to Congress as part of an
official document, a first-ever Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts, issued
in 1995.222 Thus, this body of judges has formally taken on the role of speaking
on behalf of the Article III judiciary itself.2 23
In short, over the last few decades, the federal judiciary has become an
organization with more than 1500 judges (including magistrate, bankruptcy, and
Article III judges), some 30,000 staff, and a budget of much less than one
percent of the federal budget. 2 4 As a corporate entity, the federal judiciary
educates, plans, lobbies, and opines about the shape, nature, and future of
judging. In terms of the positions taken in the last few years in its corporate
voice, the federal judiciary has argued for limited growth in the number of
life-tenured judges and, in some instances, for retrenchment,225 for better
salaries and courthouses,226 for expansion of the statutory federal judiciary,227
for less federal jurisdiction, 228 and for a presumption against creation of federal
220. See William Rehnquist, Chief Justice Recaps 1995, THIRD BRANCH, Jan. 1996, at 1 (describing
the tradition of making such remarks).
221. See CONFERENCE ON ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION ON THE WORKLOAD OF THE COURTS:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 5-6 (A. Fletcher Mangum ed., Fed. Judicial Ctr. 1995).
222. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, 166 F.R.D. at 49.
223. For discussion of the development of this approach and some questions about it, see Judith
Resnik, The Programmatic Judiciary: Lobbying, Judging, and Invalidating the Violence Against
Women Act, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 269 (2000).
224. See Omnibus Appropriations Bill a Mixed Bag for Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1998,
at 1, 5 (describing "total [fiscal year] obligations of $4.06 billion for the Judiciary," and summariz-
ing the allocations to salaries and expenses, to defender services, to juror fees, and to court
security).
225. See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, 166 F.R.D. at 98 (Recommendation 15) ("The growth of
the Article III judiciary should be carefully controlled so that the creation of new judgeships, while not
subject to a numerical ceiling, is limited to that number necessary to exercise federal court jurisdic-
tion.").
226. In addition, and relying on a long tradition of private interest-based associations, federal judges
have also organized another group, the National Federal Judges Association, focused on judicial
salaries and benefits.
227. LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 17, 166 F.R.D. at 94 (Recommendation 10) ("Where constitution-
ally permissible, Congress should be encouraged to assign to administrative agencies or Article I courts
the initial responsibility for adjudicating those categories of federal benefits or regulatory cases that
typically involve intense fact-finding."); id. at 161 (Recommendation 65) ("Magistrate judges should
perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally permissible and consistent with sound judicial
policy."). In the commentary that follows, the Long Range Plan called for consideration of expanding
the role of magistrate judges. Id.
228. Id. at 83 (Recommendation 1) ("Congress should be encouraged to conserve the federal courts
as a distinctive judicial forum of limited jurisdiction in our system of federalism. Civil and criminal
jurisdiction should be assigned to the federal courts only to further clearly defined and justified national
interests, leaving to the state courts the responsibility for adjudicating all other matters."); id. at 84-87
(Recommendations 2-5, criminal jurisdiction); id. at 88-94 (Recommendations 6-10, civil jurisdic-
tion).
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rights if enforced in federal court.2 2 9
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONAL "BOAST"
A. A HUNDRED-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE
A review of the last century makes plain that life-tenured judges have been
instrumental in a self-conscious effort to reorganize the deployment of judges,
to refocus the content of judging, and to shape the judiciary as an institutional
force. They saw needs to generate more judges (of a variety of kinds and sited
in an array of institutions) and more processes to respond to (if not to keep pace
with) the demands for adjudication that a large population, a complex economy,
and a multifaceted government imposed.
Moreover, they have succeeded. The persons who hold some aspects of the
federal power of judging have multiplied. The venues of judging have diversi-
fied. The volume and kind of cases have changed. Some tasks of judging have
devolved, while new ones have been invented and now overlap with roles once
thought to belong to nonjudicial staff. The nineteenth-century positions of
commissioner, referee, and justice of the peace have been renovated in the
twentieth century into a subsidiary judiciary of serious capacity, with stature
and status. 230 The federal judiciary has also gained a corporate structure,
enabling it to forward agendas by functioning through means associated with
agencies and special interest groups.23 '
In some of the literature on judging, this dazzling set of innovations is
explained only by reference to growing demands for judges' time. Of course,
the impulse to make changes was in part driven by conditions of excess.
Altering process and posture was one way to increase capacity. Yet volume
alone does not suffice to explain the entire set of transformations.23 2 Rather,
229. Id. at 88 (Recommendation 6) ("Congress should be encouraged to exercise restraint in the
enactment of new statutes that assign civil jurisdiction to the federal courts and should do so only to
further clearly defined and justified federal interests.").
230. The position of the magistrate judge is a particularly interesting innovation. The authorizing
legislation gives Article III judges the ability to beget judges without asking Congress for a judgeship.
All that is needed is funding. The quantities and allocations of magistrate judges remain internal
managerial decisions of life-tenured judges who also hold the power of selection.
231. The interactions to further these efforts rely on a range of modes of communication, from
published decisions to legislative testimony and informal contacts. See generally ROBERT KATzmANN,
COURTS AND COr RESS (1997); Posner, supra note 119, at 75 & n.86 (describing federal judicial
lobbying work during the enactment of bankruptcy legislation); Henry Robert Glick, Policy-Making
and State Supreme Courts: The Judiciary as an Interest Group, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 271 (1970)
(analyzing efforts by state court justices to affect state legislative policy and affiliation with other
groups in support of specific policy agendas). In contrast to these practices, in which the judiciary
competes with other groups for resources, literature on judicial independence posits that an independent
judiciary serves to arbitrate disputes among special interests. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcON. 875 (1975).
232. For example, federal case filings declined in the 1930s and 1940s. See Robert A. Kagan,
Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, The Evolution of State Su-
preme Courts, 76 MICH. L. REV. 894, 978 n.41 (1978). Further, the Administrative Office of the
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institutional actors came to believe not only in the need for greater productivity
but also in the desirability of different modes and sites of production. Settlement
efforts and alternative dispute resolution became celebrated as preferable forms
of dispute resolution, as more amicable and more creative than adjudication.2 33
The role of judge as deliberate decisionmaker receded in favor of the role of
judge as dispute resolver.2 34-Understandings developed that a life-tenured judge
need not staff all of federal adjudication. The efforts to identify issues as not
requiring a federal (as contrasted with state) court, as not requiring a constitu-
tional (as contrasted to h statutory) judge, and as not requiring public (as
contrasted to private) dispute resolution were founded upon a range of political
and social premises in which efficient distribution of resources played a part but
was not the sole determinant.
This set of responses is not anomalous. The historical trajectory I have
detailed could belong to many organizations faced with higher demands for
services that required expanded capacity through increasing the numbers and
kinds of providers, delegating duties, routinizing processes, and reconfiguring
the work. Organizational theory might well thus assimilate the developments
United States Courts surveyed federal trial judges repeatedly in the 1940s and 1950s and received
reports that case loads were manageable in many areas and/or that pre-trial management and
settlement efforts were not desirable responses. See, e.g., Folder Survey and Statistics, Federal
Courts, 1944, in Pre-Trial Committee Records, supra note 192, at Box 2 (survey of Apr. 7, 1944,
discussed in a letter from the Pre-Trial Committee to all district and circuit judges concerning
pre-trial procedure in the federal courts). But promotion of efforts to respond to docket excess did
not abate.
Similarly, trial rates in the federal system are now under four percent (down from twenty percent in
the 1940s), and although filings in general are up, some labor-intensive forms of litigation have also
declined, yet efforts to find alternatives to adjudication continue to be pursued. See Stephen Yeazell,
The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 631, 633-34 (discussing
the declining trial rate); see also Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big
Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY 497 (1996) (finding
that while the volume of litigation grew in the early period, it declined thereafter). The same is true in
the District of Columbia. See FINAL REPORT OF THE CIvIL JusncE REFORM ACT ADvISORY GROUP FOR THE
UNITED STATES DisTRIcr COURT FOR THE DisTRicr OF COLUMBIA 19 (1999).
This measure needs caveats. As noted, this form of trial data includes a range of evidentiary hearings
and does not include magistrate and bankruptcy judge trials, which may affect the numbers somewhat,
nor do recent charts address changes in the length of cases that do proceed to trial. These issues are
before the Judicial Conference, which has commissioned a review of the decline in trials. See ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, DRAFr/DEREAsING TRIAL RATES 1N THE UNITED STATED DISTmcr COURTS
(2001) (on file with author).
233. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudica-
tion, 10 Omo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211 (1995).
234. How judicial productivity is measured reflects this preference. Data track the number of
pending cases per district court judge but not the number of adjudicatory decisions per trial judge.
Telephone Interview with Staff, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 2001). Appellate courts
do track the numbers of appellate decisions rendered. See U.S. Courts of Appeals-Judicial Caseload
Profile, at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/cmsa2000.pl (last visited Jan. 29, 2002). Further, specialized
studies, either by the judiciary or by legal commentators, address publication rates. See, e.g., Mitu
Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1998). In one
analysis, publication of decisions is a measure of the "burden" of an appellate docket. See, e.g.,
BERMANr, LOMBARD & SERON, supra note 180, at xi-xii.
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within the federal judiciary to those of other institutions, also busy, which
"strive to become less reactive," to have agendas "less controlled" by those to
whom they provide service, and to be "more self-directed and bureaucratically
organized. ' 35
The issue is whether the federal judiciary ought to welcome the comparison
with other organizations or whether its peculiar mandate and constitutional
position should prompt concern about its assimilationist evolution. The question
for the next generation of reformers is whether to try to link the enterprise of
federal judging to values identified as central to Article III or to permit Article
II1 to become increasingly attenuated from that work. My answer is that an
independent judiciary is, as Justice Douglas commented in a case about the D.C.
Circuit, "one of our proudest boasts, by reasons of Article III.' 236 But what I
have shown is that Article Ill does not speak directly to the judiciary's current
structure, to most of the people who serve as judges within the federal system,
nor to a significant amount of the tasks they undertake. Article III as currently
interpreted is not sufficient to the task of ensuring that judicial independence
can and will be sustained.
Who and what is at risk? In my view, life-tenured judges are not themselves
immediately vulnerable. However unpleasant the contemporary rhetoric, United
States history is replete with verbal attacks and legislative efforts (mostly
aborted) aimed at undermining the Article III judge. This era is sometimes
identified as another peak, particularly given congressional incursions on fed-
eral court jurisdiction and remedies.237 These statutes could be read as assaults
on judicial independence or as specially targeted constraints on the judicial
authority to recognize the rights of particular sets of litigants, such as prisoners
and immigrants, now subjected to different and more onerous requirements that
limit their access to courts. But the statutory revisions could also be understood
as reflecting an agreement between the judiciary and the Congress about
appropriate limitations on access for certain sets of litigants. Indeed, a five-
person majority of the Court has often led the way in restricting access. 2 38
Rather than delineate boundaries to protect judicial remedial authority, the
leadership of the federal judiciary has shifted constitutional meanings to tolerate
both diminished access for litigants to courts and reductions in certain forms of
judicial power.2 39
235. See Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman & Wheeler, supra note 232, at 972-73 (detailing comparable
transformations in state courts).
236. Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410, 412 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (objecting to the
reorganization of the D.C. courts as challenged by a criminal defendant).
237. See supra note 172.
238. See Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding that no implied cause of action
is available for federal inmates seeking damages against a private provider of prison services);
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (concluding that no private right of action is available to
enforce claims of disparate-impact discrimination under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
239. The circumscription of common law powers of federal courts is a central example. See Peter
Strauss, Courts or Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. (forthcoming
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Moreover, the office of the life-tenured judge remains, at present, secure-if
judicial independence is translated to mean both freedom of an individual judge
to decide a case without risk of loss of tenure and the ability to obtain the
requisite economic support to provide services. 240 Debates can properly be had
about whether salaries are too low, courthouse construction insufficient, or
congressional inquiries too persistent.24' Yet the Article III judiciary has had a
record of considerable success with Congress, which has provided the life-
tenured with better pay, staff, and facilities than other judiciaries in the United
States.242
Turn from the life-tenured Article III judiciary to the large numbers of
non-life-tenured federal judges within and without, and the picture is less
encouraging. As a raft of bankruptcy and magistrate judges come up for
2002); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 122 S. Ct. 708 (2002) (interpreting, in
a decision by Justice Scalia on behalf of a five-person majority, a provision of ERISA to provide only
legal, not equitable remedies over a dissent, by Justice Ginsburg on behalf of herself and three
colleagues, objecting to the majority's reading by arguing that it exhumed old categories and would
"obstruct the general goals of ERISA by relegating to state court (or to no court at all) an array of suits
involving the interpretation of employee health plan provisions," id. at 720 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
240. As to the desirability of that "liberty," see Pamela S. Karlen, Two Concepts of Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. Rav. 535 (1999).
241. For example, the federal judiciary has proposed a significant program of courthouse renovation
and building, which in turn has prompted disagreements. See generally GEN. ACCOUTriNG OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-97-39, COURTHOUSE CONSTRUCTION: BETTER COURTROOM USE DATA COULD ENHANCE FACILITY
PLANNING AND DECISIONMAKING (1997); GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, GAO/T-GGD-96-19, FEDERAL COURT-
HOUSE CONSTRUCTION: MORE DISCIPLINED APPROACH WOULD REDUCE COSTS AND PROVIDE FOR BETTER
DECISIONMAKIN6 (1995). Some of the proposals were delayed. See, e.g., Courthouse Funding Delay
Jeopardized Judicial System, THIRD BRANCH, July 1998, at 1 (describing testimony by judges urging
Congress to approve construction projects). But thereafter, several were funded. See Omnibus Bill
Funds Courthouses in 1999, THIRD BRANCH, Nov. 1998, at 1 (describing the authorization and
appropriation of $460 million for thirteen new projects and another $25 million for repairs, as well as
the lack of assistance from the White House in obtaining these funds).
Another focus has been on congressional efforts to elicit information from judges on their allocation
of time and their travel. In the mid-1990s, Senator Charles E. Grassley, as chair of a Senate oversight
committee, sent sitting judges questions about their use of time. See Now the Judges Face the
Questions, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 5, 1996, at 8 (describing responses by judges to questionnaires sent by
Senator Grassley); see also GAO Releases Report on Noncase-Related Travel by Judges, THIRD
BRANCH, Apr. 1998, at 6 (discussing a report, also requested by Senator Grassley, that reviewed
"non-case related trips" of sixty-four appellate and 254 district court judges "encompassing 3,200"
appellate workdays and 9832 district court workdays, most of which were spent on court seminars and
meetings); Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alternative Texts, and
Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2601-04 (1998) (outlining the debate on salaries and budgets).
In December of 2000, Congress responded to some of the goals of the judiciary by providing
appropriations for cost of living adjustments for federal judges, for courthouse construction, and for
new judgeships. See COLA for Judges, supra note 56, at 1. However, in his annual discussion about the
judiciary in 2001, the Chief Justice again reported his distress about salaries and emphasized the degree
to which they were unattractive to private practitioners. William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report
on the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2002), http://www.supremecourtus.govlpublicinfo/year-end/
2001 year-endreport.html.
242. Further, Article III remains a source of protection. See United States v. Hatter, 532 U.S. 557
(2001) (holding that the Compensation Clause prohibited the collection of Social Security taxes, but not
Medicare taxes, from Article III judges holding office before Congress imposed such taxes on federal
employees).
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reappointment, their vulnerabilities are becoming plain. Some of those judges
have begun to raise questions about the effects of the reappointment process on
independence. 43 One concern is that entities targeting state court judicial
reelections might turn their attention to reappointment processes within the
federal system.2""
The federal administrative judiciary has yet fewer luxuries, and Congress
has recently proven itself especially unkind. Judges within agencies are not
equipped with the markers of prestige. They often work in cramped facili-
ties, with little by way of support staff. In the 1990s, over the objection of a
wide range of commentators, Congress abolished the Administrative Confer-
ence of the United States, the institution that had provided some systematic
consideration of the administrative judiciary.245 Further, despite many propos-
als to revamp administrative judicial processing, 46 Congress has refused to
consider efforts to enhance the authority, prestige, respect, and 61an of that
group of judges. In addition, in recent years, pressure has mounted to turn
away from the independence accorded judges appointed under the APA and
243. See, e.g., Dana Marks Keener & Denise Noonan Slavin, An Independent Immigration
Court: An Idea Whose Time Has Come: A Position Paper by the National Association of
Immigration Judges (Jan. 2002) (on file with author) (calling for structural reform of the Immigra-
tion Courts to safeguard their independence by moving the courts out of the Department of
Justice); Lisa Getter, Immigration Judges Call for Independent Court, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2002, at
Al (describing the report as the first public stand taken by a group of 220 judges calling for a new
agency for the immigration judges to ensure independence from the Department of Justice); Stan
Bernstein, The Reappointment of Bankruptcy Judges: A Preliminary Analysis of the Present
Process (paper presented to the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, Orlando, Fla., Oct. 19,
2001) (on file with author).
244. Judicial elections in states have become more expensive because of the entry of national
participants. As one commentator has explained, "The continuing nationalization of state judicial
elections is further shown by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's recent efforts through the Institute for
Legal Reform to support the election of pro-business judges in Alabama, Illinois, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, and Ohio. The goal is to make both direct campaign contributions and to pay for issue
advertising." See Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections 8 (2000) (paper prepared
for the Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, on file with author); see also William G. Kelly,
Selection of Judges, A.B.A. JUD. DIVISION REc., Winter 2000, at 3 (describing efforts by the Chamber of
Commerce and trial lawyers and "other interest groups" spending money "raking the candidates over
the coals").
The results from the perspective of the Ohio Chamber of Commerce are discussed in Keith Lake,
Outcome of Elections Leaves Political Landscape Unchanged, OHIO MAT=RS (Ohio Chamber of
Commerce, Columbus, Ohio), Nov./Dec. 2000, http://www.ohiochamber.comevents/ohiomatters/
ohiomatters_novdec00news4.html (noting that its "greatest political challenge... was to elect two
Supreme Court justices who don't answer to personal injury lawyers and are not swayed by politics and
personal agendas").
245. See William Funk, R.IP. A.C.U.S., ADMIN. & REG. L. NEws, Winter 1996, at 1 (describing the
termination of funding for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) despite
bipartisan efforts to preserve it).
246. See, e.g., A Bill to Establish the Administrative Law Judge Conference of the United States,
H.R. 5177, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. (2000) (introduced by Rep. George W. Gekas); A Bill to Establish a
Specialized Corps of Judges Necessary for Certain Federal Proceedings Required to Be Conducted, S.
594, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (introduced by Senator Howell Heflin, who later introduced a similar
bill, S. 826, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
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to permit agencies to appoint less-well-protected individuals to serve as
hearing or administrative judges. 247 As one commentator puts it, "'Non-ALJ
adjudicators' are sprouting faster than tulips in Holland. ' ' 48 And,/ while
many nongovernmental organizations are now concerned about judicial
independence,249 their attention has only begun to turn to the problems of
federal judges who lack life tenure.2
These very differences in status, prestige, and resources between life-
tenured and other federal judges demonstrate another aspect of the import of
Article III itself. That constitutional text both protects a particular cohort of
federal judges and provides an icon, a marker that the judge in the United
States is a specially situated government employee. Article III locates the
federal judge as radically independent, in the sense that the judge has the
power to sit in judgment of both public and private parties yet those litigants
have only indirect methods of control or retaliation. The power of the
symbolism came into sharp relief through the President's efforts in the fall
of 2001 to escape Article III by seeking to locate the trials of non-United
States citizens charged with terrorism in a commission controlled by the
executive branch. 251 The proposal to avoid trying designated defendants in
Article III courts serves as an example of the promise of judicial indepen-
247. See supra note 60 (discussing authorization for the Department of Interior to use non-APA
judges under certain circumstances). Regulations issued pursuant to that statute altered the definition of
"administrative law judge" by adding the term "OHA deciding official" and by providing that either
ALJs or "Indian probate judges, who are senior attorney-advisers appointed pursuant to specific
congressional authority" could handle certain Indian probate cases. See Trust Management Reform:
Probate of Indian Trust Estates, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,652, 67,652 (Dec. 31, 2001) (to be codified at 43
C.ER. pt. 4).
248. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN.
L.J. AM. U. 65, 70-71 (1996) (discussing the use of non-APA judges in the Departments of Justice,
Agriculture, and Defense); Yoder, supra note 60 (citing examples of efforts to avoid providing judges
protected by the APA). The incentives to avoid APA adjudication include a range of costs, such as that
ALJs may qualify for pay higher than other employees, the hiring system can be slow, and judges
outside the APA may be subjected to management standards. Lubbers, supra, at 73-74.
249. Many communities of lawyers-in the American Bar Association, the Judicature Society,
within state and federal judiciaries, and more recently formed organizations-have raised concerns
about the rise of vitriolic attacks on judges, particularly in state but also in federal courts. Such efforts
are part of a well-funded campaigns arguing that judges in the United States have "too much"
independence. See Bruce Fein & Burt Neuborne, Why Should We Care About Independent and
Accountable Judges?, 84 JUDICATURE 58 (2000); ABA, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1997).
250. See, e.g., Ann Marshall Young, Judicial Independence Resolution Passes 279 to 2, A.B.A. Juo.
DIViSION REc., Fall 2001, at 15 (reporting that the ABA House of Delegates had adopted resolutions
addressing judicial independence of administrative adjudication by urging that governments hold such
judges accountable under ethical standards adapted from the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct;
also proposing that removal of administrative judges, excluding agency heads, occur only upon notice
and hearing before an independent tribunal from which appeal exists).
251. See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (subjecting noncitizens whom
"from time to time" the President "determines" should "in the interest of the United States, be subject
to that order" to be detained and "tried by military commission").
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dence, protecting judges to permit their disagreement with executive branch
officers.2 52
Such is Article III's power. Therefore, it is time to face the impact of its
dilution. Rather than return to the debates of the second half of the twentieth
century about whether non-Article III federal adjudication is constitutionally
permissible, I invite discussion about the consequences of the doctrine relaxing
its contours. The effects of the growing dominance of first-tier federal judges
who lack life tenure need to be explored with a focus not only on those judges
but also on their Article III superiors and on a culture that imagines federal
judges to be uniquely independent actors.
As Article III's relationship to federal judges becomes attenuated, does an
understanding of the federal judge as an independent actor blur? Or does the
aura of independence travel with the title judge? If so, should that title be
conferred more sparingly or can a large number of individuals lay claim to and
enact its commitments? Ought the title "administrative judge" convey an under-
standing that a substantively different job is involved than that belonging to a
magistrate, bankruptcy, or district court judge? Should the judges within Article
III similarly be kept distinct? Or should we aspire, through pressing for similar
practices, norms, and ethical rules, to homogenize the many judges and perhaps
bring them within the same institution?
One set of responses to such questions returns to the discussion of appoint-
ment practices, with a focus on whether more of these judges ought to have
Article Ill status. Instead, I pursue a different tack, opening up discussion on
whether the means by which a judge is appointed could become less relevant to
that judge's status. By way of conclusion, I respond to the question of the
relationship between the diversification of federal judges and judicial indepen-
dence through sketching competing responses, incorporating aspects of contem-
porary law and forecasting future developments.
B. FEDERAL JUDGING WITHOUT ARTICLE II: ADMINISTRATORS OR JUDGES?
One option is to conclude that Article I has nothing to say to non-Article III
judges. That view may well summarize the current law on administrative law
judges. Under this approach, the form that non-Article III federal judging takes
is shaped by other parts of the Constitution, by statutes free of the strictures of
Article III, and by common law and social practices. State judges and judges in
many other countries live without life tenure and salary protection. A growing
group of federal judges can do the same.
What then delineates the role of the judge? One source is the due process
252. The effort at avoidance is especially interesting given that life-tenured judges have not had a
glorious history of blocking reductions in civil liberties in wars gone by, as decisions sanctioning the
detention and internment of individuals of Japanese heritage exemplify. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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tradition (both constitutional and common law),25 3 which locates a judge as
an impartial officer but not one structurally independent from the institution
that supplies salary and position.254 But what are the parameters of a
constitutional due process model of judging? Old precedents refused to
acknowledge that it included the concept of institutional independence. For
example, an argument was made in the nineteenth century that federal
judges in territories had constitutional independence based on English legal
traditions. A majority of the Court, however, rejected the dissent's view that
England's commitment to an independent judiciary had been incorporated
into the Constitution to shelter all judges serving under federal commis-
sion.255 Similarly, a century later, to underscore his objections to the increas-
ing reliance on administrative courts, Justice Douglas commented that the
Bill of Rights had no necessary relationship to administrative courts. 6
Moreover, to the extent that constraining norms flow from the common law
side of due process, scholarly commentary and Supreme Court decisions are
increasingly pronouncing that the federal courts lack common law pow-
ers.
2 5 7
Further, not only are due process moorings loose but their contours are
flexible. Under United States law, a due process approach does not bring with it
Article III requirements of finality of decisional power or exclusivity of func-
tion. As currently understood, agency-based judges need not work only as
judges. Moreover, such judges may be subject to superintendence by administra-
tors in a fashion quite foreign to current aspirations of a judge's freedom. At
some points, judges might-like other public employees-find protection through
the First Amendment, invoked, for example, to buffer administrative judges
from discharge based on their decisions. 258 But, were administrators to under-
take peer review for quality control, then judgments could be subject to revision
by colleagues or superiors who had not directly heard the disputants.259 While
253. See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229 (1985).
254. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
255. See McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891). The dissenters-Justices Field, Gray, and
Brown-disagreed. Id. at 196-99. (Field, J., dissenting).
256. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605-06 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting). He argued
further that "we subtly undermine the constitutional system when we treat federal judges as fungible."
Id. at 603. His commentary invoked Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (mem.), and
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871), Glidden, 370 U.S. at 605 n.ll, which provokes
the question of the symmetry between the growth of deference to congressional control over jurisdic-
tion and the growth of non-Article I judiciaries.
257. See generally Strauss, supra note 239.
258. See, e.g., Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding First Amendment protec-
tions accorded to hearing officer's decisions); Harrison v. Coffman, 35 F. Supp. 2d 722 (E.D. Ark.
1999) (denying motion to dismiss and holding that a state hearing officer gained such protection under
the First Amendment against discharge based on a claim that rulings were too favorable to prisoners);
Harrison v. Coffman, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Ark. 2000) (reiterating that approach in a decision
denying summary judgment).
259. Peer review-here used to mean that a decision would be read by other judges prior to its
issuance-is currently a topic of debate within the administrative judiciary. Some argue it will improve
20021
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statutes and civil service rules might protect their jobs,26 the fact that they
are judges would not intrinsically insulate them from discharge based on
failures to produce sufficient quantities of decisions or to meet other guide-
lines.261 In short, the current Court's retreat from imposing procedural due
process requirements on many judgments rendered in agencies and its broad
conception of congressional powers to structure statutory remedies within
agencies do not give judicial officers in such entities much by way of constitu-
tional protection.
Imagine then the many federal judges standing outside Article III and
shaded slightly by a thin line of due process and First Amendment doctrine
mixed with common law practices. Judging could, nevertheless, continue to
look familiar-at least for awhile. If we think of judging not only as a legal
institution but also as a social practice, it is possible (either as a universalist
matter or in terms of this specific culture) that its parameters, which have
developed historically and that we associate with judging, will persist,
providing direction to those individuals and institutions charged with the
task of adjudication. If the social predicates remain in place and if the norms
of judging are artifacts of social interactions, disconnecting them from
Article III does not, necessarily, undo them. Moreover, to the extent law is
needed, the Constitution is not its necessary source. Many statutes shore up
traditions of adjudication. A good deal of judging within federal administra-
tive agencies is governed or influenced by the APA, which specifies that
trial-like procedures be provided at hearings.262
That more optimistic analysis is undercut primarily by the efforts--detailed
above-to alter the practices of judging undertaken by the Article III judiciary
itself. Here is where the "modernizing" quest that focused on relaxed processes
for "Uncle Sam's Justice" becomes so important. Judicial enthusiasm for off-the-
record negotiations and support for alternative dispute resolution alter the social
meaning of judging. Not surprisingly, the informality and free-ranging quality
quality; others say it undermines the independence of judges and, depending on its form, the due
process rights of litigants. See generally Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of Administrative Law
Judges: Premises, Means, and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1 (1997); John Hardwicke &
Ronnie A. Yoder, Does Mandatory Quality Assurance Oversight of ALl Decisions Violate AL!
Decisional Independence, Due Process or Ex Parte Prohibitions?, 17 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES
75 (1997). A system used in some federal circuits could be analogized to peer review. Some circuits
have staff attorneys read opinions before they are released to check for intracircuit conflicts. If found,
the decision is returned to the panel to decide if its judgment should be revised.
260. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (2000) (prohibiting performance review of ALJs); Richard L. Sippel,
Collegiality Among Administrative Law Judges-as Well as Independence-Would Be Lost If Judges
Are Evaluated by Chief Judges on Policy Correctness, 17 J. NAT'L Ass'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 97, 101-02
(1997) (objecting to proposals for evaluation).
261. Some administrative law judges have claimed that retention and promotions have been linked
to the quantities of decisions rendered and their content. See Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler,
594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984) (challenging superintendence of decisions in Social Security
Administration hearings). See generally Ann Marshall Young, Judicial Independence in Administrative
Adjudication, Past, Present, and Future, JUDGES' J., Summer 1999, at 16.
262. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (2000).
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of contemporary innovations inside Article III are mirrored by similar efforts in
the non-Article III judiciary, such that the statutory predicates for their forms of
judging are also changing. California, for example, has revised its APA to
permit "informal hearings" and to welcome alternative dispute resolution.263 As
long as the Article III judiciary continues to insist that courts constituted outside
the parameters of Article III are "purely creatures of statutes, 26 and as long as
the Article III judiciary continues its leadership role in redefining the tasks and
means of judging, erosion of the adjudicatory model becomes the more likely
development. Thus, signature aspects of judging today-such as the current
conception of a judge tethered to a record-may soon cease to be understood as
intrinsic to the "judicial."
Having sketched a mdlange of contemporary doctrine and its possible evolu-
tions about the processes afforded by and the protections provided to federal
judges outside of Article III, I have shown that the role of "judge" may offer a
thinner veneer than might have been expected. As more people work as judges
outside of Article III and as those within Article Ill adopt a wider range of
techniques, the content of what is entailed in federal judging shifts. Process,
place, and person combine to make judging intelligible as a discrete decisionmak-
ing method. But the trajectory that I project homogenizes the tasks of various
officials of the government and among public and private dispute resolvers. The
distinctive identity of judges in courts diminishes.
Looking back and then forward, the few decades within the twentieth century
when actors within agencies had to rely on judicial processes to decide entitle-
ments against the government could become a blip on the screen, overshadowed
by the current (and projected future) retreat from a concept of individuals
having such enforceable rights. The expansion of sovereign immunity law,
sheltering states from claims made against them, points in this direction,265 as
does the narrowing scope of procedural due process and new constraints on
implying private causes of action.2 66 The license provided by the doctrine of
public rights becomes central, giving the federal government control over when,
how, and if to organize claims and remedies.
For some, this flexibility is both attractive and constitutionally proper. I,
however, find both the current contours and the future possibilities a source of
concern, prompting an interest in alternative understandings of "our proudest
boast" of judicial independence. Therefore, I turn to examine how growing
263. Asimow, supra note 34, at 319-21.
264. Smith's Estate v. Comm'r, 638 F.2d 665, 669 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that a decision by a
"special trial judge" was not a decision of the Tax Court, appealable at that time).
265. See Vicki C. Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 593 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism After Alden: Deductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationaliza-
tion of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 691 (2000).
266. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275 (2001). For further discussion, see supra note 238.
2002]
HeinOnline -- 90 Geo. L.J. 667 2001-2002
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
reliance on non-life-tenured federal judges within Article III affects the indepen-
dence of both employing and employed judge. I then argue for a broader
reading of Article III than is suggested by this first analysis of current doctrine.
C. FEDERAL JUDGING WITHIN BUT WITHOUT ARTICLE HI:
THE INDEPENDENCE OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE
Consider the future prospects of both the judges without and with life tenure
within the Article III judiciary. Under the umbrella of "judicial adjunct,"
Congress could devolve a great deal of first-tier authority to individuals whose
positions depend upon Congress and could possibly mandate processes quite
distinct from those linked with the life-tenured judiciary. Moreover, it is pos-
sible that all first-tier fact-finding will become the purview of such judges.267 As
years pass, the redundancy of two sets of trial judges could seem inefficient and
antiquated.268 Reformers could become eager to rationalize the system by
formally turning the life-tenured bench into an appellate body.
269
Could Congress constitutionally spin magistrate and bankruptcy jurisdiction
off into non-Article III courts that serve as the gateway to appellate review by
life-tenured judges? Many academic commentators have argued that the only
Article III requirement is access, at some point, to a constitutionally indepen-
dent judge.27 ° Were the grant of jurisdiction direct to magistrate and bankruptcy
judges and the nexus to the Article III branch more attenuated, however,
rebellion from the life-tenured could prompt the conclusion that the balance has
tipped too far from Article III values. Much of the expansion of the powers and
duties of magistrate and bankruptcy judges has, after all, been justified on the
grounds that serving under the supervision of Article III judges provides both
legitimacy to and security for such judges.
Those constitutional assumptions make Article III the likely port for a
growing group of non-life-tenured judges. The question then becomes one about
the limits from within. How does the growing presence of statutory judges
affect the concept of the federal judiciary as independent? One issue is size:
267. The Judicial Conference, however, has consistently objected to the direct grant of jurisdiction
to magistrate judges. See MAGISTRATE JUDGE DUTrms, supra note 79, at 1 (describing Judicial Conference
view that magistrate judges' jurisdiction should flow by designation from Article III judges rather than
directly from Congress). Congress has not always followed that advice. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000)
(authorizing "any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate" to conduct extradition
proceedings). Although courts have concluded that "extradition officers" specified in the statute do not
themselves hold "judicial power under Article III," that jurisdictional grant indicates the pressures and
utilities of direct provisions. See, e.g., Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.2d 1100, 1108 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1007 (1996).
268. As Paul Bator explained, the reliance on the theory of magistrate and bankruptcy judges as
adjuncts to the district courts undermines the purpose of such judges-to take on work, not to require
that such work be done twice. See Bator, supra note 50, at 252-53.
269. See Paul D. Carrington, The Obsolescence of the United States Courts of Appeals: Roscoe
Pound's Structural Solutions, 15 J.L. & POL. 515 (1999) (reminding readers of Pound's idea for a
posttrial motion to a panel of three judges to serve as a quick and effective appeal).
270. See supra note 123.
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Should we worry about a tipping point? (Recall that sixteen trial benches have
equal numbers of magistrate and district court judges; six have more magistrate
judges than district court judges.) 271 Another question is about dependence on
Congress, which holds the power to cut statutory jobs. A third issue is the
process: Can Article III judges enact the values of judicial independence as they
carry out the duties of employing other judges? My focus here is on this third
question-the effects of appointment and reappointment of judges by judges on
the conception of a judge as independent.
1. Judicial Selection of Judges by Judges
Life-tenured judges have always had some power of appointment-of clerks,
clerical staff, commissioners, special masters, law clerks, and other assistants.
But for the first time in the history of the United States, life-tenured judges play
a pivotal role in choosing a large number of people to serve as the initial
adjudicators within Article III and then in deciding whether such individuals
may, through reappointment, continue to do so. The two facets of this task-
initial selection and reappointment-require separate analysis, as does their
cumulative effect.
The initial question is one of constitutionality. One might argue that separa-
tion of powers theory prohibits judges from selecting judges, either because it is
beyond the province of the judge or because doing so impermissibly intrudes on
the powers of other branches. That judges have staffed their own chambers or
districts and have selected juries and special masters can be distinguished.
Article Ill judges could have the power to create ad hoc judges for a particular
instance but not the power to anoint long-term office holders. Yet, given
doctrinal toleration of mixed functions and the practices of the last several
decades, a challenge to the congressional statutes delegating selection of magis-
trate and bankruptcy judges to the Article III judiciary is unlikely to succeed.2 72
Having, however, argued the flexibility of constitutional doctrine, I need to
consider whether the Constitution should be read differently. Debate in the
United States has centered on two options for empowering judges: election and
appointment through political processes. Dissatisfaction with both routes is
commonplace, as money and politics play large roles in who can become a
judge. In contrast, the federal judiciary has, quietly, crafted a third and new
alternative: appointment through judicial processes. Selection of judges by
271. See supra notes 14-15.
272. In addition, judicial appointment of other judges within Article III could be argued under
Article II, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, which authorizes the President to make
appointments but also provides that "the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 891-92 (1991)
(holding that the reference to "Courts of Law" includes non-Article Ill courts closely resembling
Article III courts, that the Tax Court was within Article II, and, therefore, that it could properly make
appointments of special judges).
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judges could thus either be celebrated as proffering a new model or bemoaned
as harmful both to Article III judges and the polity.
Turn first to the advantages of judicial appointment of judges. As a few
details of current practices illustrate, the judiciary has selected a high-
quality and relatively nonpolitical corps of judges in a relatively inexpensive
fashion. The authorizing legislation for magistrate judges specifies very
general requirements and calls on the Judicial Conference to promulgate
procedures that include public notice and provide for merit selection panels
to assist in identifying qualified persons.2 7 3 The statutory provisions for
bankruptcy judges are less directive,274 reflecting in part the controversy in
the early 1980s about whether then-sitting bankruptcy judges ought to gain
Article III status and about how to provide for those holding jobs at the time
of the 1984 act.275 Congress has required public notification of bankruptcy
positions and listed general qualifications.276 The Judicial Conference, in
turn, has promulgated regulations that provide more direction to district
courts on the selection and reappointment of magistrate judges 277 than to
circuit courts, charged with the task of employing bankruptcy judges.278
Districts and circuits also have additional rules.27 9
273. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b) (1994) (specifying a few criteria, such that candidates have a certain
number of years of experience as lawyers and not be related to a judge on the appointing court).
Provisions for merit selection were included in 1979 amendments. See Federal Magistrate Act of 1979,
Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 3(c), (e), 93 Stat. 643, 644-45 (1979) (calling for merit selection panels to give
"due consideration to all qualified individuals, especially such groups as women, blacks, Hispanics, and
other minorities").
274. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)-(c) (providing that courts of appeal shall appoint bankruptcy judges in
numbers specified in that statute and upon consultation with the Judicial Conference).
275. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 120,
98 Stat. 333, 344-45.
276. Id., amended by Act of Oct. 22, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, tit. I, § 102, 100 Stat. 3088,
3089, and by Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, tit. III, § 303, 110
Stat. 3847, 3852 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 152 note) (including that public notice of vacancies is
given and that "an effort has been made ... to identify qualified candidates without regard to race,
color, sex, religion, or national origin," and requiring that candidates have "outstanding legal
ability and competence," "judicial temperament," and a "demonstrated commitment to equal
justice under law").
277. See THE SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGES (1997) (pamphlet
provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts) [hereinafter 1997 MAGISTRATE JUDGES
SELECTION PROCEDURES]; Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States Establishing
Standards and Procedures for the Appointment and Reappointment of United States Magistrate Judges
(as amended Sept. 2001) (provided by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, pre-publication
manuscript on file with author) [hereinafter 2001 Magistrate Judges Selection and Reappointment
Procedures].
278. Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the United States for the Selection, Appointment, and
Reappointment of United States Bankruptcy Judges (as amended Sept. 2000) (on file with author)
[hereinafter 2000 Bankruptcy Selection Regulations]; Regulations of the Judicial Conference of the
United States for the Selection, Appointment, and Reappointment of United States Bankruptcy Judges
(as revised Mar. 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2001 Bankruptcy Selection Regulations].
279. See, e.g., U.S. Courts for the Ninth Circuit, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Judge Reappointment Regulations § 2(e)(2) (as amended June 2001) [hereinafter Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Regulations], available at http://www.ce9.uscourts.gov; Sixth Circuit Judicial
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As compared with either state judicial elections or Article III nominations,
the selection process for federal statutory judges is a low-profile event. Some
variation occurs as each district and circuit runs its own processes, but in
general, after public notice, lawyers apply for positions as they become avail-
able. Questionnaires and inquiry follow, and the qualities of particular individu-
als are debated outside the heat of public hearings. Because the selection
process crafted through statute and Judicial Conference guidelines does not
mimic the inquiries associated with the congressional approval of Article Ill
judgeships and party affiliations are less central, the pool of prospective federal
judges is different. Some individuals now serve as judges who would not as a
political matter have been likely to have been nominated by a President nor
approved by the Senate.
Further, given the dependence of life-tenured judges on magistrate and
bankruptcy judges and the blur from the public perspective of exactly which
judge holds what position, Article III judges have incentives to pick stellar
candidates. That judgments about lawyers' professional capacity are made by
judges, as contrasted with executive officials, politicians, or voters, enables
those with knowledge to identify others capable of doing such work. The
process appears to have resulted in bankruptcy and magistrate benches of high
quality.280 Indeed, the ranks of Article III judges are increasingly populated by
individuals who once served as statutory judges S.2
The very sheltering of these judicial appointments from politics can be seen
as either its virtue or its vice-at both constitutional and prudential levels. One
critique rests on the view that the choice of who should be our judges is
essentially a political one, committed by the Constitution to other branches of
government. The policy in support of the constitutional claim is that the process
ought to be porous, open to public input and public scrutiny. The argument is
that federal judging is a form of power that may not legally and ought not
prudentially be conferred through processes outside the public purview. Further,
Council, Procedures for the Selection of Bankruptcy Judge Nominees and Procedures for the Reappoint-
ment of Bankruptcy Judges § 9 (as amended June 24, 2001) [hereinafter Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy
Procedures], available at http://Ca6.uscourts.gov/circexec/bkproce.pdf.
280. As one local legal paper opined, "'the Bankruptcy Court now has the best bench, top to bottom,
of any court in the City of Chicago."' See In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1160 (7th Cir. 1992)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (quoting Council of Lawyers Report on Bankruptcy Court, CHI. L. BULL., Jan.
13, 1992, at 2). According to materials from the professional association of magistrate judges, a group
of new appointees in 1998 had an average of nineteen years of experience as lawyers and included two
former state superior court judges, a federal public defender, and several former assistant United States
Attorneys. BULLETIN (Fed. Magistrate Judges Ass'n, Washington, D.C.), July 1, 2001 (on file with
author).
281. A review of the 2001 Almanac of the Federal Judiciary, listing more than 1200 judges
(including about 900 district and 240 appellate judges, as well as about seventy judges from other
courts) identified ten appellate judges who, prior to holding that position, had also served as either
bankruptcy or magistrate judges, eighty-two district court judges, of whom eleven had been bankruptcy
and seventy-one magistrate judges (and two who had been both), and two Court of Claims judges who
had been magistrates. Sarah Russell, Career Ladders and the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 29, 2002)
(unpublished memorandum, on file with author).
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had judgeships been available only through Article III and the number of such
judgeships expanded in response to demand (rather than have demand lowered
through delegating judging to non-Article III judges), the current "confirmation
mess" (as some describe contemporary nomination and confirmation pro-
cesses)2 82 might not have occurred because neither the Executive nor Congress
would have had the stamina to politicize so many jobs.
A second set of criticisms, again available at both constitutional and pruden-
tial levels, focuses on the risks to life-tenured judges of being in the position of
making judicial appointments. Article III created judicial independence to avoid
judges needing to curry favor in order to retain their jobs and their salaries. But
through the power of judicial appointment, judges now have something to
283give. Salaries, staff support, courtrooms, chambers, committee assignments,
and pensions come with magistrate and bankruptcy judge positions. As life-
tenured judges become a source of patronage, applicants and their supporters
have more to gain by courting those judges.284
Tiers of judging inside Article III can undermine judicial independence, as
traditionally understood, in another respect. A much celebrated aspect of life
tenure is that it can put judges outside career ladders by providing a great
job, forever. The reality is not quite so rosy. Ambitions do not end with a
judgeship. One problem is the "bench climber," by which is meant a district
judge hoping to be an appellate judge, and an appellate judge auditioning for
282. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONRMATION MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS
PROCESS (1994).
283. That relationships can be a form of threat to independence has been explored in the context of
the English judiciary. See Lemmings, supra note 1, at 134-35 (concluding through an examination of
which individuals were actually selected in Hanoverian England that, after the Act of Settlement, more
senior judges had closer ties to the governing party than had judges in earlier periods, and that through
"the process of 'policisation' a good deal of control was imposed). In terms of the contemporary
incentives of judges, economists and public choice theorists have begun to spawn a literature exploring
these issues. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 68 U. CINN. L. REV. 615 (2000) (bemoaning the lack of empiricism on judicial
self-interest); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 627 (1994); Janet Alexander, Judges' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on
Macey, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges Maximize? (The Same Thing
Everyone Else Does), 3 SuP. CT. EcoN. REV. 1 (1994); Posner, supra note 119 (detailing such issues in
the context of bankruptcy legislation).
284. Some insulation of the Article m district court comes from the merit selection panels, required
to do the initial screening and make recommendations for magistrate judges. See 28 U.S.C. § 63 l(b)(5)
(1994); 1997 MAGISTRATE JUDGES SELECTION PROCEDURES, supra note 277, at 9-12 (detailing the
procedures for the merit selection panel); 2001 Magistrate Judges Selection and Reappointment
Procedures, supra note 277, § 3.02 (specifying that the merit selection panel shall be comprised of no
fewer than seven members, at least two of whom are nonlawyers and none of whom are sitting federal
judges).
The regulations addressing bankruptcy permit but do not require the appellate courts to use merit
selection panels. See 2001 Bankruptcy Selection Regulations, supra note 278, § 301 (providing that a
circuit council "may appoint a merit selection panel" or "may authorize the chief judge" of a circuit to
do so); id. § 3.02 (providing that the panel have at least three members who are residents of the circuit
but not detailing other requirements).
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the Supreme Court. 8 5 Further, and in part through judicial promotion of
alternative dispute resolution, more lucrative options exist. With the title of
federal judge on one's resume, one can be a player in the growing market for
private judges.2 8 6 Between giving and getting jobs, life-tenured judges have
more reasons to please litigants, other judges, and lawyers, some of whom
may be future employees, employers, or sponsors.
The statutory judgeships create another step on the career ladder and
exacerbate the problem. In the early years of the Federal Magistrates Act, a
pervasive assumption was that a magistrate job was for people who were
unlikely to become life-tenured judges. But over time, as the job has grown
in content and stature, that expectation has diminished. An increasingly well-
trodden path is for a person to shift from magistrate or bankruptcy judge to
district court judge. The federal system thus has started to resemble a pattern
associated with the European judiciary, in which judges are specially trained
and move from one court level to the next. Analysts of such career judiciaries
note that judges who sit at lower levels and seek promotion or reappointment
have incentives to conform and defer, that they tend to be cautious in an
atmosphere in which collegiality is a virtue and retaliation is feared.28 7 Further,
such judiciaries do not always provide high status.2 8 8 In contrast, in systems
in which lawyers are directly appointed to prestigious judgeships, the
assumption is that the very traits which brought those lawyers to prominence
make them open as judges to exercising discretion and engaging in legally
adventurous interpretation. Thus, the development of a career ladder for
judges, while attractive in terms of training and information, may deter
285. One review found a three percent probability of a circuit judge being appointed to the Supreme
Court and a six percent probability of a district judge being appointed to a circuit. See Frank B. Cross &
Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REv.
1437, 1469 (2001). See generally Laura Little, Loyalty, Gratitude, and the Federal Judiciary, 44 AM.
U. L. REV. 699 (1995). In addition, judges may compete for committee assignments, travel opportuni-
ties, and other markers of leadership.
286. See William H. Rehnquist, 2000 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD BRANCH, Jan.
2001, at I (reporting that fifty-four district and appellate judges had left the bench during the 1990s and
noting that "while we cannot say that these judges left because of salary concerns alone, this number
compares with 41 judges during the 1980s and just three during the 1960s"); see also Emily Van Tassel,
Resignations and Removals: A History of Federal Judicial Service-and Disservice, 1789-1992, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 333 (1993) (focusing on the entire history of departures until the early 1990s and on the 190
judges total who had resigned from the bench for reasons other than age or health). In some state courts,
the degree to which sitting judges seek to attract favorable attention from future ADR employers has
been a topic of concern. See Reynolds Holding, Judges 'Action Cast Shadow on Court's Integrity: Lure
of High-Paying Jobs as Arbitrators May Compromise Impartiality, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2001, at A 13
(discussing judicial support for mandatory arbitration and that, in addition to easing workloads, such
programs may offer judges "potentially lucrative jobs as arbitrators after they leave the bench").
287. See, e.g., Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, Discretion in the Career and Recognition Judiciary, 7
U. CH. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 205 (2000).
288. NIGEL G. FOSTER, GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LAWS 90-91 (2d ed. 1996) (contrasting the German
judiciary, with its lower status and its conservatism, to that of the judiciary in the United Kingdom); see
also Rehnquist, supra note 241 (noting the lack of status of some European judiciaries and attributing it
in part to the absence of an infusion of private practitioners into those judiciaries).
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individuals from behaving in a manner associated in the United States with
judicial independence.
2. Reappointment of Judges by Judges
How life-tenured judges go about deciding how to reappoint other judges
raises yet harder questions about judicial independence. That task requires
appraisal not of an individual's performance as a lawyer but as a judge. "Article
III values," we are told, mean that we value independent judges, unafraid of
encountering popular disapproval and free from needing collegial approval.
How do life-tenured judges enact those values as they contemplate the question
of reappointment of other judges? What effect does reappointment have on the
statutory judges seeking it?
Again, a look at current practices is in order. The 1984 Bankruptcy Act, so
controversial in enactment, did not much detail the process of reappointment
of bankruptcy judges commissioned for fourteen-year terms. 289 But twelve
years later, the statute was amended to provide for regulations about reap-
pointment, 290 and the problem of how to do it is now visible to the legal
community as large numbers of bankruptcy and magistrate judges (who have
eight-year terms) become eligible for reappointment. 291 For example, "over
2/3 of the terms of currently sitting bankruptcy judges ... expire[d] during
the three-year period from 1999 to 2001. " 292
Regulations of the Judicial Conference address the reappointment process. A
first set had provided a presumption of reappointment,2 93 but in light of
controversies that developed (and are detailed below), revisions in 2001 elimi-
nated those provisions but continue to require that incumbents be considered for
reappointment before courts turn to other candidates.294 The revised regulations
289. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 120, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333, 344-45.
290. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 303, 110 Stat. 3847,
3852.
291. Magistrate judgeships began in 1968, but only seventy positions were full-time, whereas about
400 were part-time. The ratio has now flipped, in that more than 400 are full-time and fewer than
seventy are part-time. See supra note 112.
292. ABA STANDING COMM. ON FED. JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 2
(Aug. 1996) (recommending the 1996 amendments to "streamline" the process for reappointment of
bankruptcy judges). Another data source reports that eighty-six bankruptcy judges will be eligible for
reappointment between 2000 and 2002. See Bankruptcy's Reappointment Mess, CONSUMER BANKR,
NEws, Oct. 17, 2000, at 1. Another analysis is that sixty-two percent of the terms of 316 active
bankruptcy judges will expire between 1998 and 2002. See Bernstein, supra note 243, at 1.
293. See, e.g., 1997 MAGISTRATE JUDGES SELECTION PROCEDURES, supra note 277, at 26 (stating that
"normally, an incumbent magistrate judge who has performed well in the position should be appointed
to another term of office"); 2000 Bankruptcy Selection Regulations, supra note 278, § 5.01(b)
(providing that reappointment "should not be denied unless the incumbent has failed to perform the
duties of a bankruptcy judge according to the high standards of performance regularly met by United
states bankruptcy judges").
294. See 2001 Bankruptcy Selection Regulations, supra note 278, § 5.01(b) ("The court of appeals
shall decide whether or not to reappoint the incumbent judge before considering other potentially
[Vol. 90:607
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on reappointment of magistrate judges charge district courts with taking an
initial vote on whether to consider reappointment of an incumbent before the
public process proceeds.295 For bankruptcy, the practice is somewhat more
varied. The regulations could be read as requiring public notice once an
incumbent has indicated a willingness to serve,29 6 but at least one circuit's
regulations provide for a screening first.297 Further, unlike the procedures for
reappointment of magistrate judges, which at the reappointment stage continue
to rely on merit selection panels,298 the bankruptcy court regulations do not
require advisory panels.2 99
In terms of the rate of reappointment, a widely shared impression is of high
reappointment rates, although developing data suggest a somewhat more com-
plex picture.30 0 Recent cases and public commentary involving bankruptcy
judges in the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have prompted complaints (and
some litigation) about the reappointment process. 301 At issue in one case,
qualified candidates. In making this decision, the court of appeals shall take into consideration the
professional and career status of the incumbent, and whether the incumbent has performed the duties of
a bankruptcy judge according to the high standards of performance regularly met by United States
bankruptcy judges and demonstrated [other qualifications outlined in the regulations]."); see also 2001
Magistrate Judges Selection and Reappointment Procedures, supra note 277, § 6.02 (providing that
before an incumbent magistrate judge's term expires, the district court by majority vote, must, giving
"due consideration to the professional and career status," determine whether it wishes to consider that
judge's reappointment).
295. 2001 Magistrate Judges Selection and Reappointment Procedures, supra note 277, § 6.02(a).
296. See 2001 Bankruptcy Selection Regulations, supra note 278, § 5.02(a) (requiring public notice
by publication in a "general local newspaper," "bar journals," and the like); Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Judge Reappointment Regulations, supra note 279, § 2(c).
297. Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Procedures, supra note 279, § 9(b)-(d) (detailing requirements for the
provision of financial disclosure statements, an initial screening with a presumption of reappointment,
which, if passed, then prompts the public notice, an investigation of a committee, and a report to the
Court including copies of "all comments received").
298. 2001 Magistrate Judges Selection and Reappointment Procedures, supra note 277, § 6.03(b).
299. See 2001 Bankruptcy Selection Regulations, supra note 278, §§ 5.02-.03. Those regulations
also do not require provision of information gathered through public comment to an incumbent. Circuit
regulations may provide more. See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Regulations, supra note 279,
§ 2(e)(2) (providing that, if a preliminary assessment is against reappointment, the incumbent judge be
provided with "a copy of the materials considered by the committee... with due regard for confidential-
ity," and including "redacted public comments, both positive and negative," and also providing the
incumbent judge with an opportunity to respond and provide "a list of possible contacts for the
committee to consider in its investigation and fact finding").
300. One news service reported that "[o]f 126 bankruptcy judges whose terms expired during the
past two years, 39 (or more than 30 percent) were not reappointed for various reasons, including
retirement and promotion." Cleaning Up the Bankruptcy Reappointment Mess, Part I, BANKR. CT.
DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, Oct. 25, 2000, at Al. Preliminary data from another survey found
that of 166 judges between October 1, 1998 and September 30, 2001, the reappointment rate could be
calculated at about seventy-four percent or at about ninety-two percent, depending on how one
evaluated decisions by incumbents about seeking reappointment. See Bernstein, supra note 243, at 3, 7.
In nine cases, reappointment was denied in a "clear-cut" fashion, while a few others were denied
informally, and in yet others, incumbents chose to retire. Id. at 5-8.
301. See The Seven Most Serious Problems with the Process of Reappointing Bankruptcy Judges,
CONSUMER BANKR. NEWS, Oct. 17, 2000, at 10 . Two lawsuits have been filed. See Shannon P. Duffy &
Jeff Blumenthal, Court Votes Not to Reappoint Bankruptcy Judge David Scholl, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
HeinOnline -- 90 Geo. L.J. 675 2001-2002
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 90:607
involving a judge not reappointed in the Third Circuit, is both process and
outcome. Apparently, the Third Circuit had first sought input through a notice
and comment period and then supplemented the information by sending surveys
to a set of lawyers.3 °2 After the bankruptcy judge was not reappointed, some of
his supporters claimed that a campaign by unhappy litigants (creditors in this
instance) prompted intense scrutiny that lead to nonrenewal.3 °3 Through a
challenge in the Court of Claims, that judge, in turn, has argued that the Third
Circuit's process violated his due process rights.3° In another instance in the
Ninth Circuit, a bankruptcy judge who was reappointed offered a detailed
criticism of the process. For example, he argued, the information collection
process was unreliable and the opportunities for the incumbent to respond too
narrow.30 5 More generally, one commentator reports that "a significant number
of applicants for reappointment were put through the ringer.,
30 6
The problems that have emerged thus center about the kind of information
sought, the methods for gaining it, and the process accorded incumbents.
Soliciting views through public notice relies completely on self-selection. Some
unhappy lawyers might be reluctant to comment for fear that, were their
objections to fail, their complaints would become known to a judge before
whom they have to appear. Sophisticated repeat-player litigants might, on the
307other hand, participate to mount a campaign, either in support or opposition.
Because bankruptcy judges have power over attorneys' fees and may impose
May 26, 2000, at 1; Cleaning Up the Bankruptcy Reappointment Mess, Part I, supra note 300; Judge
Graves Sues over Reappointment, BANK. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, May 9, 2001, at AI.
As of this writing, the lawsuit involving the Third Circuit is pending. The other, involving questions
about the process and the timing of the Sixth Circuit's decision on reappointment, as well as the
bankruptcy judge's tax filings, has settled. See Judge Graves Get (Limited) "Fresh Start," BANKR. CT.
DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS & COMMENT, July 11, 2001, at Al (detailing a settlement in which the judge
agreed to a brief return to the bench and then retirement). In addition, a judge who was reappointed has
offered commentary on the process. See Letter from Samuel L. Bufford, Bankruptcy Court Judge,
Central District of California, to Frank Szczebak, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Dec. 20,
2000) (on file with author).
302. Shannon P. Duffy, Bankruptcy Judge Sues for His Job, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 4, 2000, at B I
(describing the bankruptcy judge's claim that, after an initial comment period, a questionnaire was sent
to some 1165 lawyers, which excluded "large numbers of practitioners" who had appeared before him).
303. See Judge David Scholl: Reappointment's Lightning Rod!, BANKR. CT. DECISIONS WKLY. NEWS
& COMMENT, Oct. 18, 2000, at A9 (describing Scholl's publication of more decisions than other judges
in his district but also allegations of higher reversal rates; also noting his unpopularity because he
awarded excessively low fees or was allegedly proconsumer); Bernstein, supra note 243, at 11, 16, 19
(discussing concerns about how the reappointment process undermines independence while noting that,
given the specialized jurisdiction of the bankruptcy docket, interest groups are less likely to attempt to
influence appointments).
304. See Scholl v. United States, No. 00-737C (Fed. CI. filed Aug. 23, 2000); Judge Scholl Sues to
Regain His Job, CONSUMER BANKat NEWS, Sept. 21, 2000, at 3.
305. Letter from Samuel L. Bufford to Frank Szczebak, supra note 301; The Seven Most Serious
Problems with the Process of Reappointing Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 301.
306. Bernstein, supra note 243, at 2.
307. See Duffy & Blumenthal, supra note 301; The Seven Most Serious Problems with the Process
of Reappointing Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 301 (describing such allegations in a particular case).
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sanctions, special attention may be paid to their candidacies.3 °8 Social science
sampling methodologies, constructed to elicit a range of views, would be an
improvement, but only if a sample of litigants were properly fashioned and the
response rate sufficient.
309
Assume that, given sensitivity to problems of "junk science," circuits
were to invest resources in developing surveys and were to receive a
sufficient distribution of responses. Turn then to the problem of content.
Imagine that a group of litigants complains that a judge is insufficiently
prompt, courteous, or evenhanded. What percentage of reply raises doubt?
What form of response by the judge so accused suffices to mitigate? A
preliminary analysis of cases of nonreappointment found that, in some,
serious acts of misconduct were evident, while in others, the applicant had
alienated colleagues or litigants. 3 ° As another bankruptcy judge com-
mented, the reappointment process "creates the opportunity for influence,
political gamesmanship and the like."'31 ' And, current regulations build in no
"right" of a bankruptcy judge to investigate, to receive, or to respond to
allegations.312
In short, the process and the criteria used for reappointment pose challenges
to the ideology of independent judges that Article III promotes. As constitu-
tional judges evaluate the track records of statutory judges by soliciting informa-
tion from litigants and by reviewing decisions and reversal rates, they may
prompt lower level judges to search for supporters, publish little, and keep low
profiles. While presumptive reappointment avoids those problems, it results in
giving life-tenured judges power to create, de facto, another set of tenured
judges.
Further, the more public the process, the more the status differentials
between the kinds of judges in Article III appear. In contrast to the review of
statutory judges, no mechanism exists for periodic assessments of sitting
life-tenured judges. A process is available for bringing complaints against
sitting judges (both Article III and non-Article III), alleged to have acted in
308. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choices and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11 (discussing
filing choices made to maximize fee awards); see also Letter from Samuel L. Bufford to Frank
Szczebak, supra note 301, at 1-2 (commenting that "at least three letters opposing my reappoint-
ment were written by lawyers [in a case in which] I had recently imposed sanctions on them and
their client for egregious discovery abuses. None of those lawyers has ever appeared in any other
case in my court.").
309. Cf Judge Scholl Sues to Regain His Job, supra note 304 (describing his allegation that the
questionnaire was sent to only 1165 lawyers, "disproportionately" in reorganization cases rather than
the full range of the docket, heavily concentrated in consumer bankruptcy, and that of that number, only
some 300 responded, making the reply rate insufficient).
310. See Bernstein, supra note 243, at 13-14.
311. Lief M. Clark, The Chinese Curse, Am. BANKr. INST. J., July/Aug. 1999, at 31.
312. Local rules or informal practices may make such provisions, and revisions in 2001 enabled the
process of reappointment to be extended for brief periods by the chief judge of a circuit. 2001
Bankruptcy Selection Regulations, supra note 278, § 5.04, at 18.
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a manner "prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the
business of the courts" or to be unable to discharge the duties of office.3 1 3
But complaints relating to outcomes in individual cases are expressly prohib-
ited.3 14 Further, analyses of that process suggest that complaints are rare and
that, while informal sanctions may be used, official discipline of judges is
infrequent.31 5 But through the procedures used for reappointment of statu-
tory judges, life-tenured judges send signals to the legal community about
the lower status of statutory judges within Article III.
Those signals may prove problematic for both kinds of judges. If litigants and
lawyers comes to see the statutory judges within Article III as weak, their sense
of the federal judiciary itself as uniquely independent will lessen and be
replaced by an understanding that, like other institutions, it has administrators
(here, life-tenured judges) who must be pleased. Thus, social and political
expectations for (or romanticization of) the role of the federal judge are diluted.
Evaluating the selection and reappointment processes thus helps to illuminate
the deeper problems posed by a hierarchy of judges within Article III. The
life-tenured judiciary is both deeply dependent on and its fortunes are now
linked with its non-life-tenured siblings. The very structures that delineate the
status among the two sets of judges work to undermine the independence of
both.
Having detailed the problems that a model of hierarchy creates for judicial
independence, I turn then to explore the alternative, which I have captured
through the term "homogenization." The better route for preservation of Article
III values is for life-tenured judges to attempt to infuse them into all aspects of
federal judging. Because Article III judges have retained the power to read the
Constitution's meaning, they have the power to revise the jurisprudence to focus
it on equipping their siblings with more authority, 6lan, sense of self, and
import-all of which are presumed to enable wise and deliberate judicial
decisions. Hence, below, I sketch a different jurisprudence and set of practices
through which life-tenured judges could relax their own status privileges and
attempt, self-consciously, to blur the distinctions among federal judges so as to
broaden the embrace of Article II. 316
313. See Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-458, § 3, 94 Stat. 2035, 2036 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 372 (1994)).
314. 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)(3)(A). Further, the statute empowers the chief judge of the circuit to screen
complaints and dismiss not only those related to the merits but others deemed frivolous or otherwise
not permitted. Id. § 372(c)(3)(A)-(B); cf Bernstein, supra note 243, at 16 (describing the fears of
bankruptcy judges that a "handful of non-appealed decisions.., will be subjected to very critical
inquiry").
315. See generally Charles G. Geyh, Informal Methods of Judicial Discipline, 142 U. PA. L. REv.
243 (1993); Richard L. Marcus, Who Should Discipline Federal Judges, and How?, 149 F.R.D. 375
(1993).
316. See Claire L'Heureux-Dub6, Administrative Globalization, Address to the Council of Canadian
Administrative Tribunals' International Conference Held in Quebec, Canada (June 17, 2001) (on file
[Vol. 90:607
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D. ARTICLE III INFUSION: ALTERING DOCTRINE, STATUTES, AND PRACTICES
My claim is not that Article III demands that all judges have life tenure but
rather that Article III requires that all judges be independent actors. The goal is
for Article III judges to share their cultural capital by reshaping law, policies,
and practices to convey an understanding that all federal judges share a posture
of independence. The techniques are three-fold: shifting doctrine, statutes, and
practices.
First, turn to doctrine. Constitutional scholars know well the many choices
within the exegesis of Article III and its commitment of federal judicial power.3 17
When interpreting the requirements of Article III, life-tenured judges should
condition the transfer of adjudicatory authority on a concomitant transfer of
structural independence. For example, the Constitution ought to be read to
require that those holding federal adjudicatory power be charted for sufficiently
long terms, be insulated from certain forms of dismissal, 318 and be protected
against certain kinds of pressures such as directives to resolve cases in a
particular fashion.3 19 Such an interpretation could also refer to international
norms of judicial independence, in which factors such as lack of procedural
protections from recall and "time limited appointments of judges have given
cause for concern. ' '320 Moreover, doctrine should limit judges to certain forms
with author) (proposing that independence of administrative tribunals is essential and in some instances
when review is limited ought to be more respected than in courts).
317. See generally Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a "Unified Judiciary," 78 TEx.
L. REV. 1513 (2000).
318. See McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174, 196-99 (Field, J., dissenting) (making this
argument).
319. What form of supervision is permissible is a subject in need of exploration. For example,
descriptions of the concept of judicial independence in Germany indicate that in the "core area of
judicial activity" (determining the contents of judgments and preparing for oral hearings), "supervisory
measures are simply inadmissible." THE GERMAN JUDICIARY ACT: DocuMENTs ON POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN
THE FEDERAL REPUBLC OF GERMANY 6-7 (Oguz Akalin ed., 1993). In contrast, forms of "peer review"
may be provided for administrative law judges in the United States, in which supervising judges review
proposed judgments. See Sippel, supra note 260. Moreover, in some circuits, decisions are circulated
pre-publication as a means of checking for conflicts, and if prior case law is discovered on point, notice
is provided to judges who are given an opportunity to change their ruling.
320. See, e.g., Starrs v. Ruxton, 2000 J.C. 208, 226 (H.C.J. 1999) (interpreting the European
Convention on Human Rights provision in Article 6, para. 1, on the right to a public hearing before an
"independent and impartial tribunal" and relying on other precedents to hold illegal the use of
temporary sheriffs for sheriff courts in Scotland, in which they served for one-year terms without
formal safeguards against recall by the executive, without limits on the assignment of cases during their
terms, with no procedural protections if removed, and with reappointment resting on the Lord
Advocate, who was a member of the Scottish Executive and chief prosecutor). In a subsequent decision,
the use of temporary judges was upheld, on the grounds that, while appointed by the Scottish
Executive, the judges were under the control of judges. See Clancy v. Caird, 2000 Sess. Cas. 441 (Sess.
2000).
Many countries have a jurisprudence on what forms of institutional protections must accompany the
role of the judge; special note is often made of a series of Canadian cases. See, e.g., Reference re:
Public Sector Pay Reduction Act (P.E.I.), 150 D.L.R. 4th 577, 692-93 (Can. 1997) (holding that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that provincial court judges' salaries be protected
from manipulation by the political branches and therefore that provinces were required to constitute
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of discourse, marking and making boundaries. 32' Further, Article III judges
should reconsider the license their doctrine has given to Congress. The "public
rights" approach has increasingly become a means by which Article III powers
shrink, and it is time to revisit the breadth of congressional power to fashion
rights and remedies outside judicial processes. Article III judges could also turn
to an amalgam of constitutional and common law rights to guarantee public
access to some adjudicatory proceedings.322 All kinds of federal judges ought to
have mandates to decide impartially and openly, with the public having a
presumptive place in the process, be it located in courts or agencies.323
Second, consider statutes. I have raised the problem of selection and reappoint-
ment of statutory judges. As to selection, were the federal system to include
more members of the public in the selection process and revisit the question of
openness of its procedures, it might develop a model that focuses on quality but
does not exclude the public from participating in determining who should be its
judges. At a minimum, Congress ought to require the Judicial Conference to
rely on merit selection panels, in which nonjudges play a significant role, and to
include public avenues for comment on nominees.
Turning to the problem of judicial retention, while it is new to the federal
judiciary, it is not unique to the federal system. A range of models are avail-
able.3 24 One option, common to some constitutional courts in Europe, is to have
fixed, nonrenewable terms.325 New Jersey's constitution provides another-a
independent, effective commissions to review the adequacy of and proposed changes in judicial salaries
and to provide non-binding recommendations to the executive and legislative bodies, whose decisions
could be reviewed for rationality by the courts). See generally Martin L. Friedland, Judicial Indepen-
dence and Accountability: A Canadian Perspective, 7 CRIM. L.F. 605 (1996).
321. Cf Idaho Historic Pres. Council v. City Council, 8 P.3d 646 (Idaho 2000) (holding that when a
city council functions in a quasi-judicial capacity and receives ex parte communications, its failure to
disclose such contacts in the public hearing to enable rebuttal violated due process).
322. See Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 405 (1987).
323. See generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 17 (2000).
324. For example, the District of Columbia has a Commission on Judicial Disabilities and Tenure
and another for Judicial Nominations (and reappointments), comprised of individuals appointed from
an array of institutions, including the federal and local executive, the judiciary, and the bar. See D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-1521 to -1522 (2001). Press descriptions of the reappointment process state that
efforts to block reappointments are rare and in the instance described, unsuccessful. See Nancy Lewis,
35 Prosecutors Try to Block D.C. Judge's Reappointment, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 1996, at B 1; Bill Miller,
Judge Criticized by Prosecutors Wins New Term, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 1996, at C4.
325. See, e.g., Article 4 of the Law of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (as amended
1998) (providing for judges of that constitutional court to have twelve-year terms, for which
neither "immediate" nor "subsequent re-election" is permitted); see also EDWARD MCWHINNEY,
SUPREME COURTS AND JUDICIAL LAW-MAKING: CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNALS AND CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
viEw 57 (1986) (summarizing a variety of provisions for judicial term and concluding that
most-the United States excepted-provide for nonrenewable terms of seven to twelve years,
which may constitute "desirable time limits for exercise" given the discretion and range accorded
to judges).
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seven-year term followed by reappointment for "good behavior., 326 As to the
length of service, a long, nonrenewable term could shift a pool of applicants
toward those seeing a statutory judgeship as the cap to a career as a lawyer, not
the bridge to a sequence of judgeships,327 and thereby reduce those interested or
able to climb a career ladder within the judiciary.
Third, turn to practices. Were life-tenured judges to embrace the idea that
they share the lot of all federal judges-statutory judges inside of Article III
as well as the administrative judiciary outside-Article III judges might use
their lobbying resources to press Congress for support of the federal judi-
ciary in its entirety. Interjurisdictional associations of judges could develop
to identify shared needs, rather than each group of judges primarily focused
on its own professional organization, salaries, and facilities. Some efforts at
homogenization are underway, as, for example, consideration is given to
whether one set of ethics can properly embrace all kinds of judges.328
Further, within agencies, attention is being paid to the ever-present problem
of charging officials with undertaking a mixture of functions. 329 Thus, for
administrative judges to gain more stature requires not only different treat-
ment by Congress and their life-tenured siblings but also that such judges
behave differently themselves. Courts within agencies provide little opportu-
nity for public oversight, which is part of the rationale for judicial indepen-
dence.
326. N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (providing this term for justices of the supreme court and judges of the
superior court; also providing for retirement upon the age of seventy).
327. Shorter terms, on the other hand, could signal that a judgeship be seen as a temporary position.
Historically, territorial judges and judges of the D.C. lowest courts held short terms, from four to six
years. See Katz, supra note 83, at 897 n.13, 899 n.24.
328. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (as
endorsed by the National Conference of Administrative Law Judges in 1995). Other codes address other
judges. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1998); MODEL CODE FOR FEDERAL ADMNISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES (1989); CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES (1992). The Code of Conduct for United
States Judges can be found as an addendum in 28 U.S.C.S. § 372 (Law. Co-op. 2001) and applies to
"United States Circuit Judges, District Judges, Bankruptcy Judges, and Magistrate Judges." Further,
certain provisions may be applied to special masters and commissioners, and the "Tax Court, Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces have adopted this Code."
Id. (Introduction). The Judicial Conference Committee on Codes of Conduct renders advisory opinions
as issues of interpretation and application arise. As noted, in August of 2001, the ABA passed a
resolution calling for administrative judges to be held to ethical standards adapted from the Model Code
of Judicial Conduct. See supra note 250.
329. How constrained ALJs should be has been a matter of dispute. Administrative law judges
currently may be so enmeshed in an array of activities that they may need to reallocate work so as to
distinguish themselves from other employees. Alternatively, the range of decisions they make may need
to be sorted to clarify when they act as judges. See generally Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls:
Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 759 (1981); see
also Young, supra note 250, at 15, 18 (detailing that the resolution defined the "administrative
judiciary" to exclude agency heads who had policy making duties).
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E. HIERARCHY OR HOMOGENIZATION
These proposals may not be greeted warmly in all quarters. The Article III
judiciary is deeply ambivalent about the expansion of the non-Article III federal
judiciary. This ambivalence is one reason why the case law on Article III is a
notorious mess. We have a desperate need for more judges. We greatly admire
the constitutional position of federal judges as independent, and we have yet to
devise means to achieve that end at the rate needed for judges.
The current status quo has supporters who see the evolution that I have
detailed as responsive to all of these concerns. They fear that, were Article III
judges too plentiful, their status would decline and moreover, if too many held
that office, they could not perform in a fashion that enhances their value.
Moreover, they believe that not all decisions of the administrative state are of
grave import to the administrative state, however much they affect the indi-
vidual claimants. Given that the shape of statutory remedies the government
ought to provide is deeply contested, a presumption against constitutionalizing
too many judicial roles flows. And, given that increasing diversification and
specialization has occurred in many professions, a varied typography of courts
is similarly appropriate.33 °
Thus, anxiety attends each extension of the term "court" and the title "judge."
The permissive approach toward delegation of judging I have detailed has not
been undertaken without qualms. Judges, both state and federal, have fought to
prevent others whom I have called judges from bearing their name. In the
1970s, the Judicial Conference of the United States disagreed with provision of
the title "judge" for administrative hearing officers, 331 and opposed using the
term "judge" in lieu of "referee" in bankruptcy proceedings.332 In the 1990s,
when the word "judge" was proposed to be added to magistrates' titles, Article
III judges objected again.3 33 Such a posture is not unique to the federal
judiciary. State judges have also argued against state hearing examiners being
330. One could conceive of the federal courts as using doctrine to enable them to become
constitutional courts, akin to those of some other Western democracies. See generally GERMANY, LAW
ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITIONAL COURT (2d. ed 1996).
331. REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 49-50 (Sept.
1977) (describing the historical opposition of the Judicial Conference to proposals providing "legisla-
tive sanction to the title 'Administrative Law Judge"' and reiterating those views in opposing pending
legislation); see also Walter Gellhorn, The Administrative Procedure Act: The Beginnings, 72 VA. L.
REV. 219, 232 (1986) (describing that "'Hearing officers' [were] puffed up into 'Hearing Commission-
ers' and ... later ... into Administrative Law Judges who sometimes flaunt their robes a bit too
obtrusively for my taste").
332. See Posner, supra note 119, at 71-80 (arguing that Article III district judges did so to maintain
their own prestige and that they campaigned for "trivial" markers of status, relating to modes of
appointing law clerks and pensions, as well as insisting on a cumbersome appellate process to make
plain that bankruptcy judges were understood as inferior in status to district court judges).
333. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 631 (1994)); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES, supra note 68, at
55-56.
[Vol. 90:607
HeinOnline -- 90 Geo. L.J. 682 2001-2002
INVENTING THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS
renamed "judges. 33"
The desire to keep a distinctive trademark is, I think, evidence of the fear that
the position of the judge is not immune from erosion and that, in fact, confusion
in the minds of the consumer is likely to follow. (Data on popular perceptions
support that view; attitudes toward state and federal lower courts are very
similar.)335 Yet these concerns have not succeeded in stopping judges and
courts, in name and in fact, from multiplying.336
I too worry about the idea of the judicial and about the protection of the
independence, power, and social and political import of the judge. But given
that the appellation "judge" is applied to a growing number of individuals in a
range of statuses around the country, my suggestion is to try to link those
individuals by practices that bring respect to that title. Thus, while I lack no
appreciation for the impulse toward hierarchy (to delegate some of what seem
like lesser tasks to individuals understood as lesser in terms of power, position,
and capacity in an effort to conserve the concept of the judge), I think that the
better preservationist approach is to try to elevate the statuses of the lower tiers.
Moreover, as I read the twentieth century's developments of judges, such has
been the trend. The narrative I have provided above is a story of increasing
status and professionalization of lower-level judges, and the anniversary of the
200th year of the D.C. courts will, I hope, serve as an opportunity to reinforce
that effort.
Thus, instead of hierarchy, I counsel self-conscious efforts at homogenization
to recognize that the fate of all judges is already woven together and that, when
incursions on the independence of one set occur, others become more vulner-
334. See Ann Marshall Young, supra note 261, at 16. As she put it, "Every administrative law
judge (and they are legion) who has ever heard the words 'real judge' uttered to differentiate his or
her chaff from others' wheat recognizes this reticence to accord unequivocal respect to our
profession." Id. at 17.
335. See generally American Bar Association Report on Perceptions of U.S. Justice System, 62 ALB.
L. REV. 1307 (1999) (detailing similar levels of knowledge of lower court justice systems and
comparable levels of confidence in the lower courts of either); David B. Rottman, Voters in Judicial
Elections: Motivation, Capability, and Trust 4 (2000) (paper prepared for the Summit on Improving
Judicial Selection, on file with author) ("Most Americans are unable to answer questions that speak to
fundamental aspects of the judiciary, such as the difference between federal and state courts, the
existence of an independent judicial branch of government, and even the manner in which judges are
selected in their state.").
336. As the Fourth Circuit recently noted, "[a]dministrative judges are what their name says they
are-judges." S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
122 S. Ct. 392 (2001). Another illustration comes from changes dating from the 1920s to the 1960s in
the naming of what is now known as the Tax Court. See Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch.
234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336-38 (creating the "Tax Board"); Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56
Stat. 798, 957 (renaming the body the "Board of Tax Appeals"); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-172, §§ 951-962, 83 Stat. 487, 730-36 (renaming the body the "Tax Court" and confirming its status
as an Article I court). Recall also that the Tax Court appoints assistants who used to be called
"commissioners" but who, in 1984, were renamed "special trial judges." See Tax Reform Act of 1984,
§ 464(a), 98 Stat. 494, 824; discussion supra notes 25, 87. A similar history can be provided by tracing
the Board of General Appraisers, created in 1890, through its reincarnation at the Customs Court in
1926 and its reorganization, in 1980, as the U.S. Court of International Trade.
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able. I do not believe that such a proposal is unduly ambitious. As one gazes
back one hundred years, it is stunning to see how ideas unimaginable in 1901
draw no attention in 2001 because they have become so much a part of ordinary
life. The thousands of federal judges upon whom the nation depends did not
exist in 1901; that they might in 2101 be seen as important and peculiar
government actors, specially licensed and specially protected, should not be
considered unduly daring.
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